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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by virtue of § 78-2a-3(2)(j), U.C.A. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW and 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Issue: Whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard in determining 
the reasonableness of the billing rate of Mr. Jensen when the trial court (1) disallowed the 
affidavits submitted by three large law firms on the grounds that the overhead expenses of 
such large law firms may be greater than those of Mr. Jensen, who is a solo practitioner; 
(2) failed to understand the billing rates for non-court time and court time as used by the 
attorney who submitted an affidavit and on which the trial court relied for its ruling; and 
(3) failed to allow any increase in Mr. Jensen's billing rate during the nearly five years 
over which the subject litigation spanned. This issue arises from the final order and 
judgment entered by the trial court and is therefore appealable as provided by Rule 4, 
Utah R. App. P. It was preserved by timely filing a notice of appeal 
Standard of Review: The question of whether the correct legal standard was 
applied is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. See generally State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
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2. Issue: Whether the trial court's determination of the amount of billable time 
allowed to Appellant's attorney was appropriate and reasonable. This issue arises from 
the final order and judgment entered by the trial court and is therefore appealable as 
provided by Rule 4, Utah R. App. P. It was preserved by timely filing a notice of appeal. 
Standard of Review: The standard of review of the amount of a trial court's 
award of attorney fees is generally patent error or clear abuse of discretion. See e.g, Keith 
Jorgensen's, Inc. v. Ogden City Mall Co., 2001 UTApp 128, Pll, 419 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 
(citation omitted). See also, Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 268 
(Utah 1992). However, the amount and reasonableness of a trial court's award of 
attorney fees is ordinarily a question of law with some measure of discretion given to the 
trial court in applying the reasonableness standard to a given set of facts, i.e., it is a mixed 
question of law and fact. See Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 1996); 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994); Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 
830 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1992); Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 
(Utah 1988). See Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, %l, 977 P.2d 1201; Taylor 
ex rel C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, %6, 977 P.2d 479. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
The initial trial court proceedings began as a breach of contract case that flowed from 
prior litigation between the parties.1 After more than three years of hostile and bitter 
litigation, the parties entered into a Global Settlement Agreement ("Agreement").2 
However, Mr. Blevins concocted a plan to thwart the Agreement by attempting to divert 
to his friend the very funds that he was required, by the terms of the Agreement, to turn 
over to Custom Steel, et al He did this by instigating a garnishment action to garnish the 
funds that he was holding for Custom Steel, et al. 
Mr. Blevins' garnishment action was defeated, but Custom Steel, et al incurred 
substantial legal fees. Custom Steel, et al then commenced an action against Mr. Blevins3 
for breach of the Agreement and to recover the legal fees incurred in defending against 
1
 The parties are many. They include a corporation, Custom Steel Fabrication, 
and six individuals, all of whom were related to each other. The Appellants in this appeal 
represent only four of the individuals. Custom Steel and two individuals, Heidi Bishop 
and Mark Garamendi, were dismissed from the case. (R. 173-74). For convenience, the 
three dismissed parties are referred to herein as "Custom Steel, et al" Following their 
dismissal, the trial court awarded to them $ 1,330 in attorney fees, the exact amount 
requested by their counsel. (R. 192-95, 204, 208). 
2
 In 1995, Mr. Blevins loaned money to Custom Steel Fabrication at a 48% 
interest rate. Following default by Custom Steel and judgment against it, Mr. Blevins 
seized equipment from Custom Steel. During the seizure, he allegedly assaulted 
Heidi Bishop and wrongfully seized personal property belonging to her and 
Mr. Garamendi. Further litigation ensued. The Agreement was to resolve all claims 
between the parties. 
3
 Although Mr. Blevins was the principal actor, his wife was included in the action 
because she was also a party to the Agreement. 
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the contrived garnishment action. In that action, Appellees failed to timely file a 
counterclaim. Undaunted, Appellees commenced a separate breach of contract action 
against Custom Steel, et al and in doing so added the four Appellants herein. Based on 
the doctrine of res judicata, the trial court dismissed Custom Steel, et al from the case. 
(R. 173-75). The remaining defendants, comprising the four Appellants herein, were then 
left to defend against four separate causes of action. 
Through summary judgment Appellants prevailed on all four causes of action. 
Appellants also defeated a motion for summary judgment brought by Appellees. Id. 
Since the Agreement provides attorney fees to the prevailing party (R. 288, 485 ^4), 
and since Appellants prevailed, the trial court awarded attorney fees to Appellants. 
Judgment I at 4; (R. 484-86); Addendum 1 at 2 f4. Appellants then submitted affidavits 
of fees, (R. 441-44, 465-67), including detailed billing records, (R. 445-53). 
Affidavits from Appellants' counsel supported a request for $11,538. Without 
entering any findings to support a reduction in fees, the trial court entered an award of 
attorney fees in the amount of $6,050. Judgment I; (R. 484-86); Addendum 1 at 3. More 
puzzling, the trial court's final order and judgment included the following paragraph: 
The Court, having previously granted summary judgment in favor 
of Defendants on the First Cause of Action and now by granting 
summary judgment on all remaining causes of action, and after 
reviewing the affidavit of attorney fees submitted by Defendants and 
finding such fees to be reasonable, orders and . . . 
Judgment I at 3; (R. 486); Addendum 1 at 3 {emphasis added) 
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Judgment I was entered on February 1, 2002. (R. 484-86); Addendum 1. Based on 
the trial court's substantial reduction in the amount of attorney fees and based on the trial 
court's failure to provide any findings to support such reduction, Appellants then filed on 
February 27, 2002 their First Notice of Appeal (R. 491-92). 
Despite extensive steps to collect Judgment I,4 and after Appellants made repeated 
requests over four months, the trial court denied without comment Appellants' request for 
$2,107 in attorney fees ("Judgment II") (R. 628-29). Appellants then filed their Second 
Notice of Appeal (R. 630-31). Subsequently, both appeals were consolidated by this 
Court. (R. 639). 
On August 5, 2004, this Court issued its Amended Memorandum Decision 
("Blevins i")5 (R. 671-73);6 Addendum 2. In Blevins I, this Court reversed the trial court, 
awarded attorney fees on appeal and remanded to the trial court for a determination of 
attorney fees consistent with this Court's decision. 
4
 Appellees' attempts to defeat the collection of Judgment I, included a Motion to 
Quash Supplemental Order (4/1/2003), (R. 506-511), and a Notice of Supersedeas Bond 
(4/11/2002). (R. 526-27). At the supp order hearing, the trial court ordered a $200 bail on 
a bench warrant for Mr. Blevins because of Mr. Blevins' failure to appear as ordered. 
(R. 575-76). Appellants filed the following: Memorandum in Opposition to Appellees' 
Motion to Quash Supplemental Order (3/29/2002) (R. 500-04), and a Motion for 
Protective Order (4/8/2002) (R. 517-18). 
5
 This Court first issued its Memorandum Decision without an award of attorney 
fees on appeal. Appellants were compelled to file a Petition for Rehearing. This Court 
then issued its Amended Memorandum Decision that included an award of attorney fees 
on appeal. 
6
 This Court sent Blevins I to the trial court on October 7, 2004 along with this 
Court's Remititur. 
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On Remand 
On remand, the trial court took more than 9 months to render a decision on the 
amount of attorney fees to award.7 No evidentiary hearings were held in the trial court, 
but Appellants submitted additional affidavits of attorney fees. At the request of the trial 
court, (R. 793), the parties submitted affidavits from local attorneys to establish a 
reasonable billing rate for Mr. Jensen, counsel for Appellants. In addition to affidavits, 
the parties submitted memoranda in support or in opposition to the fees sought. As of 
February 28, 2005, the amount sought by Appellants was $28,540 (R. 790); Addendum 5. 
Billing rates for Mr. Jensen ranged from a beginning rate of $175 per hour in 2000 to 
$200 per hour in the period 2002 through 2004.8 
The trial court awarded $575.97 in costs on appeal for Blevins /and $11,665 in 
attorney fees and costs for (1) the trial phase; (2) the post-judgment collection phase; 
(3) the appeal; and (4) the fees incurred on remand to defend all of the fees sought. 
(R. 847); Addendum 1 at 7. That is, out of the $28,540 sought by Appellants as of 
February 28, 2005, the trial court awarded only $12,240, or less than 43%. And, such 
award does not include the additional work expended subsequent to February 28, 2005, 
and which work was ordered or necessitated by the trial court. 
7
 The Remittitur was filed in the trial court on October 7, 2004, and the trial 
court's order and judgment was entered on July 22, 2005. 
8
 Mr. Jensen's billing rate increased to $210 per hour in the Spring of 2005. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court was instructed by this Court to make on remand findings of fact to 
support an award of attorney fees for the trial phase, the post-trial phase, the appellate 
phase, and the fees incurred on remand. (R. 671-73); Addendum 2. But the trial court 
failed to make any findings of fact and expressly stated that there are "no facts" in this 
case. (R. 695). The trial court then instructed the parties to submit affidavits from local 
attorneys to establish the customary billing rates for attorneys with 4-9 years of practice. 
(R. 793); Addendum 6. Appellees submitted two affidavits from solo practitioners. 
(R. 822-27); Addendum 8. Appellants submitted three affidavits from large law firms. 
(R. 798-812); Addendum 7. However, the trial court rejected the affidavits from large 
law firms on the basis that such law firms have greater overhead expenses than a solo 
practitioner. (R. 841-47); Addendum 3. 
The trial court erred as a matter of law by applying a new factor in the determination 
of billing rates when it excluded the affidavits from three large law firms based simply on 
their overhead expenses. The trial court also erred when it failed to comprehend the 
distinction between "court work" and "non-court work" as those terms were used by one 
of the solo practitioner affiants and upon which the trial court relied in setting a billing 
rate for Mr. Jensen. The trial court also erred when it failed to allow any increase in 
billing rates from 2000 to 2005, although the trial court in its instructions to the parties 
requested affidavits to cover billing rates for attorneys with 4-9 years of practice, clearly 
contemplating differing rates with more years of practice. 
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After applying the minimum billing rate of $125 per hour from two solo practitioners, 
the trial court then stepped through the various groups of pleadings to opine the number 
of hours that the trial court believed to be reasonable for each group. In doing so, the trial 
court merely stated the number of pages in such pleadings and sometimes the number of 
legal citations. The trial court appeared to give little or no weight to the amount of time 
required to assemble facts contained in those pleadings or to prepare supporting 
affidavits. 
Although the trial court itemized groups of legal work, it failed to identify any 
pleadings that were unnecessary to the litigation. The trial court also failed to accept 
affidavits from large law firms, and in particular the affidavit of Mr. Orton of 
Kirton & McConkie, based solely on the overhead expenses inherent in large law firms. 
(R. 841-47); Addendum 3. But Mr. Orton's affidavit in particular provides a professional 
opinion on the reasonableness of the billing rates of Mr. Jensen and the reasonableness of 
the time spent by Mr. Jensen on the pleadings, including the appellate brief in Blevins I. 
(R. 798-812); Addendum 7. 
The trial court relied exclusively on the Record for its determination of fees. 
Therefore, this Court is not disadvantaged in any way to review the Record below in 
determining the reasonableness of the attorney fees sought by Appellants. And, 
Appellants urge this Court not to grant any deference to the trial court's ruling on the 
amount of attorney time that was reasonable. This Court has the entire record on which 
the trial court relied to opine on the reasonableness of the amount of time billed. 
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Based on the professional opinion of Mr. Orton, the trial court should have found that 
the amount of time and amount of fees billed by Mr. Jensen were reasonable. There was 
no controverting evidence in the record. In effect, the trial court erred as a matter of law 
and abused its discretion by awarding an unreasonable amount of time to award for all of 
the legal work performed by Mr. Jensen and for not weighing the evidence presented. 
ARGUMENT 
As a beginning matter, Appellants first express their concern with the overall 
approach and tone of the trial court's determination of attorney fees. Appellants believe 
that an objective observer would conclude that the trial court may have retaliated against 
Appellants, and perhaps Mr. Jensen. Instead of examining for reasonableness the 
attorney fees sought by Appellants, the trial court appears to have taken upon itself to 
minimize such fees by both minimizing the hourly billing rate allowed for Mr. Jensen, 
and then minimizing the amount of time, in the opinion of the trial court, that each block 
of work should have taken. But even the minimal approach taken by the trial court 
appears to be unrealistic and unreasonable. 
The word "reasonable" means to be "not excessive" or "not unjust" or "moderate" or 
"sensible."9 It also means "fair, proper, or moderate under the circumstances."10 The 
9
 See WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1502 (2d ed. 1980) 
10
 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1272 (7th ed. 1999) 
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word does not mean "minimal" or "the least possible." But it appears that on remand the 
trial court attempted to minimize the award of attorney fees. Utah's appellate courts have 
never required nor suggested that attorney fees should be the least possible. Instead, they 
should be "reasonable" (meaning not excessive) when compared with what other 
attorneys in the same community charge for similar services. 
The approach taken by the trial court in this case, if allowed to stand, will 
undoubtedly have a chilling effect on attorneys and on parties whose contracts contain 
fee-shifting provisions. The intent of fee-shifting provisions is to make the prevailing 
party whole. Such intent, however, is thwarted when a trial court takes a minimalist's 
approach rather than a reasonable approach. The prevailing party is not made whole 
despite the intent of the parties. 
The trial court has now twice undermined the contractual intent of the parties by first 
in Blevins /, without comment, halving the attorney fees and now again in Blevins II 
awarding less than 43% of the fees sought. 
It is in this light that Appellants seek this Court's review of the trial court's ruling, 
order and judgment. There are also ancillary issues for this Court to review that have 
adversely affected the amount of attorney fees awarded by the trial court. For example, 
the trial court would not honor Rule 34(d), Utah R. App. P., and it failed entirely to 
comply with the requirements of Rule 58B, Utah R. of Civil P. 
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ISSUE NO. 1: 
Whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard in 
determining the reasonableness of the billing rate of Mr. Jensen when 
the trial court (1) disallowed the affidavits submitted by three large law 
firms on the grounds that the overhead expenses of such large law firms 
may be greater than those of Mr. Jensen, who is a solo practitioner; 
(2) failed to understand the billing rates for non-court time and court 
time as used by the attorney who submitted an affidavit and on which 
the trial court relied for its ruling; and (3) failed to allow any increase 
in Mr. Jensen's billing rate during the nearly five years over which the 
subject litigation spanned. 
I. The trial court erred when it (a) disallowed the affidavits submitted by three 
large law firms: (b) incorrectly applied the wrong hourly rate for non-court 
time: and (c) failed to allow any increase in rates over the span of five years. 
On two prior occasions in these proceedings the trial court found no problem with the 
billing rate of Mr. Jensen.11 Despite the trial court's earlier approval of Mr. Jensen's billing 
rate of $175 per hour, on remand the trial court directed the parties to submit "affidavits 
from other attorneys to establish the billing rates for attorneys with four years of practice12 to 
11
 On May 18, 2001, the trial court in its Minute Entry approved Mr. Jensen's 
Second Amended Affidavit of Attorney Fees, (R. 208), which fees were billed at the rate 
of $175 per hour (R. 193). And on February 1, 2002, the trial court's final order and 
judgment in Blevins I expressly stated that Mr, Jensen's fees were reasonable. (R. 486). 
12
 It is curious why the trial court started the range with "four years" since 
Mr. Jensen had been practicing for five years when he filed his first pleading in this case. 
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nine years of practice in the areas of breach of contract and collection matters." (R. 793); 
Addendum 6. 
In response to the trial court's request, Appellants submitted three affidavits from 
partners or shareholders of large law firms operating in the Salt Lake City area. 
(R. 798-812); Addendum 7. The three affidavits are from Kent B. Alderman, Parsons Behle 
&Latimer; John G. Weston, Snell & Wilmer; and R. Willis Orton, Kirton & McConkie. Id. 
Mr. Alderman's affidavit states in part the following: 
"Our firm customarily charges the following billing rates based on an 
attorney's years of experience: 
4 years at $170;13 5 years at $180; 6 years at $185; 7 years at $190; 
8 years at $200; and 9 years at $210." 
Alderman Aff. at 2; (R. 800-01); Addendum 7 at 3-4. 
Mr. Weston's affidavit states in part the following: 
"The Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P. Salt Lake City office customarily charges 
hourly billing rates between $190 and $240 for attorneys with four to 
eight years of experience practicing law." 
Weston Aff.atl; (R. 802-03); Addendum 7 at 5-6. 
13
 The trial court's Order and Judgment incorrectly states that Mr. Alderman's 
affidavit shows $120 per hour for a four-year associate. Perhaps it was a typographical 
mistake or a reflection of the trial court's approach to find a minimum billing rate. 
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Mr. Orton's affidavit states in part the following: 
"From the documents I was provided, I took note of the various 
hourly rates charged by Mr. Jensen during the course of the litigation as 
reflected on Exhibits A and B [of this affidavit], and noted that they 
ranged from between $175 to $200 per hour and have continued through 
today at the current rate of $200. I particularly noted that lawyers 
associated with mv law firm and similar lengths of experience 
(vis.. 1995 or 1996 law school graduates) charged similar rates for the 
same relevant period of time. 
"In determining the reasonableness of the $175 to $200 hourly 
rates charged by Mr. Jensen, I note that Mr. Jensen graduated with a 
Bachelor's degree from the University of Utah, and with an MBA 
degree from Harvard University. Following a successful business 
career, Mr. Jensen graduated cum laude from Boston College Law 
School in 1995, and he began practice in Utah in 1995." 
Orton Aff at 5; (R. 808); Addendum 7 at 11 {emphasis added). 
Appellees submitted two affidavits from solo practitioners. The affidavit of 
Russell D. Hartill states in part the following: 
"I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Utah since 
May 17, 2000. I graduated with a JD degree in May of 1996 from the 
University of Idaho. I am currently engaged in private practice dealing 
with breach of contract and collection matters, among other issues. 
"My billing rate for such matters is $125 per hour for non-court 
appearances and $ 175 per hour for courtroom work. My rates have not 
changed since May 17, 2000. Included with this affidavit is a copy of 
my legal representation agreement which states mv rates. My practice is 
that of a sole practitioner, with no affiliations with any other attorneys 
and I am located at 140 W 9000 S, Sandy, Utah." 
Hartill Aff. at 1-2; (R. 822-23); Addendum 8 at 1-2 {emphasis added). 
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With respect to his billing rates, Mr. Hartill's "Legal Representation Agreement," 
attached to his affidavit, contains the following: 
'The rate of $125 per hour for matters not related to court preparation 
and the rate of $ 175 per hour for court preparation and appearances." 
HartillAff. at 3; (R. 824); Addendum 8 at 3 {emphasis added). 
The affidavit of Philip A. Reichenbach states in part the following: 
"I have practiced for over six years, having been admitted to the Utah 
Bar on October 20, 1998. My practice has included several collection 
matters and several cases alleging breach of contract.... I have billed 
clients between $120 and $165 per hour for my time. The 
overwhelming majority of my time is billed at $125 per hour." 
Reichenbach Aff. at 1-2; (R. 826-27); Addendum 8 at 5-6. 
A. The trial court erred when it disallowed the affidavits from the three large 
firms on the grounds that the overhead expenses of large firms are greater 
than those of a solo practitioner. 
The trial court acknowledged receipt of the affidavits from the large law firms, but it 
disallowed them, stating: 
"There is no question that the billing rates contained in the affidavits 
submitted by Mr. Jensen must be viewed in light of the organization of 
the offices which submitted them. Large law firms, and especially 
national law firms, have large overhead/expenses. Mr. Jensen would not 
have such expenses. As noted in his filings, he worked out of his 
home."14 
Order and Judgment at 2 (R. 842); Addendum 3 at 2. 
14
 The trial court had no basis to conclude that Mr. Jensen only worked out of his 
home. Throughout all of these proceedings, Mr. Jensen maintained a separate and formal 
law office in the Kearns Building. The Record is void of any support to the notion 
conveyed by the trial court in its ruling. 
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The trial court then proceeded to apply the billing rates from the two solo 
practitioners submitted by Appellees. Although the trial court did not identify which of 
the two affidavits submitted by Appellees that it used, or both, it seems quite clear that it 
primarily relied on the Hartill affidavit. This conclusion is reached because Mr. Hartill's 
affidavit is the only affidavit submitted to the trial court that delineates hourly rates 
between "court work" and "non-court work," and the trial court also delineated the hourly 
rates into those same categories: "none-court time" and "court time." (R. 842); 
Addendum 3 at 2. 
The trial court stated the following: 
"The Court determines that the rates charged by the solo practitioners 
are consistent with the rates customarily charged for similar services and 
by attorneys in similar situations, and therefore awards Mr. Jensen $125 
an hour for non-court time and $175 an hour for court time." 
(R. 842); Addendum 3 at 2 (emphasis added). 
First, the trial court appears to be referencing the two solo practitioners whose 
affidavits were submitted by Appellees when it states "the rates charged by the solo 
practitioners." Id. (emphasis added). But then the trial court seems to be comparing the 
rates charged by those two solo practitioners with the "rates customarily charged for 
similar services." That is, the trial court leaps without any other evidence to the 
conclusion that the rates of the two solo practitioners are consistent with the rates other 
attorneys charge without defining who those other attorneys are. In effect, the trial court 
relied exclusively on the two affidavits submitted by Appellees to determine what is 
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customary and what rates should apply to Mr. Jensen. In contrast, the affidavits 
submitted by the three large law firms would have by their very nature represented scores 
of attorneys, not just two attorneys. 
Second, the trial court appears to have confused the term "similar services" with 
"similar situations." This came about in a bizarre and disconnected way. 
The trial court first cited Dixie State Bank v. Bracken (764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988) 
(R. 841); Addendum 3 at 1. The trial court then set forth the first factor it considered: 
"1 . Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily 
charged in the locality for similar services?'' 
Id. {emphasis added). 
While the factor is stated correctly, the trial court added a new factor not previously 
set forth in Dixie nor in any other Utah case. The factor "similar services" is intended to 
be used in comparing billing rates between attorneys who are or have provided similar 
legal services for their clients. There has never been any attempt to compare the overhead 
expenses of attorneys or their "situations." Such an approach would take the legal 
profession down a slippery slope. It would also imply that the greater the overhead of an 
attorney, the greater the billing rate that could be justified. But that would be adverse to 
the public interest and contrary to the purpose behind the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct. See e.g., Rule 1.5, Utah R. Prof. Conduct. 
The trial court should have accepted the affidavits from the three large law firms. 
There was no legally cognizable basis for ignoring them. Such affidavits also provide to 
-16-
the trial court a range of hourly rates across years of practice, which is precisely what the 
trial court directed the parties to submit. The trial court erred by not including those 
affidavits. Had the trial court accepted and relied on the affidavits from large firms, the 
trial court could not reasonably have concluded that $175 per hour was an unreasonable 
billing date for Mr. Jensen, which is the net result of the trial court's award of only $125 
per hour. The trial court reached such a conclusion based only on two affidavits from two 
solo practitioners. 
B. The trial court erred when it failed to understand the billing rates for non-
court time and court time as those terms were used by one attorney upon 
whose affidavit the trial court relied for its ruling. 
The trial court also failed to understand the difference between "court time" and 
"non-court time" as used by Mr. Hartill in his affidavit. Although the language in 
Mr, HartiU's affidavit could have been more clear, he expressly referenced and attached 
his "Legal Representation Agreement." His fee agreement clarifies his billing rates: 
"The rate of $125 per hour for matters not related to court preparation 
and the rate of $175 per hour for court preparation and appearances." 
(R. 824); Addendum 8 at 3 {emphasis added). 
The trial court, however, allowed $175 per hour only for actual "court-room work." 
(R. 846) Addendum 3 at 6. Had the trial court examined Mr. HartiU's "Legal 
Representation Agreement," it would have seen that Mr. Hartill charges $175 per hour for 
"court preparation and appearances." That is, Mr. Hartill would have charged $175 per 
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hour for all of the work in this particular case. For whatever reasons, the trial court failed 
to observe this critical information, or, as suggested in the preamble to Appellants' 
Argument, the trial court attempted at every possible turn to minimize the amount of 
attorney fees instead of examining them for reasonableness. 
Had the trial court properly understood the billing rate of Mr. Hartill, the trial court 
would have applied the $175 per hour billing rate for the work done in these proceedings, 
or at least during the first year of these proceedings with an allowance for increases in 
subsequent years. Instead, the trial court applied only $125 for all but 6.8 hours of 
work.15 (R. 847). This simple but substantial error resulted in a reduction of $4,190 in 
the amount of fees awarded.16 
C. The trial court also erred when it failed to allow any increase in 
Mr. Jensen's billing rate during the nearly five years over which the subject 
litigation spanned. 
The trial court failed to allow for any increases in hourly billing rates over the 4-5 
years since this case began. The trial court directed the parties to submit affidavits of 
other attorneys to establish the billing rates for attorneys with 4-9 years of practice; 
15
 The trial court's ruling stated that it could only document 6.8 hours of actual in-
court time. Therefore, it allowed $175 per hour for those 6.8 hours and applied $125 per 
hour for all other time. 
16
 The trial court applied $125 per hour for 83.8 hours instead of $175 per hour 
and greater for subsequent years of practice. The difference of $50 per hour times 83.8 
hours equals $4,190. Applying a greater rate for other years would result in an even 
greater difference. 
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"One factor to be considered is whether the billing rate is consistent with 
the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services. The 
Court directs the parties to submit, on or before April 15, 2005, 2005, 
affidavits from other attorneys that establish the billing rates for 
attorneys with four years of practice to nine years of practice in the areas 
of breach of contract and collection matters. 
Minute Entry (R. 793); Addendum 6 {emphasis added) 
The trial court clearly contemplated that hourly rates vary depending on the number 
of years of practice in the legal profession. Unlike the two affidavits submitted by 
Appellees, the three affidavits submitted by Appellants provided billing rates for the 
entire range of years requested by the trial court. But the trial court ignored those 
affidavits. Instead, the trial court relied exclusively on the two affidavits from solo 
practitioners who expressed no opinion on the range of 4-9 years of practice. 
Notwithstanding the trial court's request for a range of billing rates covering the 
range of years this case has spanned, the trial court failed to consider any increase in the 
billing rate for Mr. Jensen from 2000 to 2005, representing years 5 through 10. 
Mr. Jensen's billing rate began at $175 per hour in 2000 and increased to $200 per hour. 
His billing rate since the Spring of 2005 has been and currently is $210 per hour. 
However, the trial court allowed a beginning rate of $125 per hour and held that rate 
constant through all years of this case. But there are no facts or evidence to support the 
trial court's hourly rate beyond the years of experience expressed by the two solo 
practitioners. 
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Had the trial court accepted the three affidavits from partners of large law firms in 
Salt Lake City, Mr. Jensen's billing rates would appear more than reasonable. The hourly 
rates for associates in the law firm of Parsons Behle & Latimer range from $170 to $210 
for 4-9 years of legal practice. (R. 801); Addendum 7 at 4. The rates in the law firm of 
Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P. range from $190 and $240 for 4-8 years of legal practice. 
(R. 802); Addendum 7 at 5. The hourly rates in the law firm of Kirton & McConkie 
parallel those of Mr. Jensen. (R. 808); Addendum 7 at 1L By any objective standard, 
Mr. Jensen's billing rates are neither excessive nor extreme when compared with the rates 
of these three large law firms who represent scores of attorneys with similar experience as 
Mr. Jensen. And, Mr. Jensen's billing rate is consistent with Mr. Hartill's billing rate for 
"court preparation and appearances." (R. 824); Addendum 8 at 3. 
Further, there is no basis for applying the lowest billing rate in an award of fees. The 
question is whether or not the fees are reasonable. Some attorneys may charge less and 
some may charge more. Their individual billing rates may be a function of their 
expertise, their competence, and their success. If some attorneys charge $150 per hour 
and others $200 per hour for similar services, is $175 per hour unreasonable? Or, at what 
point are billing rates deemed unreasonable? How close to a range of fees charged by 
other attorneys must the billing rate be to be considered reasonable? Must it be the 
average? Must it be the minium of the range? Or, can it be at the upper end of the range 
of fees and still be reasonable? The trial court appears to have adopted a minimalist's 
approach by awarding the minimal billing rate of two solo practitioners. 
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The trial court clearly applied an incorrect legal standard by including "overhead 
expenses" as a factor in determining "similar services," which in turn caused it to 
disallow affidavits from large law firms on the grounds that such firms have greater 
overhead expenses than Mr. Jensen. The trial court also applied the incorrect billing rate 
from Mr. Hartill, on which the trial court relied, by not clearly understanding the fee 
agreement used by Mr. Hartill, since Mr. Hartill would have charged $175 per hour for all 
work in this particular case. Further, the trial court failed to allow any increase in billing 
rates over the nearly five-year period that these proceedings have spanned. 
ISSUE NO. 2: 
Whether the trial court's determination of the amount of billable time 
allowed to Appellant's attorney was appropriate and reasonable. 
After setting the hourly billing rate for Mr. Jensen, the trial court proceeded next to 
opine on the amount of time to allow for the various legal tasks set forth in a Summary & 
Outline of Fees Incurred During the Trial Phase. (R. 811); Addendum 4.17 
The instant case is similar to the analysis of attorney fees in Salmon v. Davis County, 
916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996). In Salmon, "the fee award decision was made by a district 
court judge who had before him only a written record and oral argument." Id. at 893. 
17
 It is noteworthy that the trial court rejected all three affidavits submitted by 
Appellants but relied on Exhibit A of the affidavit from Mr. Orton of Kirton & 
McConkie, Exhibit A, also included herein as Addendum 4, was prepared by Mr. Jensen 
but it is not included anywhere in the Record except as part of Mr. Orton's affidavit. 
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The Supreme Court concluded, therefore, that it had "before it everything relied upon by 
the court below. Accordingly, there is no justification for any deference to the trial court 
because it was not advantaged in any way in the fact-finding process." Id. 
Here, the litigation prior to Blevins I was resolved without a trial and without any 
evidentiary hearings. On remand, more than two and one-half years later, the trial court 
relied solely on the record, the Summary & Outline of Fees Incurred During the Trial 
Phase prepared by Appellants' attorney for the convenience of the trial court, the 
additional affidavits of attorney fees on appeal and on remand, and the affidavits from 
other attorneys on the issue of billing rates. There were no evidentiary hearings. And 
importantly, the trial court expressly found that there "are no facts to this case" and 
directed the parties to submit memoranda. See Minutes of Scheduling Conference, 
dated November 19, 2004. (R. 695). 
Based on the unique circumstances present in this appeal, "Blevins II" this Court has 
before it everything relied upon by the trial court. Accordingly, there is no justification 
for any deference to the trial court because it was not advantaged in any way in its 
determination of reasonable attorney fees. Appellants, therefore, urge this Court not to 
extend any deference to the trial court. 
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II. The trial court erred in its determination of the amount of time allowed for the 
legal work by failing to (a) make any detailed findings as required by this Court; 
(b) consider Mr. Orton's affidavit in support of the amount of time billed: and 
(c) examine the complete and pertinent part of the record. 
The trial court allowed only about 60% of the time billed during these proceedings. 
The trial court disallowed 32 hours of the 76.10 hours sought by Appellants for the trial 
phase.18 (R. 844). Thus, the trial court allowed 58% of the time billed by Mr. Jensen.19 
For appellate work, the trial court allowed 32 hours out of 51 hours billed, or 62%. 
(R. 845). On remand for post-appellate work, the trial allowed 14.5 hours out of 24.60 
hours billed, or 59%. (R. 846). Over all, the trial court allowed only 90.60 hours out of 
151.70 hours billed, or about 60%. 
In setting the amount allowed, the trial court, for the most part, simply opined on the 
amount of time that a particular block of work should have taken. With only one 
exception,20 the trial court did not find that any work was unnecessary. The one 
exception relates to the time Mr. Jensen spent with the attorneys from the three large law 
18
 The trial court states that the trial and post-trial time billed was 76.10 hours. 
(R. 844). That number is nowhere to be found in the Record. If one adds the 64.9 hours 
from the trial phase and the 11 hours sought for post-trial collections, a total amount of 
75.9 hours is obtained. Where the trial court found 76.10 hours is unknown. Since it is a 
minor discrepancy, it is being ignored for the purposes of this appeal. 
19
 This percentage is derived by dividing 44.10 hours (the amount not disallowed 
by the trial court) by 76.10 hours, which equals 58%. 
20
 The trial court did make minor mention about an unrelated task concerning a 
guardianship that was mistakenly billed in the amount of 0.3 hours. That amount was 
appropriately deducted. 
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firms, which the trial court disallowed because "these [communications] have no value to 
the case and therefore are not reasonable." (R. 846) Addendum 3 at 6. However, as 
argued above on Issue No. 1, Appellants believe that the trial court erred by not 
considering the affidavits from the three large law firms. If those affidavits had been 
accepted by the trial court as Appellants contend, the time Mr. Jensen spent with those 
three attorneys should have been deemed reasonable. 
A. The trial court made no findings of fact as instructed in Blevins 7. 
In Blevins 7, this Court expressly directed the trial court to enter "findings of fact" 
consistent with this Court's Memorandum Decision. (R. 673); Addendum 2 at 3. 
However, the trial court's Order and Judgment is void of any findings of fact. 
(R. 841-47); Addendum 3. Instead, the trial court repeatedly used the term "determines." 
In the process of doing so, the trial court merely leaps to its many determinations about 
the amount of time various tasks should have taken with little instructive analysis. And 
unfortunately, the trial court ignored outside evidence to the contrary when it disallowed 
affidavits from three large law firms. Further, as cited above, the trial court expressly 
found that there "are no facts to this case." See Minutes of Scheduling Conference 
(R. 695). 
But the trial court's opinions or determinations lack sufficient details to enable this 
Court to review the trial court's analysis. 
-24-
In Salmon, the Utah Supreme Court stated the following: 
The findings here appear to me to state little more than the trial court's 
ultimate legal conclusion. In contrast, this court has always demanded 
findings sufficiently detailed to "'disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusion on each factual issue was reached/" Butler, Crockett & Walsh 
Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co,, 909 P.2d 225, 231 (Utah 
1995) {quoting Acton v. IB. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)). We 
demand detailed findings because the reasonableness of an attorney fee 
award is a highly fact-sensitive legal determination and '"detailed findings 
are necessary to enable this court to meaningfully review the issues on 
appeal.'" State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 788 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. 
Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 770 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)); see Cottonwood Mall, 
830 P.2d at 269 ("Although a trial court has discretion to determine an award 
of attorney fees, the exercise of that discretion must be based on an 
evaluation of the evidence."); Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 
1985) ("An award of attorneys fees must generally be made on the basis of 
findings of fact supported by the evidence and appropriate conclusions of 
law."). 
Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 at 901 (emphasis added). 
Here, the trial court made no findings of fact. But even if the trial court's 
"determinations" are deemed equivalent to findings of fact, they offer this Court very 
little in the way of substantive analysis. Those determinations certainly don't provide 
detailed steps by which the trial court reached its ultimate conclusion. Unless, however, 
merely stating the number of pages contained in a pleading is sufficient to establish the 
reasonable amount of time necessary to prepare such pleadings. 
Moreover, the trial court did not identify any particular tasks that were unnecessary. 
Rather, the trial court simply stated its opinion of the amount of time a particular motion and 
memorandum should have taken. 
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More troublesome, the trial court ignored the affidavit of Mr. Orton, a partner of 
Kirton & McConkie. (R. 842); Addendum 3 at 2. Mr. Orton is a reputable and experienced 
attorney with more than 20 years of experience and who has for nearly 10 years been a 
member of the Executive Committee of the Litigation Section of the Utah State Bar. 
Orton Aff. at 2-3; (R. 805-06); Addendum 7 at 8-9. He spent 2.25 hours reviewing all of the 
pleadings in these proceedings, including those pleadings filed by opposing counsel or by 
the opposing parties. Orton Aff. at 6; (R. 809); Addendum 7 at 12. 
After Mr. Orion's extensive review of the pleadings, he opined as follows: 
In looking at the overall amount charged, I considered of particular 
significance (1) the hourly rate charged for the service; (2) the time and 
labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and 
the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (3) the issues 
involved and the result obtained; (4) the time constraints and number of 
motions involved in the circumstances of the case; (5) the experience, 
reputation and ability of Mr. Jensen, and (6) the fact that the fee 
arrangement is hourly. 
Upon consideration and reflection of the overall fee charged for the 
services described in Exhibit "A" and "B" hereto, in light of my own 
skill, knowledge, experience and training, and keeping in mind the 
requirements of Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.5, it is my 
opinion that (a) the hourly rates charged by Mr. Jensen are within the 
range of reasonableness for the services provided within the jurisdiction 
of the Greater Salt Lake City area, and (b\ in particular, that the overall 
fees charged by Mr. Jensen, as set forth on Exhibits "A" and "B" are 
within the range of reasonableness for the services provided within the 
jurisdiction of the Greater Salt Lake City area. 
Orton Aff at 6-7; (R. 809-10); Addendum 7 at 12-13 (emphasis added). 
No other evidence was submitted to or used by the trial court in determining the 
amount of time to allow for Mr. Jensen's legal work. 
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The Salmon case is particularly on point with the issues in the instant case. 
Salmon submitted evidence establishing that in light of the various 
reasonability factors, he was entitled to the full amount of attorney fees 
he requested. Both Havas and Snow testified by affidavit that they had 
reviewed Dunning's affidavit, the legal invoices, and the memorandum 
in support of Salmon's motion for summary judgment, which included a 
detailed description of the work done in the circuit court. Both witnesses 
opined that their review of the specific facts and circumstances of 
Salmons case indicated that the amounts charged and requested were 
reasonable and necessary. Both attorneys testified that they were 
familiar with rates customarily charged in this area and then went on to 
address why specific tasks performed by Salmon's counsel were 
necessary and reasonable in this case. In sum, I would conclude that 
Salmon submitted evidence sufficient to support an award of attorney 
fees in the amount he requested. 
Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 at 893 (emphasis added). 
Mr. Orton provided his professional opinion on the reasonableness of the work 
performed and the billing rates. He then rendered his opinion that the amount of fees 
charged by Mr. Jensen were reasonable. Orton Aff. at 7; (R. 810); Addendum 7 at 13. 
There was no controverting evidence submitted to the trial court. Similarly in Salmon, 
the court stated: 
"The County, in turn, failed to offer any evidence to rebut Salmon's 
showing and thereby support an award for less than the amount Salmon 
requested. Although the County argued below that certain fees should be 
rejected or reduced, the County failed to submit any evidence to support 
these arguments." 
Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 at 893. 
As in Salmon, Appellees here failed to offer any evidence to rebut Mr. Orton's 
affidavit. Had the trial court accepted Mr. Orton's affidavit, it would have been 
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compelled to weigh that evidence in determining the amount of time to allow for the 
various legal tasks. 
B. Trial phase. 
The trial court first stepped its way through the various blocks of tasks listed in the 
table entitled Summary & Outline of Fees Incurred During the Trial Phase, (R. 811); 
Addendum 4. For the trial phase, the trial court selected five blocks of work and opined 
an amount of time each block should have taken compared with the amount of time 
actually billed. The trial court's opinions are set forth in its Order and Judgment as 
subparagraphs "a" through "e" under the heading of "Trial and Post Trial."21 (R. 843-44); 
Addendum 3 at 3-4. 
(1) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on First Cause of Action. 
The trial court stated the following: 
"a. A Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the First Cause of 
Action. This Memorandum was five pages long, three and one-half of 
which were facts and contained no legal citations. Mr. Jensen claimed 
5.8 hours on his billing. The Court determines 1.5 hours is a reasonable 
amount of time for this work." 
Order and Judgment at 3; (R. 843); Addendum 3 at 3. 
The trial court appears to "determine" the amount of time based on the number of 
pages contained in a memorandum and discounts entirely the amount of time required to 
21
 Although the trial court used the term "post trial," it failed to provide any 
analysis or opinion on the tasks involved in the post-trial collection phase. 
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collect facts, all of which facts were external to the subject litigation. But the statement 
by the trial court that the memorandum on the first cause of action "was five pages long, 
three and one-half of which were facts and contained no legal citations" does not lead to a 
conclusion that a reasonable amount of time for such memorandum is 1.5 hours instead of 
the 5.8 hours claimed by Mr. Jensen. The trial court completely omits in its analysis the 
justification provided by Appellants: 
" . . . the legal work included a review of litigation in a previous 
bankruptcy case in which one of the Defendants in this case allegedly 
had not relinquished certain funds to Plaintiffs. In response to that 
allegation, it was necessary to obtain the affidavit of another attorney, 
Richard Perkins, including various supporting documents from the 
bankruptcy case. This led to the dismissal of the first cause of action. 
This particular task required extensive research of documents in the 
prior bankruptcy case and interviews of attorney Perkins. Although the 
first cause of action was a frivolous claim, it nonetheless required a 
substantial amount of time to defeat Plaintiffs' claim." 
Mem. onAttyFees at 9-10; (R. 713-14). 
For the trial court to merely weigh the number of pages and disallow the amount of 
time necessary to research and collect such facts is insufficient for this Court to review 
the trial court's analysis. The approach taken by the trial court, according to its own 
words, should further compel this Court to grant no deference or discretion to the trial 
court since the trial court appears only to have formed an opinion based on the length and 
content of the subject memorandum in support of the motion for partial summary 
judgment and since the trial court ignored entirely Mr. Orton's affidavit. 
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To compound the trial court's lack of detailed steps, the trial court overlooked the full 
content of the memorandum on the first cause of action. The "five pages" cited by the 
trial court fails to recognize the affidavit and many exhibits in support of and attached to 
the memorandum. (R. 57-83). The complete memorandum filed by Appellants contains 
27 pages, including exhibits and the three-page affidavit of Richard Perkins, which was 
also prepared by Mr. Jensen. (R. 57-83). The exhibits attached thereto include letters in 
the bankruptcy proceeding and a canceled check paid in the bankruptcy proceeding. 
(R. 80-83). The work involved multiple telephonic conversations with Mr. Perkins, 
preparation of his affidavit, revisions of such affidavit at his request, and a meeting with 
him to review and sign his affidavit. See Billing Records 11/16/2000 through 2/06/2001; 
(R. 737-38). Also included from previous litigation were excerpts from a deposition of 
Steven Blevins, one of the Plaintiffs and Appellees herein. This Court should find that 
the amount of time billed by Mr. Jensen, being a mere 5.8 hours, is more than reasonable 
for the amount of work necessary to produce the memorandum. 
(2) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Second Cause of Action. 
The trial court stated the following: 
"b. A Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Second Cause of 
Action. This Memorandum was five and a half pages long, three of 
which were facts and contained one legal citation. Mr. Jensen claimed 
4.5 hours on his billing. The Court determines 1.5 hours is a reasonable 
amount of time for this work." 
Order and Judgment at 3; (R. 843); Addendum 3 at 3. 
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Again, the trial court offers little analysis. The trial court also distorts the amount of 
effort involved. The total number of pages relating to the memorandum on the second 
cause action, if that is important, is actually 32 pages, not "five and a half pages." 
(R. 220-51). The trial court appears to discount entirely the amount of effort required to 
assemble "facts," For this particular memorandum, an analysis was required of 
Mr. Blevins' deposition and his responses to interrogatories. Attachments to the 
memorandum include excerpts from discovery, including a deposition and interrogatories. 
(R. 234-43). A reply memorandum was also prepared and filed. 
The trial court ignored entirely the supporting affidavits, deposition, and reply 
memorandum in its analysis. Accordingly, the trial court failed to (1) evaluate all of the 
pertinent record; and (2) to accept affidavit testimony from Mr. Orton on the 
reasonableness of the fees billed by Mr. Jensen. 
(3) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Third and Fourth 
Causes of Action. 
The trial court stated the following: 
"c. A Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Third and Fourth 
Causes of Action. This Memorandum was 9 pages long, two and a half 
of which were facts. This memo did contain legal citations, the majority 
of which were the usual citations used to set forth the standards for 
granting summary judgment. For this memo he billed 13.5 hours. The 
Court determines 4 hours is a reasonable amount of time for this work." 
Order and Judgment at 4; (R. 844); Addendum 3 at 4. 
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Continuing in a similar pattern, the trial court offers no guidance to support its 
opinion. The trial court also ignores the work required to research the factual issues from 
discovery results, which included, as Exhibit C to the memorandum, extensive citations to 
the deposition of Mr. Blevins. (R. 316-21). The trial court also ignored the work required 
for a reply memorandum. (R. 410-16). Since the trial court only refers to the number of 
pages in the memorandum, the quantity of facts, and whether there were legal citations or 
not, this Court is not disadvantaged in any way in reviewing the same pleadings the trial 
court reviewed in forming its opinion about the amount of time that should be allowed for 
such work. Again, the trial court fails to cite any work that was unnecessary. 
(4) Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs9 Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
The trial court stated the following: 
"d. A Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. While this twelve page memo was more substantial then 
(sic) his previous filings, it addressed two very simple issues. For this 
memo he claimed 16 hours of billable time. The Court determines that 6 
hours is a reasonable amount of time for this work." 
Order and Judgment at 4; (R. 844); Addendum 3 at 4. 
The trial court completely ignored the affidavits from Appellants, (R. 342-50), in 
support of this memorandum and the citations to two depositions of Appellants, 
(R. 352-55). The trial court also ignored the extensive motions and memoranda relating 
to striking the hearsay portions of Mr. Blevins' affidavit. (R. 322-27, 401-05), not 
including a motion to strike an improvidently filed Notice to Submit by Mr. Blevins. 
-32-
(R. 369-72). In effect, the work reasonably necessary to defeat Plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment was extensive and far greater than characterized by the trial court. 
Again, the trial court had no advantage over this Court in determining the reasonableness 
of the amount of time required for this particular block of legal work. And the trial court 
failed to identify any unnecessary legal work. 
(5) Affidavits for Attorney Fees. 
The trial court stated the following: 
"e. Between April 10, 2001, and May 7, 2001, Mr. Jensen billed for five 
Affidavits of Attorney's Fees. These affidavits are six paragraphs long, 
five of which are identical. The one different paragraph outlines the 
hours he is claiming, for this he billed 6.4 hours. The Court determines 
1.5 hours is a reasonable amount of time for this work." 
Order and Judgment at 4; (R. 844); Addendum 3 at 4. 
Although the trial court incorrectly counts the number of affidavits,22 the trial court's 
opinion allows only 18 minutes for each of the affidavits for attorney fees submitted by 
Mr. Jensen (1.5 hours divided by 5). To illustrate how unrealistic 18 minutes is, 
Mr, Jensen would be expected to first review his billing records and determine the 
amount of time billed for the additional work not previously billed and then incorporate 
that amount of time in an affidavit, have it signed in the presence of a notary, and file and 
serve the affidavit. On its face, that simply is not reasonable. An attorney must be 
22
 The Record does not support the trial court's count. There were three affidavits. 
Perhaps, the trial court may have confused motions and memoranda relating to attorney 
fees. 
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diligent and cautious before submitting an affidavit of attorney fees. Meticulous care 
must be taken to review the billing records for accuracy. It is unreasonable for an 
attorney to be cavalier about the amount of time asserted in an affidavit. The trial court 
seems to consistently disregard the amount of time to assemble complete and accurate 
facts, including the amount of time to support an affidavit of attorney fees. 
More importantly, however, the trial court referenced the wrong billing records. 
Blevins I relates to Judgment I. Judgment I was entered on February 1, 2002 (R. 484-86); 
Addendum 1. The billing records examined by the trial court ("from April 1, 2001 to 
May 7,2001") were filed 9-10 months prior to Judgment I and were not in any way 
calculated into the attorney fees sought for Judgment I. Rather, the trial court referenced 
affidavits that were for an initial judgment in these proceedings in which the trial court 
dismissed Custom Steel, et al. (R. 173-74). Following their dismissal, the trial court 
awarded attorney fees to them in the amount of $1,330, the exact amount requested at that 
time by Mr. Jensen. (R. 192-95, 204, 208). Therefore, the trial court examined on remand 
billing records that are not related to Blevins I and which were not at issue on remand. 
The proper part of the record that the trial court should have examined begins on 
December 7, 2001 (R. 441) and continues through April 12, 2002 (R. 530-36), during 
which period three affidavits were filed, the last one being in support of fees relating to 
the collection of Judgment I. 
There was substantial opposition to the amount of attorney fees sought for 
Judgment I, and this created some mini-litigation over fees. See e.g., (R. 441-480). The 
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total amount billed for preparation of affidavits of fees and memoranda in support of fees 
and in opposition to Plaintiffs' memorandum was 7.8 hours. Summary & Outline of Fees 
Incurred During the Trial Phase. (R. 811); Addendum 4. Unfortunately, the trial court 
failed to examine the relevant part of the record. 
C. Appellate Phase. 
The trial court opined on the amount of time for three categories of pleadings filed 
during the appellate phase. Order and Judgment at 5; (R. 845); Addendum 3 at 5. First, 
the trial court allowed 1.5 hours for the first Docketing Statement and 0.5 hours for the 
second Docketing Statement. Id. The amount of time billed and claimed is 3.4 hours and 
2.2 hours respectively for the first and second Docketing Statements. The trial court 
states that "all but three paragraphs are the standard statements to be contained in all 
docketing statements." Id. The trial court apparently believes that all attorneys have a 
template, kept up to date with the latest rules governing docketing statements, and that all 
that is needed is dropping in a few "facts," "issues for review," and the "determinative 
law." 
However, there is no evidence that such docketing statements are routine documents 
subject to boilerplate treatment. They certainly are not. And, the two subject docketing 
statements were filed 8 months apart. Even if an attorney does some appellate work, that 
attorney must rigorously follow the latest rules governing the form and content of 
docketing statements. It is mandatory to update the research on relevant determinative 
law cases. And, here again the trial court fails to appreciate the amount of time necessary 
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to succinctly present a ''statement of facts" required in a docketing statement. The trial 
court appears to be out of touch when it comes to the preparation of such documents! 
Also, the trial court failed to acknowledge Mr. Orton's affidavit that supports the amount 
of time billed on appeal. 
The trial court seems to have placed itself in the role of an expert on how much time 
appellate work should take as though the trial court has had recent experience in 
preparing such documents. But that is not the case. The most recent case where the trial 
court was counsel on an appeal was while part of a team of attorneys from the Attorney 
General's office for a defendant where no docketing statement was required. That was 
prior to 1994.23 
Rule 9, Utah R. App. P., was amended in 1994, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2002, and 2005. 
The Rule was completely rewritten in 2002. For the trial court to contend that 
Appellants' docketing statement merely contained "standard statements to be contained in 
all docketing statements," (R. 845); Addendum 3 at 5, demonstrates the trial court's lack 
of familiarity with how often changes are made to the requirements for docketing 
statements. The trial court's understanding of how much effort is required to properly 
prepare a docketing statement appears lacking and unsupported by any evidence in the 
record. 
A Lexis-Nexis search of Utah judicial decisions reveals this information. 
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For the third category, the trial court simply opines that the Brief should have taken 
only 17 hours to prepare, edit and revise. Id. The amount claimed is 51 hours. The only 
evidence on the reasonableness of time and fees was Mr. Orton's affidavit, which the trial 
court ignored. 
The trial court's appellate analysis also failed to consider (a) a motion to consolidate 
the two appeals; (b) motions and cross-motions for summary disposition; and (c) a 
Petition for Rehearing.24 
As in Salmon, this Court is not disadvantaged in any way to review the number of 
hours claimed by Mr. Jensen for the appeal work. The specific affidavit and billing 
records in support of the appellate work are included in the Record. (R. 697-704). The 
specific tasks performed are listed in the affidavit as follows: 
a. File two appeals; 
b. Prepare two Docketing Statements; 
c. File a Motion to Consolidate both appeals; 
d. File Motion for Summary Disposition; 
e. Respond to Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Appeal; 
f. Prepare and file Brief; 
g. Prepare Reply Brief based on fallacious statements in Plaintiffs' Brief; 
h. Prepare and file Petition for Rehearing; 
i. Conduct research on all issues for Docketing Statements, Briefs, and 
Petition for Rehearing. 
Affidavit of Attorney's Fees Incurred on Appeal at 2; (R. 698). 
24
 Since this Court failed to include in its first Memorandum Decision a provision 
for attorney fees on appeal, a Petition for Rehearing was required. This Court then issued 
an Amended Memorandum Decision. Addendum 2. 
-37-
This Court is in an equal position with the trial court to evaluate whether the 51 hours 
of time billed for the above work is reasonable. More importantly, the affidavit of 
Mr. Orton completely supports the amount of time billed by Mr. Jensen. Mr. Orton's 
affidavit should also be considered. There is no controverting evidence in the Record. 
D. Post Appellate Phase. 
The trial court considered four categories of work during the post-appellate phase of 
these proceedings. 
(1) Affidavit for Attorney Fees. 
The trial court stated the following: 
"a. Affidavit of Attorney's Fees. Once again this affidavit is substantially the 
same as the previous five affidavits. Mr. Jensen billed 1.5 hours. A reasonable 
amount is 0.5 hours." 
Order and Judgment at 5; (R. 845); Addendum 3 at 5. 
First, the trial court refers to the "previous five affidavits." We now know that the 
trial court was incorrect in identifying such affidavits, since those affidavits were never 
part of Blevins /nor in support of Judgment I, 
Second, the trial court fails to consider Mr. Orton's affidavit in support of such fees 
and no controverting evidence is found in the Record. And, the trial court fails to allow 
any time for preparing the billing records and describing the tasks required during 
remand. 
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(2) Memorandum on Attorney Fees and Costs. 
The trial court stated the following: 
"b. Memorandum on Attorney's Fees. This memorandum is billed at 7.9 hours. 
This contains much information previously submitted. A reasonable amount is 5 
hours." 
Order and Judgment at 5-6; (R. 845-46); Addendum 3 at 5-6. 
The memorandum on fees filed on remand is 15 pages plus 60 pages of exhibits, and 
plus a reply memorandum. (R. 705-75); Addendum 10. The memorandum had to be 
tailored to fit the needs of the post-appellate phase, including a discussion on billable 
costs incurred on appeal as provided by Rule 34(d), Utah R. App. P. This additional 
discussion became necessary when both the trial court and its clerk ignored Rule 34(d).25 
See Memo, on Atty Fees and Costs at 6-7; (R. 710-711); Addendum 10 at 6-7. Although 
the costs incurred on appeal were eventually included in Judgment III, they should have 
rightly been included in a separate judgment in accordance with Rule 34(d). The failure 
of the trial court to abide by the requirements of Rule 34(d) required Appellants to file a 
Request for Order and to include a lengthy discussion of Rule 34(d) in their 
Memorandum of Attorney fees and Costs. Id. 
25
 Apparently the policy of the trial court is not to follow Rule 34(d), Rather, the 
clerk of the court will only enter a judgment for billable costs upon an order from the trial 
court. In this case, however, even after a Request for Order (R. 689-90) was filed, the 
trial court declined to enter an order requiring the clerk to follow Rule 34(d). 
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(3) Outline and Summary of Fees and Affidavits from other Attorneys. 
The trial court stated the following: 
"c. Outline and summary of fees incurred during trial and analysis of affidavits 
from attorneys. The court requested specific information from attorneys of 
similar work experience and situation. The affidavits submitted by Mr. Jensen in 
no way answered this request. Since there is no breakdown of these 3.4 hours 
between the outline of fees, which has been seen before, and the work on the 
affidavits, the total of 3.4 hours is disallowed." 
Order and Judgment at 6; (R. 846); Addendum 3 at 6. {emphasis added). 
First, the trial court's insertion of the words "and situation" was not included in 
its request to the parties, which reads: 
"One factor to be considered is whether the billing rate is consistent with 
the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services. The 
Court directs the parties to submit, on or before April 15, 2005, 2005, 
affidavits from other attorneys that establish the billing rates for 
attorneys with four years of practice to nine years of practice in the areas 
of breach of contract and collection matters. 
Minute Entry (R. 793); Addendum 6 {emphasis added). 
The trial court again appears to confuse "similar services" with "similar situations." 
Second, the trial court's statement that the "affidavits submitted by Mr. Jensen in no 
way answered this request" is clearly erroneous. The affidavits submitted by Appellees 
contained only the billing rates of two solo practitioners. (R. 822-27); Addendum 8. 
Those affidavits did not contain billing rates for a range of "four years of practice to nine 
years of practice" as requested by the trial court. On the other hand, the affidavits 
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submitted by Mr. Jensen were clearly on point by providing billing rates for scores of 
attorneys with 4-9 years of practice. (R. 798-812); Addendum 7. Based on the clear error 
of the trial court, the amount of time disallowed was improper. 
(4) Miscellaneous communications and meetings. 
The trial court stated the following: 
"d. Phone calls, e-mails and meetings with Mr, Orton and Mr. West[on], These 
were billed at 3.3 hours. For the reason stated above, these have no value to the 
case and therefore are not reasonable. The total 3.3 hours is disallowed." 
Order and Judgment at 6; (R. 846); Addendum 3 at 6. 
Again, the trial court improperly ignored the affidavits submitted by the three large 
law firms. If those affidavits are deemed appropriate, the time spent of 3.3 hours should 
be allowed. 
In sum, the trial court allowed only 90.6 hours out of 151.5 hours billed. And it 
reached this conclusion without considering Mr. Orton's affidavit and without 
considering any other evidence in the Record. The trial court did not enjoy any advantage 
over what this Court has before it—the Record. 
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III. Summary of Fees Billed and Disallowed, 
To assist this Court, a summary table of fees that were allowed and claimed is set 
forth below: 
Description of Fees 
Trial Proceedings 
Post-Trial Collection Proceedings 
Appeal Proceedings: Blevins I 
Post Appeal on Remand 
TOTALS = 
Hours 
Billed 
64.9 
11.0 
51.0 
24.6 
151.5 
Hours 
Allowed 
33.1 
11.0 
32.0 
14.5 
90.6 
Amount 
Sought 
$11,538 
$2,107 
$10,200 
$4,920 
$28,765 
Amount 
Allowed26 
$4,37827 
$1,375 
$4,000 
$1,91228 | 
$11,665 
From the Summary Table above, the trial court allowed only $11,667 in fees 
compared with $28,765 billed and sought, or only 40.6% of the total requested. It is also 
noteworthy that the trial court first found Mr. Jensen's attorney fees to be reasonable in its 
Judgment I and allowed $6,050, (R. 484-86); Addendum 1, for attorney fees but on 
remand allows only $4,378. See Summary Table above. Such a reduction further 
26
 Generally, the trial court applied a billing rate of $125 per hour but allowed 6.8 
hours at $175 per hour. The 6.8 hours was prorated between the "Trial Proceedings" 
(4.8 hours) and the "Post Appeal on Remand (2.0 hours). 
27
 Calculated as follows: 4.8 hrs x $175 + 28.3 hrs x $125 = $4,377.50. 
28
 The amount on remand is an estimate based on 2 hours of in-court time at $175 
per hour and the balance of 12.5 hours at $125 per hour. The trial court did not provide a 
breakout by category of fees for its estimate of court time and non-court time. 
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supports Appellants belief that the trial court may have retaliated against Appellants and 
possibly Mr. Jensen for appealing and obtaining a reversal of its Judgment I. 
Appellants request this Court to reverse the trial court and to remand with 
instructions to modify Judgment III to include the full amount sought by Appellants plus 
the attorney fees incurred on this appeal at Mr. Jensen's current billing rate of $210 per 
hour. Merely instructing the trial court to consider the affidavits from the three large law 
firms, including in particular Mr. Orion's affidavit, and to recompute all of the attorney 
fees on remand would only subject the parties and the trial court to an undue burden that 
would further add to the amount of attorney fees. 
At some point, the issue of attorney fees should end. As the Utah Supreme Court 
stated in Cottonwood Mall Co v Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah 1992), it is not the intent". 
. . to turn fee award determinations into satellite litigation . . ." If this Court simply 
remands for findings consistent with another memorandum decision, the trial court will be 
frustrated, the parties will be frustrated, and more importantly, the amount of attorney 
fees will increase beyond what they are now. 
CONCLUSION 
On Issue No. 1, the trial court ignored the affidavits from large law firms on the basis 
that those firms have higher overhead expenses than a solo practitioner like Mr. Jensen. 
The trial court also failed to correctly apprehend the distinction between "court work" and 
"non-court work" as those terms were used by the affiant (Mr. Hartill) upon which the 
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trial court relied in determining a reasonable billing rate. Finally, the trial court failed to 
allow any increase in billing rates for Mr. Jensen over the five years spanned by these 
proceedings. 
On Issue No. 2, the trial court made no findings of fact. Rather, the trial court merely 
stated, often incorrectly, the number of pages in the various memoranda and ignored the 
many affidavits in support of those memoranda. The trial court also gave little or no 
weight to the amount of time required to assemble facts and prepare supporting affidavits. 
The affidavit of Mr. Orton was ignored, although such affidavit provides a professional 
opinion on the reasonableness of Mr. Jensen's attorney fees. Instead, the trial court 
substituted itself as an expert on the amount of time various tasks should have taken. 
The trial court relied exclusively on the Record below and expressly stated that there 
. were "no facts" to be determined. (R. 695). Therefore, the trial court was not advantaged 
in any way in its determination of attorney fees. This Court is not disadvantaged in 
making its own findings and determinations concerning the amount of attorney fees to 
award for all legal work considered by the trial court. 
Appellants urge this Court to end the attorney fee litigation by reversing the trial 
court and instructing the trial court to modify its judgment to include the full amount of 
fees and costs sought. On remand, this Court should further instruct the trial court to 
determine the amount of attorney fees incurred on appeal in a manner consistent with the 
billing rates applied by this Court and consistent with the principles set forth by this 
Court. Attorney fees on appeal are provided by the underlying contract that gave rise to 
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an award of attorney fees in Blevins I, and Appellants request this Court to expressly 
provide for such fees on appeal in its ruling. 
POST SCRIPT 
It may be unusual and somewhat unorthodox to add a "post script" to Appellants5 
Brief. But the issue of attorney fees in this case gives rise to a general, and far too 
frequently, contentious issue of how Utah's trial courts are awarding attorney fees. The 
entire approach taken by the trial court in this case appears arbitrary and minimalistic, 
Had the trial court initially awarded the fees sought by Appellants, particularly after the 
trial court expressly found such fees to be "reasonable," this case would have concluded 
with a fee award of $11,538 and no appeals. Instead, Appellants have incurred $28,765 
in fees, not including the expense of the current appeal, Blevins II, which will likely 
exceed Blevins I by $4-5,000 because of the greater complexity of the issues herein. 
Appellants suggest to this Court that attorney fees should be awarded by trial courts 
on the basis that such fees are, on their face, deemed reasonable and should only be 
reduced if found to be extreme or unconscionable. After all, attorneys are officers of the 
court and have a duty to charge reasonable fees. 
In the instant case, the trial court did not identify tasks that were unnecessary to the 
litigation. The trial court merely opined that a particular pleading should have been done 
in less time than what was billed. Often the trial court overlooked companion pleadings 
and supporting affidavits. Perhaps the trial court was in a hurry. Whatever the cause, the 
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process has burdened the trial court and the parties way beyond reasonableness. And, 
after Blevins 7, the trial court still got it wrong on remand. 
Despite all attempts to keep fees reasonable, the courts in this case have also added 
unnecessarily to the attorney fee expenses. The trial court's proprietary procedures to 
award costs incurred on appeal required Appellants to file additional pleadings that are 
not required by Rule 34(d), Utah R. App. P. The example cited above concerning 
Rule 34(d) is just one example. The trial court has informally adopted its own particular 
procedure for an award of costs on appeal, and that procedure ignores the requirements of 
Rule 34(d). 
Another example is the way the trial court acted when Appellees attempted to force 
Appellants to sign away their rights to an appeal by insisting that a Satisfaction of 
Judgment be issued. When Appellants rejected a blanket satisfaction of judgment but 
instead offered a limited satisfaction, Appellees, without notice, took the matter directly 
to the trial court. Despite the provisions of Rule 58B, Utah R. Civ. P., the trial court, 
without notice or hearing, entered its own satisfaction of judgment for Appellees. 
(R. 854). Appellants were then compelled to request that the trial court rescind such 
satisfaction of judgment. (R. 858-62). The trial court complied with the request but only 
after additional pleadings were filed. 
And finally, this Court has also contributed to the amount of attorney fees in Blevins I 
by first failing to include a provision for attorney fees. Appellants were compelled to file 
a Petition for Rehearing, and this Court then issued an amended memorandum decision 
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with an award of attorney fees on appeal. All in all, attorney fees have been greater 
because of the actions of the courts themselves. 
What is needed is greater uniformity and predictability in awarding attorney fees. 
Such predictability should lead to fewer appeals over issues of fees and should yield 
greater confidence in fee-shifting provisions contained in contracts. As it is now, fees can 
be from 10% to 100% of the amount requested with no certainty and no predictability 
except for the propensity of certain trial courts. 
DATED this 28th day of November 2005. 
*-^t&Uj& 
Michael A. Jensen (7^3 
Counsel for Appellants 
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FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
ENTERED IN R1CI3TRY 
DATS 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge L.A. Dever 
The Court, having reviewed Defendants' Motions and Memoranda for Summary 
Judgment on the Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action and also having reviewed 
Plaintiffs' memoranda in opposition, and after hearing on November 30, 2001, at which 
all parties were represented by counsel and where Plaintiffs' counsel stipulated to 
dismissing Plaintiffs' Second and Fourth Causes of Action, now makes the following 
conclusions: 
1. After applying the test as set forth in Ward v Intermountain Farmers Ass X 
907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995), the Court finds that Paragraph 3.2.b. of the Settlement 
Agreement, which forms the subject matter for Plaintiffs' Third Cause Action, is 
unambiguous. 
2. The Settlement Agreement provides that Mr. Blevins use his best business 
judgment in negotiating and settling the Clean Gas Receivable claim.and that Mr. Blcvin3 
admittedly did or ghould have used his best business judgment in accepting the amount 
from Clean Gas on the Clean Gas Receivable claim. As a consoquoncofmere was and is 
no offset as contemplated within the Settlement Agreement to support Plaintiffs' claim. 
•Further, there was and is no breach of Defendants' duty to act witli-good faith and fair 
dealing. 
3. Consistent with the Court's interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Third Cause of Action should be 
granted. 
4. Since the Settlement Agreement expressly provides for attorney fees to the 
prevailing party, Defendants are determined to be the prevailing party and are therefore 
entitled to reasonable attorney fees. 
Siuua Mi. Dievins used his bcsl bubinc^ judgment when he accepted Llie dinuunt 
paid by Clean Gas, the Court finds that there is no need to consider whether Mr. Blevins' 
The Court, having previously granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on 
the First Cause of Action and now by granting summary judgment on all remaining 
causes of action, and after reviewing the affidavit of attorney fees submitted by 
Defendants and finding such fees to be reasonable, orders and 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs' Motions for 
Summary Judgment on the Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action be granted and 
that Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed,in its entirety with prejudice and on ito mcrita. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants be awarded their reasonable 
attornev fees in the amount of$[p OOP 
DATED this \K day o 
AGREED AS TO FORM: 
Ronald L. Dunn 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Custom\Order3 Final Order Judgment December 7, 2001 -3-
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Blevins, 
Plaintiffs and Appellees, 
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GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Randy and Linda Isaacson, Jason Bishop, and Wendy Garamendi 
(collectively, Defendants) appeal from two orders of the trial 
court. We reverse and remand. 
Defendants make two arguments on appeal. First, Defendants 
argue that the trial court's decision to reduce their attorney 
fees, incurred as a result of defending a breach of contract 
action, was unsupported by findings of fact. Second, Defendants 
argue that the trial court's decision to deny them additional 
AMENDED MEMORANDUM DECISION' 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20020177-CA 
F I L E D 
(August 5 , 2 0 04) 
(2004 UT App 265, 
1 . T h i s Amended Memorandum D e c i s i o n r e p l a c e s t h e Memorandum 
D e c i s i o n i n Case No. 20020177-CA i s s u e d on J u n e 10 , 2 0 0 4 . 
attorney fees, incurred in pursuing enforcement of their initial 
award of attorney fees, was likewise unsupported by findings of 
fact. 
"Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and will not be overturned in the 
absence of a showing of a clear abuse of discretion." Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). However, 
"although trial courts are normally afforded broad discretion in 
determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, such an award must 
be based on the evidence and supported by findings of fact." 
Anderson v. Poms, 1333 UT App 207,^9, 984 P.2d 392 (quotations 
and citations omitted). Specifically, in determining an award of 
reasonable attorney fees, trial courts are required to answer the 
following four questions: 
1. What legal work was actually performed? 
2. How much of the work performed was 
reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute 
the matter? 
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent 
with the rates customarily charged in the 
locality for similar services? 
4. Are there circumstances which require 
consideration of additional factors, 
including those listed in the Code of 
Professional Responsibility? 
Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 990 (footnotes omitted). Indeed, 
this court has made it clear that a trial court "'abuses its 
discretion in awarding less than the amount [of attorney fees] 
requested unless the reduction is warranted' by one or more of 
the above factors." Endrody v. Endrodv, 914 P.2d 1166, 1171 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (alteration in original) (citation omitted); 
see also Saunders v. Sharp, 818 P.2d 574, 580 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) (noting that trial court erred because it reduced, without 
explanation, the prevailing party's attorney fees). 
In this case, the trial court determined in its first order 
that Defendants' initial request for attorney fees was 
"reasonable." However, without providing any explanation or 
making any findings of fact, the trial court then reduced the 
fees sought by Defendants from $11,538 to $6050. Although 
Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit from a local attorney stating 
that Defendants' attorney fees should not exceed $7000, it is not 
clear from the trial court's order that this was the reason for 
the reduction in the amount of fees awarded. Similarly, the 
20020177-CA 2 
trial court's decision to deny Defendants' request for additional 
attorney fees, incurred in enforcing the original judgment, was 
unsupported by any findings of fact. In its second order, the 
trial court noted only that the additional fees .requested were 
"unreasonable." 
Based on the foretgfaing," the trial court r's reduction in 
Defendants' .initial, award of attorney fees and its subsequent 
denial of Defendants' request for additional attorney fees 
constituted' arf abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we remand for 
the entry of findings of fact consistent with this decision, and 
if appropriate, for an adjustment in the amount of attorney fees 
awafdecT*t5o""Defendants by the trial court. Moreover, because the 
fee-shifting provision of the settlement agreement entered into 
by th*£"parties also^'allQws for the recovery of attorney fees 
incurred on appeal, we award Defendants reasonable attorney fees 
incurred as a result of this appeal in an amount to be determined 
by the trial court on remand. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Juag 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, 
Associate—Presiding Judge 
James Z^/Davis, 
20020177-CA 
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o7/-yio lot rDATE 
This matter was reversed and remanded to this Court for findings of fact and, if appropriate, 
for an adjustment in the amount of attorney's fees awarded to the defendants. 
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the trial court must answer four questions in 
determining an award of reasonable attorney's fees. Those four questions are outlined in Dixie 
State Bankv Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988). The Appellate Court continued that the trial 
court must establish that any reduction is warranted by one or more of the four factors. Not all 
four factors must be addressed. 
A review of the factors applicable to this case is necessary: 
1. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily charged in the 
locality for similar services? 
The Court directed the parties to submit Affidavits of attorneys with similar experience, 
both in terms of work and length of practice, with the billing rates of those individuals. Affidavits 
BLEVINS V. CUSTOM STEEL PAGE 2 ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
from the defendant's counsel were from large law firms with large offices. One Affidavit, from 
Mr. Willis Orton, said associates from his firm charged similar rates, although he did not state 
what the actual rate was. 
A second Affidavit from defense counsel was from Kent Alderman, also from a large law 
firm. He stated that his firm bills for the time of four year associates at $120 per hour and six 
year associates at $185 per hour. 
The third Affidavit was also from a large national law firm. Mr. John Weston stated his 
firm's billing rates for attorneys with 4 to 8 years of experience is $190 to $240 per hour. 
The plaintiff submitted two Affidavits from solo practitioners.1 The defendant's counsel is 
also a sole practitioner. These Affidavits establish rates of $120 to $175. One Affiant pointed 
out that his rate was $125 an hour for non-court appearances and $175 for court appearances. 
There is no question that the billing rates contained in the affidavits submitted by Mr. 
Jensen must be viewed in light of the organization of the offices which submitted them. Large 
law firms, and especially national law firms, have large overhead/expenses. Mr. Jensen would 
not have such expenses. As noted in his filings, he worked out of his home. 
The Court determines that the rates charged by the solo practitioners are consistent with 
the rates customarily charged for similar services and by attorneys in similar situations, and 
therefore awards Mr. Jensen $125 an hour for non-court lime and $175 an hour for court time. 
2. How much of the work performed was routinely necessary to adequately 
Mr. Jensen filed a response in opposition to one Affidavit. Mr. Blevins moved to strike because it 
was based on hearsay. This request is well taken and the Affidavit of Mr. Jensen, dated 4/15/05 is 
stricken. 
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prosecute the matter? 
This factor is difficult for a Court to answer, because it requires a detailed review of the 
billing, along with a comparison to the work product supplied to the Court. When this is done, 
the Court then must determine if the work was reasonable, both as to necessity and time to 
complete. 
As has been pointed out by the Utah Supreme Court in Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P 2d 
305, 317 (1998), "[a] trial court's discretion in determining the amount of reasonable attorney fee 
'arises from the fact that it is in a better position than an appellate court to gauge the quality and 
efficiency of the representation and the complexity of the litigation." (citing, Richard Barton 
Enters, v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 380 (Utah 1996). 
The Court will give several examples of the work billed by Mr Jensen, divided into trial 
and post trial billings, appellate billings, and post appellate billings: 
Trial and Post Trial 
a. A Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the First Cause of Action. This 
Memorandum was five pages long, three and one-half of which were facts and contained no 
legal citations. Mr. Jensen claimed 5.8 hours on his billing. The Court determines 1.5 hours is 
a reasonable amount of time for this work. 
b. A Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Second Cause of Action. This 
Memorandum was five and a half pages long, three of which were facts and contained one legal 
citation. Mr. Jensen claimed 4.5 hours on his billing. The Court determines 1.5 hours is a 
reasonable amount of time for this work. 
BLEVINS V. CUSTOM STEEL PAGE 4 ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
c. A Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Third and Fourth Causes of Action. 
This Memorandum was 9 pages long, two and a half of which were facts. This memo did 
contain legal citations, the majority of which were the usual citations used to set forth the 
standards for granting summary judgment. For this memo he billed 13.5 hours. The Court 
determines that 4 hours is a reasonable amount of time for this work. 
d. A Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. While this 
twelve page memo was more substantial then his previous filings, it addressed two very simple 
issues. For this memo he claimed 16 hours of billable time. The Court determines that 6 hours 
is a reasonable amount of time for this work. 
e. Between April 10, 2001, and May 7, 2001, Mr. Jensen billed for five Affidavits for 
Attorney's Fees. These affidavits are six paragraphs long, five of which are identical. The one 
different paragraph outlines the hours he is claiming, for this he billed 6.4 hours. The Court 
determines that 1.5 hours is a reasonable amount of time for this work. 
f. Contained in the billing submitted to the Court is .3 hour for guardianship work, which 
does not appear to be related to this case. The Court disallows this claim. 
The total amount of hours claimed by Mr. Jensen for the trial and post trial fees was 
76.10 hours. The Court has determined that 32 hours were not necessary and awards Mr. 
Jensen 44.10 hours for the trial and post trial work. 
Appellate Time 
The Court has reviewed the claim for Appellate as directed by the Court of Appeals. 
Because the Court has had experience in handling in appellate work a review of the claims is 
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appropriate, 
a. Mr. Jensen claims 3.4 hours to prepare the Docketing Statement. The Court has 
reviewed the statement submitted by Mr. Jensen. AH but three paragraphs are the standard 
statements to be contained in all docketing statements. The statement of facts, issues for 
review and determinative law required some work. The Court determines that 1.4 hours is a 
reasonable amount of time for the preparation of the statement. 
b. Docketing Statement for 2nd Appeal was billed at 2.2 hours. A review of that 
document shows that it is nearly identical to the first docketing statement. A reasonable time for 
this work is .5 hours. 
c. Preparation of the Brief. Mr. Jensen claims 32.5 hours for the preparation of the 
brief, including 17.5 hours for editing and finalizing the brief. Mr. Jensen stated he had recent 
experience in appellate briefing. The Court has reviewed the brief submitted by Mr. Jensen. A 
reasonable amount of time for the brief and the revision is 17 hours. 
The total amount of hours claimed by Mr. Jensen for the appellate fees was 51.0 hours. 
The Court has determined that 19.2 hours were not necessary and awards Mr. Jensen 32 hours 
for the appellate work. 
Post Appellate Time 
a. Affidavit of Attorney's Fees. Once again this affidavit is substantially the same as the 
previous five affidavits. Mr. Jensen billed 1.5 hours. A reasonable amount is .5 hours 
b. Memorandum on Attorney's Fees. This memorandum is billed at 7.9 hours. This 
contains much information previously submitted. A reasonable amount of time for this work is 5 
rxx^ 
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hours. 
c. Outline and summary of fees incurred during trial and analysis of affidavits from 
attorneys. This was billed at 3.4 hours. The Court requested specific information from 
attorneys of similar work experience and situation. The affidavits submitted by Mr. Jensen in no 
way answered this request. Since there is no breakdown of these 3.4 hours between the 
outline of fees, which has been seen before, and the work on the affidavits, the total 3.4 hours is 
disallowed. 
d. Phone calls, e-mails and meetings with Mr. Orton and Mr. West. These were billed at 
3.3 hours. For the reason stated above, these have no value to the case and therefore are not 
reasonable. The total 3.3 hours is disallowed. 
The total amount of hours claimed by Mr. Jensen for the post- appellate fees was 24.60 
hours. The Court has determined that 10.1 hours were not necessary and awards Mr. Jensen 
14.5 hours for the post-appellate work. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the direction of the Court of Appeals, this Court has reviewed the request of 
counsel for the defendants for attorney's fees for the trial, post-trial, appellate and post-
appellate work. 
The Court has determined that the proper hourly rate for an attorney of Mr. Jensen's 
experience and situation is $125.00 an hour for non-courtroom work and $175.00 for court-room 
work. The total amount of hours determined to be reasonable is 90.60, 
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Mr Jensen did not break out court room from non-court room hours. However, the 
Court did determine from a review of the docket that it could document 6.80 hours of court time. 
The amount of fees awarded are 
83.8 hours of non-court time at $125.00 an hour = $10,475 00 
6.8 hours of court times at $175.00 an hour = 1,190.00 
Costs on Appeal = 575.97 
Total = $12,240 97 
Judgment is awarded to the defendants in the sum of $12,240.97 less the sum of 
$6,050.00 previously paid by the plaintiffs. 
Dated this Y_ day of July, 2005. 
L A. DE^ 
DISTRICT COURT JUDC 
Tab 4 
Summary & Outline of Fees Incurred During The Trial Phase 
Prepared February 28, 2005 
Item 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 6 
7 
1 8 
1 9 
Description 
Review Complaint; prepare Answer; throughout 
proceedings, prepare procedural pleadings for 
scheduling, notices, conferences, and hearings; 
throughout proceedings, client consultations 
Prepare motion and memorandum in support of 
summary judgment: Cause of Action ("CO A") 1 
Discovery activities, including Defendants' 
requests for discovery and Plaintiffs' requests 
for discovery 
Prepare motion and memorandum in support of 
summary judgment: CO A 2 
Oppose Plaintiffs' Rule 59 Motion or motion to 
"Reinstate" claims 
Prepare motion and memorandum in support of 
summary judgment: CO A 3 and COA 4 
Oppose Plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment on COA 3, including affidavits and 
motions to strike Plaintiffs hearsay testimony 
i Prepare for and attend hearing on summary 
i judgment motions, including preparation and 
delivery of courtesy copies the Court's clerk 
Prepare affidavits of attorney fees; prepare 
memoranda in support of fees and in opposition 
to Plaintiffs' filed objections and affidavits 
TOTALS 
Hours 
5.1 
5.8 
8.4 
4.5 
2.2 
13.5 
14.3 
3.3 
7.8 
64.9 
Amount* 
$907 
$1,031 
$1,493 
$800 
$391 
$2,400 
$2,542 
$587 | 
$1,387 
$11,538 
* The amount for each category was determined by multiplying the number of hours 
times the blended hourly rate of $177.7812. The total amount of $11,538, is consistent 
with the Amended Affidavit of Attorney Fees filed December 26, 2001. 
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SUMMARY TABLE OF FEES AND COSTS 
February 28, 2005 
Exhibit 
1 A 
1 B 
1 C 1 D 
Description of Fees 
Trial Court Proceedings 
Post-Trial Collection Proceedings 
Appeal Costs 
Appeal Proceedings 
Estimate of1 Proceedings on Remand 
TOTALS (except on Remand) 
Amount 
Sought 
$11,538 
$2,107 
$575 
$10,200 
$4,120 
$28,540 
Amount 
Paid 
$6,050 
$0 
$0 
$0 
! $0 
$6,050 
Amount 
Unpaid 
$5,488 
$2,107 
$575 
$10,200 
$4,120 
$22,490 
DATED this 28th day of February 2005. 
LiM 
Michael A. Jens 
Attorney for 
1
 The estimate for fees on remand include actual times spent plus 3.5 hours of 
estimated time for attending the hearing set for March 7, 2005 and to prepare and submit 
a final order and judgment, including findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN & DEBRA BLEVINS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION INC, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY RULING 
Case No: 000906072 
Judge: L A DEVER 
Date: 03/28/2005 
m «v"i" 
Pursuant to the decision of the court of Appeals (Blevins v. 
Isaacson, 2004 UT App 265} this Court must consider certain factors 
when awarding attorney fees. One factor to be considered is 
whether the billing rate is consistent with the rates customarily 
charged in the locality for similar services. The Court directs 
the parties to submit, on or before April 15, 2005, affidavits from 
other attorneys that establish the billing rates for attorneys with 
four years of practice to nine years of practice in the areas of 
breach of contract and collection matters. 
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MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231) 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 571708 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708 
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264 
"' j * ^ 
£Uiiu hi n 
s,tLT L ; 
BY „L 
* i s 
; /J::TY 
L A , ,» « » . — •— 
Filed 04/13/2005 
Counsel for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN BLEVINS AND 
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, 
INC., ET AL 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS'S AFFIDAVITS ON 
ATTORNEY FEES FROM LOCAL 
ATTORNEYS 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge L.A. Dever 
In response to the Court's Minute Entry dated March 28,2005, Defendants, by and 
through counsel, hereby submit three affidavits, attached hereto, on attorney fees from the 
following attorneys, all of whom are partners in their respective law firms: 
Kent B. Alderman, Parsons Behle & Latimer 
John G. Weston, Snell & Wilmer 
R. Willis Orton, Kirton& McConkie 
DATED this 13th day of April 2005. 
Michael A. Jensen CJ 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge L.A. Dever 
STEVEN BLEVINS AND 
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., ET AL, 
Defendants. 
I, Michael A. Jensen, Counsel for the Defendants, hereby certify that on this day I 
personally served the foregoing DEFEND ANTS'S AFFIDAVITS ON ATTORNEY 
FEES FROM LOCAL ATTORNEYS by mailing a copy to: 
Steven and Debra Blevins 
10758 South 1090 East 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
DATED this 15th day of April 2005. 
^jUM^ 
MICHAEL A. JENSEN, Esq. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN BLEVINS AND DEBRA KAY 
BLEVINS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., et 
al., 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT ON ATTORNEY BILLING 
RATES (KENT B. ALDERMAN) 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge L.A. Dever 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The undersigned, Kent B. Alderman of Parsons Behle & Latimer, upon his oath states as 
follows: 
1. I am a member of the Utah State Bar, and I am licensed to practice law in the state 
of Utah, 
2. My firm, Parsons Behle & Latimer, regularly provides legal services, including 
contract litigation, to numerous businesses and individuals in Utah. 
3. Our firm customarily charges the following billing rates based on an attorney's 
years of experience: 
696604.1 
Years of Experience 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
DATED this S _day of April, 2005. 
Amount 
$170 
$180 
$185 
$190 
$200 
$210 
_ ^ 
KENTIIA'LDIRMAN 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
. c?4-SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this ^ , > _ day of April, 2005 
LINDA R BAILEY 
Notary Public 
am south mn*\mSLC JT w ] ^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
2 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
450 South State Street 
PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860 
Clerk: 238-7480; In-Court Clerk: 238-7464/7325 (Kathy/Debbie/Bryce) S35 
STEVEN BLEVINS AND 
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, 
INC., ET AL 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT ON ATTORNEY 
BILLING RATES 
(John G. Weston) 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge L.A. Dever 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The undersigned, John G. Weston of Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., upon his oath states 
as follows: 
1. I am a member of the Utah State Bar, and I am licensed to practice law in 
the state of Utah. 
2. My firm, Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., regularly provides legal services, 
including litigation relating to breach of contract matters, to numerous businesses and 
individuals in the state of Utah. 
3. I am a partner at Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. 
4. The Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. Salt Lake City office customarily charges 
hourly billing rates between $190.00 and $240.00 for attorneys with four to eight years of 
experience practicing law. 
344255 2 
DATED this 8th day of April, 2005 
J«(hn G. Weston 
Snell & Wlfmer L.L.P. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to me before this 8th day of April, 2005. 
NOTARY P^ UBLIC ' 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
CINDY MEEHAN 
15 W So Temple Ste 1200 
Sait Lake City, Utah 34101 
My Commission Expires 
july 20 2008 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231) 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 571708 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708 
801 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264 
Counsel for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN C. BLEVINS and DEBRA 
KAY BLEVINS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, 
INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
R. WILLIS ORTON AS TO 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Civil No. 000906072 
: Judge Leon E. Dever 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
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I, R. Willis Orton, having been duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am an attorney and have been a member of the Utah State Bar since 
October 6, 1981, which admission has entitled me to practice law in the state of Utah and 
to appear as counsel before all state trial and appellate courts as well as all state and most 
federal administrative agencies. With the exception of a two week period in April 1984, 
when I moved to Arizona, I have practiced continuously in Salt Lake City with the law 
firms of Greene, Callister & Nebeker (nka Callister Nebeker & McCullough); Parsons, 
Davies, Kinghorn & Peters; Mackay Price & Williams, and, for the last six and one-half 
years, with Kirton & McConkie, P.C. 
2. I was also admitted to practice in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah in October 1981. I have since been admitted to practice before the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California, the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
and the United States Supreme Court. 
3. Since my admission to the Utah State Bar, my practice has been largely civil 
litigation, with the largest component thereof being commercial litigation in nature, 
encompassing both the prosecution and defense of lender liability, real estate, 
racketeering, securities fraud, corporate governance and shareholder derivative, and 
general commercial disputes. 
-2-
4. Since 1996,1 have served as a member of the Executive Committee of the 
Litigation Section of the Utah State Bar and from July 2001 to July 2002, served as Chair 
of the Litigation Section. I continue to serve on the Executive Committee of the 
Litigation Section. In addition, I have served as a standing member of the Model Utah 
Jury Instruction Committee ("MUJI"), primarily responsible for the section on business 
torts and have been a member of two Inns of Court. 
5. I am completely familiar with the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 
1.5, which governs the ethical requirements of reasonableness of attorney fees charged to 
clients by lawyers, and the factors therein recited for consideration of the reasonableness 
of attorney fees. I make use of Rule 1.5 on a continuous basis in my own practice, to 
assure that the fees I charge are reasonable within the confines of the Rule. 
6. In the course of my legal career, I have kept up on the range of hourly rates 
and other charges for lawyers with practices and experience in the Salt Lake City area 
similar to my own. My knowledge in this area includes ranges for lawyers at large local 
firms, mid-size local firms and small local firms who practice commercial litigation, as 
well as the regional imports over the past two decades who have driven up the hourly 
rates in the marketplace. Much of my knowledge is derived from word of mouth from 
other lawyers, and a substantial amount of knowledge I hold concerning rates charged by 
lawyers is derived from reviewing affidavits of attorneys fees, costs and expenses in many 
scores of cases I have handled in my practice where such affidavits have been submitted. 
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In addition, for two years, I was a member of Kirton & McConkie's compensation 
committee, which regularly monitors hourly rates for lawyers, including associates, in the 
Greater Salt Lake City area, and have developed a general understanding of the hourly 
rates charged by many solo and firm-associated lawyers in the area. 
7. From the foregoing base of knowledge, I have become aware in my practice, 
and have maintained awareness over the course of my practice, of the fees customarily 
charged in the Greater Salt Lake City area for services rendered to clients in all manner of 
commercial and civil litigation. 
8. I have been retained by the defendants in this case, through their attorney, 
Michael A. Jensen, to opine as to whether the fees, costs and expenses charged to the 
defendants by Mr. Jensen as to certain matters in connection with the above-captioned 
litigation are reasonable, within the scope of my knowledge and experience in practicing 
in the area of law in which I practice within the Greater Salt Lake City market, and 
whether they comport with the ethical standard of reasonableness imposed by the Utah 
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.5. I have been engaged on an hourly basis, at the 
rate of $260,00, to analyze the pertinent case materials, and assess the information 
available to me, so as to be able to render a professional opinion. 
9. In the course of preparing to form such an opinion, I interviewed Mr. Jensen 
about the background of the case, from its origin to the present, the nature of the case, and 
the nature of his clients' involvement in the case. I also asked him as to the nature of his 
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involvement in the case, the scope of his engagement and the work actually performed by 
him. At my request, Mr. Jensen also allowed me to review all pleadings and papers filed 
in connection with the attorneys fees claimed as contained on the Summary & Outline of 
Fees Incurred During the Trial Phase, Exhibit "A" hereto, and the Summary Table of Fees 
and Costs, Exhibit "B" hereto. 
10. From the documents I was provided, I took note of the various hourly rates 
charged by Mr. Jensen during the course of the litigation as reflected on Exhibits "A" and 
"B", and noted that they ranged from between $175.00 to $200.00 per hour. It is my 
understanding that these charges began in 2000 at $175 per hour and have continued 
through today at the current rate of $200. I particularly noted that lawyers associated with 
my law firm and with similar lengths of experience (viz., 1995 or 1996 law school 
graduates) charged similar rates for the same relevant period of time. 
11. In determining the reasonableness of the $175 to $200 hourly rates charged by 
Mr. Jensen, I note that Mr. Jensen graduated with a Bachelor's degree from the University 
of Utah, and with an MBA degree from Harvard University. Following a successful 
business career, Mr. Jensen graduated cum laude from the Boston College Law School in 
1995, and he began practice in Utah in 1995. 
12. I also reflected on my own personal experiences with Mr. Jensen, which have 
left me with the impression of him as a clear thinking, creative and detailed oriented 
lawyer, with the highest standards of professionalism. 
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13,1 took note from the file I reviewed that the case at issue was a case involving 
a variety of claims that, despite the amount of damages claimed, fall within the category 
of complex commercial litigation. I further took note that a large number of filings had 
occurred during the relevant time period, which required a great deal of time in assessing 
an appropriate strategy for response and which required a great deal of reading, review 
and analysis, in addition to the drafting of papers and affidavits by Mr. Jensen for filing, 
14. To determine whether such filings were reasonable and appropriate, and to 
determine whether the overall amount charged for such services appeared reasonable with 
the standards of Rule 1.5 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, I took approximately 
2.25 hours in reviewing and comparing the pleadings and papers filed by Mr. Jensen, as 
listed on Exhibits "A" and "B" hereto, to the corresponding papers filed by opposing 
counsel. 
15. In looking at the overall amount charged, I considered of particular 
significance (1) the hourly rate charged for the service; (2) the time and labor required, 
the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the 
legal service properly; (3) the issues involved and the result obtained; (4) the time 
constraints and number of motions involved in the circumstances of the case; (5) the 
experience, reputation and ability of Mr. Jensen, and (6) the fact that the fee arrangement 
is hourly. 
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16. Upon consideration and reflection of the overall fee charged for the services 
described in Exhibit "A" and "B" hereto, in light of my own skill, knowledge, experience 
and training, and keeping in mind the requirements of Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Rule 1.5, it is my opinion that (a) the hourly rates charged by Mr. Jensen are 
within the range of reasonableness for the services provided within the jurisdiction of the 
Greater Salt Lake City area, and (b), in particular, that the overall fees charged by 
Mr. Jensen, as set forth on Exhibits "A" and "B" are well within the range of 
reasonableness for the services provided within the jurisdiction of the Greater Salt Lake 
City area. 
17. Although I have utilized a caption for this affidavit that was provided by 
Mr. Jensen, the entire contents of the affidavit were prepared by me, and not Mr. Jensen. 
DATED this O day of April, 2005. 
R. Willis Orton 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this fe^day of April, 2005 
" N o t a r y P u b l i c " " ""1 
BAUNA DAVIS . 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower I 
60 East South Temple • 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 i 
My Commission Expires I 
• •K^rrrsro' March 1.2006, . 
@PFDesktop\::ODMA/PCDOCS/DOCS/820612/t 
Tl2Gmi~A-
NOTARY PUBLIC 
X-
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Summary & Outline of Fees Incurred During The Trial Phase 
Prepared February 28, 2005 
Item 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Description 
Review Complaint; prepare Answer; throughout 
proceedings, prepare procedural pleadings for 
scheduling, notices, conferences, and hearings; 
throughout proceedings, client consultations 
Prepare motion and memorandum in support of 
summary judgment: Cause of Action ("COA") 1 
Discovery activities, including Defendants' 
requests for discovery and Plaintiffs' requests 
for discovery 
Prepare motion and memorandum in support of 
summary judgment: COA 2 
Oppose Plaintiffs' Rule 59 Motion or motion to 
"Reinstate" claims 
Prepare motion and memorandum in support of 
summary judgment: COA 3 and COA 4 
Oppose Plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment on COA 3, including affidavits and 
motions to strike Plaintiffs hearsay testimony 
Prepare for and attend hearing on summary 
judgment motions, including preparation and 
delivery of courtesy copies the Court's clerk 
Prepare affidavits of attorney fees; prepare 
memoranda in support of fees and in opposition 
to Plaintiffs' filed objections and affidavits 
TOTALS 
Hours 
5.1 
5.8 
8.4 
4.5 
2.2 
13.5 
14.3 
3.3 
7.8 
64.9 
Amount* 
! $907 
$1,031 
$1,493 
$800 
$391 
$2,400 
$2,542 
$587 
$1,387 1 
$11,538 _ J 
* The amount for each category was determined by multiplying the number of hours 
times the blended hourly rate of $177.7812. The total amount of $11,538, is consistent 
with the Amended Affidavit of Attorney Fees filed December 26, 2001. 
Exhibit A 
SUMMARY TABLE OF FEES AND COSTS 
February 28, 2005 
| Exhibit j 
1 A 
1 B 
1 C 
1 D 
Description of Fees 
Trial Court Proceedings 
Post-Trial Collection Proceedings 
Appeal Costs 
Apneal Proceedings 
Estimate of' Proceedings on Remand 
TOTALS (except on Remand) 
Amount 
Sought 
$11,538 
$2,107 
$575 
$10,200 
$4,120 
$28,540 
Amount 
Paid 
$6,050 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$6,050 
Amount 
Unpaid 
$5,488 1 
$2,107 1 
$575 
$10,200 
$4,120 
$22,490 | 
DATED this 28th day of February 2005. 
Michael A. Jensen 
Attorney for Defendants 
1
 The estimate for fees on remand mclude actual times spent plus 3.5 hours of 
estimated time for attending the hearing set for March 7, 2005 and to prepare and submit 
a final order and judgment, including findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Custom\Bievins3\Summary of Fees February 28, 2005 -2 Exhibit B 
Tab 8 
Russell D. Hartill (#8729) 
Attorney at Law 
HOW 9000 S Suite 1 
Sandy, UT 84070 
(801)561-4797 
Fax (801) 561-4798 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
Steven & Debra Blevins 
Plaintiff AFFIDAVIT 
v. 
Case: 000906072 
Custom Steel Fabrication INC., 
Defendant Judge: LA. Dever 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
Russell D. Hartill, being first duly sworn, hereby deposes and says: 
I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Utah since May 17, 2000.1 
graduated with a JD degree in May of 1996 from the University of Idaho. I am 
currently engaged in private practice dealing with breach of contract and collection 
matters, among other issues. 
My billing rate for such matters is $125 per hour for non-court appearances and 
$175 per hour for courtroom work. My rates have not changed since May 17, 2000. 
Included with this affidavit is a copy of my legal representation agreement which 
states my rates. My practice is that of a sole practitioner, with no affiliations with 
any other attorneys, and I am located at 140 West 9000 South, Suite 1, Sandy, 
UTAH 84070. 
ah Signed and dated this 1 lLn day of April, 2005, in Sandy City, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
Russell D. Hartill 
Attorney at Law 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
The foregoing affidavit was acknowledged before me this 11th day of April, 2005 and RUSSELL D. 
HARTILL, who is personally known to me or who has produced a driver's license as identification, signed 
same in my presence this day. 
SUSAN TERESA HARTJLLI 
| &f%®te$b N0TARY PUBLIC' STATE of UTAH 
& QttVte
 1 0 1 9 2 SANNOR HILL ROAD 
SANDY UT 84092 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 05-22-2007 
Susan Teresa Hartill 
LEGAL REPRESENTATION AGREEMENT 
This agreement is dated this day of , between (hereinafter 
"Client") and RUSSELL D. HARTILL of 140 West 9000 South, Suite 1, Sandy, Utah 84070 (hereinafter 
"Attorney"). 
1 An initial retainer of is to be paid by the Client before representat i^ 
commences This retainer shall bind the Attorney not to take a fee from or represent'any other person invoked 
in this matter. It shall constitute partial consideration for the Attorney's representation ofthe Client. The 
Attorney may apply the retainer against legal services performed for the C l i e# | l l | Jb r costs and expenses 
incurred by the Attorney. The retainer need not be placed into the Attorney's trust account and may be 
immediately deposited by the attorney into his general earned income funds. It is uncf^|pod and agre^dby the 
Client that the bill to be rendered by the Attorney will reflect one or more ofthe followife|: 
a. The rate of $ 125 per hour for matters not related to court preparation and the rate of $ 175 per*hour for court 
preparation and appearances. 
b. Assistance of a paralegal at an hourly rate of between $3!@Jto $75 per hour. 
c. Assistance of another attorney at their hourly rate of between $v150 to $200 per hour, at the discretion of 
Attorney. 
d The complexity and difficulty ofthe matter. 
e. The amount involved or the results obtained5: 
f. The time limitations imposed by the Clienffor oy oxner circumsxances. 
g. The nature, substance and length of documenttdrafted. 
h. The stress ofthe matter. 
IT IS UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that Client wishe$ Attorney to be available for 
2. Interim billings willL^§^bmitted to the Client from time to time and shall be due and payable in full upon 
receipt. Failure to pay ill^eiffefl^iliings within thirty (30) days after date appearing on the billing will permit the 
Attorney, at his option, after reaflMbte notice to the Client, to terminate his representation ofthe Client. All 
accounts which are not paid in full within shinty (30) days after receipt of any statement shall bear interest on the 
unpaid balance at the rate of 1.50% per month or an ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE of 19.56%. The amount 
of any FINANCE CHARGE cannot be determined at this time. The charging of this interest will in no way be 
deemed a waiver ofthe Attorney's right to withdraw for nonpayment or as a waiver of his right to withdraw as 
counsel under any other circumste&e. In addition, during the course of representation, the Attorney may require 
the Client to pay additional sums to be applied against anticipated legal services and costs to be rendered and 
incurred in the future. Failure to pay such additional sums when requested shall entitle the Attorney to withdraw 
as counsel for Client. Additionally, the Attorney may exercise this right, at his option, any time that the Client's 
account is past due. The Client agrees to pay any and all costs of collection including reasonable Attorney's fees 
whether for time incurred by Attorney or other legal counsel. In order to secure the amount owed Attorney, 
Client grants Attorney a lien on any property awarded client or owned by Client, whether or not related to the 
legal matter in which Client is involved. 
3. The hourly time charges for the Attorney or any assistant include, but are not limited to court appearances, 
telephone conferences relating to Client's matter whether with Client or anyone else, office conferences, legal 
research, preparation for and attendance at depositions, review of file materials and documents sent or received, 
preparation for trials, hearings and conferences with other counsel or office staff, travel time from the Attorney's 
office and back to the Attorney's office, and drafting of pleadings, instruments, correspondence and office 
memoranda 
4 The Client also agrees to assume and pay for all costs incurred by the Attorney in connection with this mattei 
An example of such costs include, secretarial assistance, paralegal assistance at a rate determined by the 
Attorney to be fair and reasonable, filing fees, witness fees, mileage, sheriffs and constable's fees, expenses of 
depositions, investigative expenses, expert witness fees, copy and printing costs, long distance charges, and 
other expenses incidental to the representation of the Client. ^ J*L^ 
5. The Client understands that in some cases a court may or may not award attorney's fees to one party and ma> 
order the other party to pay the amount awarded. This is solely at the discreti^ofethe court. In other cases, if 
there is a settlement agreed to by both parties, thereby avoiding further action on tS^l^wsmtfcJJie settlement 
agreement may provide that one of the parties will contribute to the other party's legal!expenses. In the event 
such a contribution is obtained for the benefit of the Client, the imount, when received oy the Attorney, will be 
credited against any amount remaining due once it is actually received. However, the Client;nyndersj;ands that h< 
or she is primarily responsible for immediate payment of the Attorney's bill. c ^ S ^ 
6. The Client agrees to cooperate with the Attorney in a M l ^ ^ t s in relation to this matfelr, including, but not 
necessarily limited to, completely and accurately disusing tcTfcfte Attorney all facts related to the matter, 
providing the Attorney with copies of all papers a ^ ^ c u m e n t s related to the matter, allowing the Attorney to 
conduct all negotiations related to the matter and*Sllov$hg the Attorney to employ the services of additional 
legal counsel or legal assistants as Attorney may determine is reasonable. 
7. Client recognizes that because of practical and ethical considerations Attorney may not be able to withdraw 
from Client's case because of the status of the pro^eding absent the Client's express termination of Attorney's 
services. Accordingly, anytime Client is delinquent ffefhe paymsntjgfthe amount due or requested by Attorney 
Client consents that Attorney n@l|^M%incur any\ut-of^eket expenses that would normally be incurred on 
Client's behalf, Client relieves Attorney from the obligation, that Attorney may normally have to represent 
Client zealously, and waives and releases Attorney from an^damage that resulting from Attorney's negligence 
that would otherwise,be^civilly and ethically actionable against Attorney. Any dispute that Client may have wit 
the amount due Attornef or services rendered by the Attorney, shall be communicated in writing to the Attorne 
immediately upon the disputel^sing, but not greater than thirty (30) days from the date Client is provided any 
request for payment of services"fifeL^isputes. 
3. THE CLIENT ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIVING A COPY OF THIS AGREEMENT, THAT THE CLIENT 
HAS READ AND FULLY UNDERSTANDS EACH AND EVERY TERM OF THIS AGREEMENT, AND 
AGREES TO EACH-AND EV1JRY/TERM CONTAINED IN IT, AND UNDERSTANDS THAT THIS IS A 
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE ATTORNEY AND THE CLIENT. 
CLIENT 
RUSSELL D. HARTILL, ATTORNEY 
Philip A. Reichenbach, #08260 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 377 
Centerville, Utah 84014-0377 
Telephone: 801-255-2055 
Facsimile: 877-349-4103 
Email: preichl2@hotmail.com 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN & DEBRA BLEVINS, AFFIDAVIT OF PHILIP A. 
Plaintiff, REICHENBACH 
vs. 
Civil No. 000906072 
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., Judge L.A. Dever 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of Davis ) 
Philip A. Reichenbach (Affiant), being first duly sworn and under oath deposes and 
states: 
1. I am at least eighteen years of age and am competent to testify in a Court of law. 
2. I am an Attorney and am currently licensed to practice law in the State of Utah. 
3. I have practiced for over six years, having been admitted to the Utah Bar on October 20, 
1998. My practice has included several collection matters and several cases alleging breach of 
contract. 
POPV 
Affidavit of Philip A. Reichenbach 
Page 1 of 3 
4. I was approached by Steven Blevins, one of the Plaintiffs, to prepare this Affidavit. I had 
not met him before he approached me to prepare this document. 
5 1 have billed clients between 4120 00 and $165.00 per hour for my time. The 
overwhelming majority of my time is billed at $125.00 per hour. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
DATED THIS / / "^ day of _ .,2005. 
PHILIP A. REICHENBACH 
Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this j f^' day of 
f p C k b ,2005. 
\ ^ U . 1 
WTARY PUBLIC 
Affidavit of Philip A. Reichenbach 
Page 2 of 3 
71»1 
KARAUCfTOS 
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Tab 9 
MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231) 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 571708 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708 
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264 
Counsel for Defendants 
TN THE THTRD JUDTCTAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
450 South State Street, PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860 
Clerk: 238-7480; In-Court Clerk: 238-7464/77325 (Audrey/Debbie/Bryce) W37 
STEVEN BLEVINS AND 
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, 
INC., ET AL 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES INCURRED ON REMAND 
(Post Appeal Fees) 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge L.A. Dever 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Michael A. Jensen, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am over the age of twenty-one years, and I am competent to provide the 
information, under oath, that is contained in this Affidavit. This information is based on 
my personal knowledge. If called upon to testify in a court of law, I could, and would, 
testify the same as I have stated herein. 
2. I am legal counsel to Defendants in the above-entitled action. 
Filed 04/13/2005 
r\l¥K 
3. Since the commencement of this action, I have been providing legal services for 
Defendants in connection with all phases of litigation in the above entitled action, including 
on appeal and on remand for post-appeals proceedings. 
4. The post-appeal proceedings have been extensive, including many requests made 
by the Court for memoranda, hearings, and affidavits from local attorneys on the issue of 
attorney fc^ and uilliiig idles. A COpj^  Of my duUulod u u h u g l c u u l d b die a t t a c h e d l ie ielu. 
5. During the period on remand, I have spent 24.60 hours, not counting any time for 
preparing a final judgment or findings of fact and conclusions of law. At my current billing 
rate of $200 per house, the total fees on remand are $4,920.00. 
6. I believe that the hourly rate charged by me is reasonable and comparable to those 
charged by other attorneys with similar experience and for similar activities. 
7. I believe that the time I spent was reasonable under all of the circumstances. 
Much of the work on remand resulted from objections by Plaintiffs for costs on appeal and 
resulted from requests of the Court. 
DATED this 13th day of April 2005. 
Michael A. Jensen 
On the 13th day of April 2005, personally appeared before me, Michael A. Jensen, the 
signer of the within Affidavit, who acknowledged to me that he did execute the same and that 
the contents thereof are true, accurate and complete to the best of his information and belief. 
Custom\Bievins3\Aff Fees on Remand April 13, 2005 2-
Notary Pubiic • 
KATHRYNG.JEJISEM I 
730 Thrti Fbunttfnt Drive, Untt 871 
Murray, Utoh 64107 | 
My Cdminfetion Expires • 
Jiflowy 15,200* I 
State of Utah , 
CERTIFICATION 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge L.A. Dever 
STEVEN BLEVINS AND 
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS, Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., ET AL, Defendants. 
I, Michael A. Jensen, Counsel for Defendants, hereby certify that on this day I 
personally served the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED 
ON REMAND (Post Appeal Fees) by personally mailing a copy to: 
Steven B levins 
10758 South 1090 East 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
(801)571-7601 
DATED this 15th day of April 2005. 
MICHAEL A. JEN 
CustomYBlevins3\Aff Fees on Remand April 13, 2005 
0 1 — 
4/12/2005 
10:18 AM 
Michael A. Jensen 
Slip Listing Page 1 
Selection Criteria 
Activity (hand selec Include: Post Appeal 
Slip.Classiflcation Open 
Client (hand select) Include: Custom3 Blevins 
Rate Info - identifies rate source and level 
Slip ID 
Dates and Time 
Posting Status 
Description 
16234 TIME 
10/8/2004 
WIP 
Litigation: telephone call to Clients; draft and 
file Request for Scheduling Conference. 
16233 TIME 
10/18/2004 
WIP 
Litigation: telephone conference with Court's 
clerk to reset date for Scheduling 
Conference; draft and file Motion to Reset 
Date of Conference; mail copy to Blevins; 
file and deliver Motion to Reception area for 
Judge Dever. 
16249 TIME 
10/20/2004 
WIP 
Litigation: draft and file Request for Order 
and Order; telephone call from Court's Clerk 
re Rufe 34. 
16414 TIME 
11/19/2004 
WIP 
Post Appeal Proceedings: review file; draft 
Affidavit of Attorney Fees and compile billing 
records to file with Court at Scheduling 
Conference; draft Order to Refund Appeals 
Bond; attend Scheduling Conference, 
16466 TIME 
12/4/2004 
WIP 
Post Appeal Proceedings: draft 
Memorandum on Attorney Fees and 
assemble exhibits in support. 
User 
Activity 
Client 
Reference 
Jensen 
Post Appeal 
Custom3 Blevins 
I 
Jensen 
Post Appeal 
Custom3 Blevins 
Units 
DNB Time 
Est. Time 
Variance 
0.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.70 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Rate 
Rate Info 
Bill Status 
200.00 ~~ 
T@1 
200.00 
T@1 
Slip Value 
80.00 
140.00 
Jensen 
Post Appeal 
Custom3 Blevins 
Jensen 
Post Appeal 
Custom3 Blevins 
0.70 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.50 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
200.00 
T@1 
200.00 
T@1 
Jensen 
Post Appeal 
Custom3 Blevins 
7.90 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
200.00 
T@1 
140.00 
300.00 
1580.00 
4/12/2005 
10:18 AM 
Michael A. Jensen 
Slip Listing Page 2 
Slip ID 
Dates and Time 
Posting Status 
Description 
16527 TIME 
12/21/2004 
WIP 
Post Appeal Proceedings: receive and 
review Memorandum from Bievins; draft 
Reply Memorandum. 
16544 TIME 
12/22/2004 
WIP 
Post Appeal Proceedings: draft Request to 
User 
Activity 
Client 
r Reference 
Jensen 
Post Appeal 
Custom3 Bievins 
Jensen 
Post Appeal 
Custom3 Bievins 
Submit for Decision and file same with Reply 
Memorandum. 
16829 TIME 
2/4/2005 
WIP 
Post Appeal Proceedings: receive and 
review Minute Entry re Attorney's Fees. 
16830 TIME 
2/28/2005 
WIP 
Jensen 
Post Appeal 
Custom3 Bievins 
Jensen 
Post Appeal 
Custom3 Bievins 
Post Appeal Proceedings: analyze affidavits 
Units 
DNBTime 
Est. Time 
Variance 
2.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.10 
0.00 
0,00 
0.00 
3.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0,00 
Rate 
Rate Info 
Bill Status 
200.00 
T@1 
200.00 
T@1 
200.00 
T@1 
200.00 
T@1 
supporting request for attorney fees; prepare 
Outline of Fees During Trial Phase; prepare 
Summary Table of Fees and Costs; organize 
and prepare courtesy copies of affidavits 
and deliver same to Judge Dever's Clerk; 
mail Outline and Summary to Bievins and 
Clients. 
Slip Value 
440.00 
40.00 
20.00 
680.00 
16831 TIME 
3/7/2005 
WIP 
Post Appeal Proceedings: attend hearing 
with Judge Dever on issue of attorney fees 
[ESTIMATED TIME] 
16832 TIME 
3/7/2005 
WIP 
Post Appeal Proceedings: prepare final 
order and judgment; mail copy to Bievins; 
submit to Court [ESTIMATED TIME]. 
16991 TIME 
3/29/2005 
WIP 
Jensen 
Post Appeal 
Custom3 Bievins 
Jensen 
Post Appeal 
Custom3 Bievins 
Jensen 
Post Appeal 
Custom3 Bievins 
1.50 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.70 
0.00 
0.00 
200.00 
T@1 
200.00 
T@1 
200.00 
T@1 
300,00 
400.00 
140.00 
4/12/2005 
10:18 AM 
Michael A. Jensen 
Slip Listing Page 3 
Slip ID 
Dates and Time 
Posting Status 
Description 
Post Appeai Proceedings: receive Minute 
Entry from Judge Dever requesting affidavits 
concerning billing rates; telephone 
conference with attorney Willis Orton re 
affidavit; telephone conference with John 
Weston re affidavit; telephone conference 
with Kent Alderman re affidavit 
User 
Activity 
Client 
Reference 
Units 
DNBTime 
Est. Time 
Variance 
Rate 
Rate Info 
Bill Status 
Slip Value 
0.00 
17012 
3/31/2005 
WIP 
TIME Jensen 
Post Appeal 
Custom3 Blevins 
Post Appeai Proceedings: review files and 
meet with Willis Orton re attorney fees and a 
review of case. 
17034 TIME 
4/6/2005 
WIP 
Post Appeal Proceedings: exchange e-mail 
letters with attorney John Weston re 
affidavit; review and organize files in 
preparation to meet with Willis Orton; meet 
with Willis Orton to review and examine 
pleadings; meet with Orton and answer 
questions as necessary; review affidavit for 
technical correctness. 
Jensen 
Post Appeal 
Custom3 Blevins 
0.80 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.60 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
200.00 
T@1 
200.00 
T@1 
160.00 
320.00 
17048 
4/7/2005 
WIP 
TIME Jensen 
Post Appeal 
Custom3 Blevins 
Post Appeal Proceedings: exchange e-mail 
messages with attorney John West re his 
affidavit. 
17058 TIME 
4/8/2005 
WIP 
Post Appeal Proceedings: telephone call 
from attorney Orton re his affidavit; read and 
review said affidavit. 
Jensen 
Post Appeal 
Custom3 Blevins 
17066 
4/12/2005 
WIP 
TIME Jensen 
Post Appeal 
Custom3 Blevins 
Post Appeal Proceedings: prepare and file 
Defendants' Affidavits on Attorney Fees from 
Local Attorneys; update and prepare "post 
appeai attorney fees on remand." 
0.10 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.30 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.50 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
200.00 
T@1 
200.00 
T@1 
200.00 
T@1 
20.00 
60.00 
100.00 
<zw 
4/12/2005 
10:18 AM 
Michael A. Jensen 
Slip Listing Page 4 
Slip ID User Units Rate Slip Value 
Dates and Time Activity DNB Time Rate Info 
Posting Status Client Est. Time Bill Status 
Description Reference Variance 
Grand Total 
Billable 24.60 4920.00 
Unbillable 0.00 0.00 
Total 24.60 4920.00 
Tab 10 
MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231) 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 571708 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708 
(801) 519-9040; Fax:519-9264 
Counsel for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
450 South State Street 
PO Box I860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860 
Clerk: 238-7480; In-Court Clerk: 238-7464/7325 (Shandra/Debbie/Darla) S35 
STEVEN BLEVINS AND 
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, 
INC., ET AL 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM ON ATTORNEY 
FEES AND COSTS 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge L.A. Dever 
This post-judgment and post-appeal matter came before this Court in the form of a 
Scheduling Conference held on November 19, 2004. At the conclusion of the 
Conference, this Court requested the parties to submit memoranda on how this Court 
should resolve the issues pending on remand from the Utah Court of Appeals. At the 
direction of this Court, this first memorandum is to be submitted by those Defendants 
who prevailed on appeal. Plaintiffs will then have 10 days to respond, and Defendants 
may, if they choose, file a reply memorandum prior to submitting this matter for decision. 
. - u .v iKi l i CGURi Filed 12/06/2004 
RELEVANT FACTS ON THE ISSUES OF FEES AND COSTS 
1. Plaintiffs commenced their lawsuit against Defendants for breach of a prior 
Settlement Agreement that contained a provision for attorney fees to the prevailing party. 
2. Certain Defendants, namely Custom Steel Fabrication, Inc., Mark Garamendi and 
Heidi Bishop, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the basis of res judicata, and this Court 
granted said motion. Accordingly, on May 2, 2001, this Court entered an order and 
judgment dismissing these particular three Defendants from the lawsuit. 
3. The remaining Defendants, Randy Isaacson, Linda Isaacson, Jason Bishop, and 
Wendy Garamendi, then filed a series of motions for summary judgment on each of the 
four causes of action; all four causes of action were subsequently dismissed. 
4. Counsel for Defendants then submitted on December 7, 2001, his affidavit of 
attorney fees, including detailed billing records. The amount of fees sought in such 
affidavit were $10,354. 
5. Based on the vigorous objections filed by Plaintiffs and based on the well-
established principal of "fees for fees," counsel for Defendants filed on 
December 26, 2001, an amended affidavit of fees seeking $11,538. 
6. Without hearing or comment, this Court then awarded on February 1, 2002, 
attorney fees for Defendants in the amount of $6,050. 
7. After extensive efforts to collect from Plaintiffs the judgment entered against 
them, the judgment amount of $6,050 was paid to Defendants on May 1, 2002, following 
a hearing held on April 12, 2002, at which hearing this Court denied the attempt by 
Plaintiffs to characterize the $6,050 as a supersedeas bond. 
-2-
8. Immediately following this Court's ruling, counsel for Defendants filed a Motion 
to Augment Judgment and submitted in support his First Affidavit of Attorney Fees and 
Costs Relating to the Collection of Judgment. 
9. On May 8, 2004, this Court declined to rule on Defendants' Motion to Augment 
and merely filed the Motion and Order unsigned. 
10. After multiple attempts to obtain a signed order, this Court eventually signed on 
September 22, 2002, without hearing or comment, an order denying any fees and costs to 
Defendants that they incurred during the collection phase of these proceedings. 
11. Both orders of this Court, the judgment entered on February 1, 2002, and the 
order entered on September 22, 2002, were appealed in two separate appeals. These 
appeals were subsequently consolidated into one appeal. 
12. On June 10, 2004, the Utah Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision 
which reversed the two orders of this Court and remanded for a determination of such 
fees consistent with the Decision. The Decision, however, was silent on the issue of 
whether attorney fees were to be awarded on appeal. 
13. After Defendants filed a Petition for Rehearing, the Utah Court of Appeals 
issued on August 5, 2004, an Amended Memorandum Decision, a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. This Amended Decision expressly provides for attorney 
fees on appeal and such fees are to be determined by this Court on remand. 
14. On October 8, 2004, Defendants filed, pursuant to Rule 34(d), Utah R. App. P., 
their Verified Bill of Costs. 
15. On October 21, 2004, Plaintiffs filed objections to Defendants' request for costs, 
but they did not dispute the amount of such costs. 
-3-
16. Consistent with the Amended Memorandum Decision from the Court of 
Appeals, counsel for Defendants filed on November 19, 2004, his affidavit of attorney 
fees incurred on appeal. 
PROPOSED PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINATION OF FEES AND COSTS 
It appears that there are five issues to be resolved by this Court. 
1. What amount of costs on appeal, as provided by Rule 34(d), should be awarded, 
2. What amount of attorney fees during the trial phase of these proceedings should 
be awarded. The initial amount sought was $11,538; the amount awarded was $6,050. 
3. What amount of attorney fees and costs should be awarded during the collection 
phase of these proceedings. The amount sought was $2,035 in fees and $72 in costs, for a 
total amount of $2,107; no amount was awarded. 
4. What amount of attorney fees should be awarded on appeal; the amount sought is 
$10,020 and such amount is supported by affidavit and billing records. 
5. What amount of attorney fees should be awarded for the proceedings on remand, 
such amount being determined at the conclusion of these post-appeal proceedings. 
OPTION 1: 
Defendants recommend that this Court hold an evidentiary hearing on all five issues1 
set forth above. In advance of such a hearing, either side should be required to submit the 
identities of any witnesses, giving each party reasonable time to submit the identities of 
rebuttal witnesses. Defendants urge the Court to severely limit the number of such 
1
 The Costs on appeal should be summarily granted, since Plaintiffs do not dispute the 
amount of such Costs and there is no legally cognizable basis to object to such Costs. 
-4-
witnesses and the amount of time for hearing; 1-2 hours and 1-2 witnesses are suggested. 
Following such hearing, this Court should then enter findings of fact and judgment on 
each of the five issues. 
OPTION 2: 
Alternatively, Defendants recommend that this Court enter findings of fact and 
judgment based on the pleadings submitted, provided, however, that Plaintiffs do not 
support any of their objections by third-party affidavits. If Plaintiffs intend to support 
their objections by testimony from third parties, such witnesses should be subject to cross 
examination by Defendants. This is particularly important because during the trial phase, 
Plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of a local attorney. It is clear that his testimony was 
based on biased and incomplete information and was also based on a misapprehension of 
the law.2 Previously, Defendants had no opportunity to challenge the opinions of such 
attorney or to conduct voir dire. 
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF FEES AND COSTS 
To facilitate these proceedings and to avoid lengthy and costly litigation to 
determine the amount of fees and costs to be awarded, Defendants set forth herein their 
arguments in support of the fees and costs sought. For expediency and to assist the Court, 
Defendants attach hereto each of their previously submitted affidavits for fees and costs. 
2
 In the affidavit submitted during the trial phase, attorney Stephens indicated that the 
amount in controversy was only about $6,000. That is clearly in error, since Plaintiffs' pleadings 
expressly asserted claims exceeding 516,000 on one cause of action, plus attorney fees and costs. 
Further, Mr. Stephens opined that fees should be in relation to the amount in controversy. 
Utah's appellate courts, however, have rejected such a notion. 
-5-
Issue No. 1: Bill of Costs on Appeal 
Defendants timely filed their Verified Bill of Costs incurred on appeal, seeking a 
total amount of $575.97, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B. Rule 34(d), 
Utah R. App. P., expressly states that if no objections are filed within five days of such 
filing, "the clerk of the trial court shall tax the costs as filed and enter judgment for the 
party entitled thereto, which judgment shall be entered in the judgment docket with the 
same force and effect as in the case of other judgments of record." 
First, Plaintiffs did not file their objections until the passage of 13 days. Rule 34(d) 
mandates the action by the clerk of the trial court: 
The adverse party may, within 5 days of service of the bill of costs, serve and 
file a notice of objection, together with a motion to have the costs taxed by the 
trial court. If there is no objection to the cost bill within the allotted time, the 
clerk of the trial court shall tax the costs as filed and enter judgment for the 
party entitled thereto, which judgment shall be entered in the judgment docket 
with the same force and effect as in the case of other judgments of record. 
By any standard, the clerk of the trial court failed to comply with Rule 34(d). There 
is no discretion given to the clerk. The term "shall" mandates that the clerk enter 
judgment as filed, since Plaintiffs failed to object within the required "5 days." Further, 
the clerk is also mandated to enter judgment even if Plaintiffs timely object: 
If the cost bill of the prevailing party is timely opposed, the clerk, upon 
reasonable notice and hearing, shall tax the costs and enter a final 
determination and judgment which shall thereupon be entered in the judgment 
docket with the same force and effect as in the case of other judgments of 
record. 
Although not timely opposed, the clerk is not to be absolved of her duty when 
Plaintiffs belatedly filed their objections. That would provide a greater advantage to a 
late filer than to a timely filer. Even if Plaintiffs are excused from filing their objections 
within five days, the clerk is required to enter judgment. Only after judgment has been 
entered, and within five days of such entry, may this Court review the judgment: 
"The determination of the clerk shall be reviewable by the trial court upon the 
request of either party made within 5 days of the entry of the judgment." 
This Court is not authorized to review the determination of the clerk until after entry 
of the judgment. Accordingly, this Court should instruct the clerk of the trial court to 
enter judgment and strictly comply with Rule 34(d). 
Second, Plaintiffs do not object to the amount of costs sought by Defendants. 
Rather, Plaintiffs appear to object only to the intent of Rule 34(d), believing that 
Defendants are not entitled to any costs. Plaintiffs failed to raise this issue on appeal. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have no legally cognizable basis to now object to the award of 
costs to Defendants. 
Issue No. 2: Attorney Fees during trial phase. 
The initial amount sought for attorney fees during the trial phase was $11,538. See 
Amended Affidavit of Attorney Fees, attached hereto as Exhibit C.3 Without hearing or 
comment, the Court awarded $6,050. However, the Court first found that the fees sought 
by Defendants were reasonable, stating that"... after reviewing the affidavit of attorney 
3
 The Amended Affidavit does not duplicate the extensive billing records attached to the 
initial Affidavit. The initial Affidavit and billing records are attached hereto as Exhibit D. 
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fees submitted by Defendants and finding such fees to be reasonable, orders .. ." 
Notwithstanding this Court's finding that the fees sought by Defendants were reasonable, 
and notwithstanding that Defendants sought $11,538 tn fees, this Court entered $6,050 as 
the amount to awarded. 
On the issue of attorney fees, the Utah Supreme Court has demanded detailed 
findings to "cdisclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue 
was reached.'" Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev, Corp, v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 
909 P.2d 225, 231 (Utah 1995) {quoting Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 131 P.2d 996, 999 
(Utah 1987)). 
In Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996) the Utah Supreme Court 
stated the following: 
The findings here appear to me to state little more than the trial 
court's ultimate legal conclusion. In contrast, this court has always 
demanded findings sufficiently detailed to "'disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.m Butler, 
Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 
P.2d 225, 231 (Utah 1995) [quoting Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 121 P.2d 996, 
999 (Utah 1987)). We demand detailed findings because the 
reasonableness of an attorney fee award is a highly fact-sensitive legal 
determination and '"detailed findings are necessary to enable this court to 
meaningfully review the issues on appeal.1" State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774, 788 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 770 (Utah 
Ct App. 1990)); see Cottonwood Mall, 830 P.2d at 269 ("Although a trial 
court has discretion to determine an award of attorney fees, the exercise of 
that discretion must be based on an evaluation of the evidence."); Cabrera 
v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1985) ("An award of attorneys fees 
must generally be made on the basis of findings of fact supported by the 
evidence and appropriate conclusions of law."). 
Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 901 (Utah 1996) {emphasis added). 
-8-
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Based on a careful review of the billing records submitted by counsel for Defendants 
and based on a careful review of the Court's Docket, attached hereto as Exhibit G, the 
amount of fees sought appear to be more than reasonable. The total number of hours 
spent by counsel for Defendants leading to judgment against Plaintiffs was 58.5 hours. 
An additional 6.4 hours was spent in preparing final orders and defending against 
Plaintiffs' objections to the attorney fees sought by Defendants. The total number of 
hours by December 26, 2001 was 64.9. 
This lawsuit was commenced by Plaintiffs on August 3, 2000. The Amended 
Affidavit of Fees was filed on December 26, 2001, a period of 17 months. This 
represents only 3.8 hours per month during the litigation. During this period of time, 
Defendants conducted discovery (two sets of interrogatories), filed separate motions for 
summary judgment on each of the four causes of action, and defended against Plaintiffs' 
Rule 59 Motion and against Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 
Defendants successfully defended against Plaintiffs' 59 Motion and Plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment. Defendants also successfully prevailed on each of their 
motions for summary judgment. When examining the details of the procedural steps 
taken by Defendants, this Court should find that they were reasonably calculated to 
prevail against Plaintiffs. This Court should also find that the amount of time billed for 
each itemized task during this 17-month period was reasonable. 
For example, the legal work included a review of litigation in a previous bankruptcy 
case in which one of the Defendants in this case allegedly had not relinquished certain 
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funds to Plaintiffs. In response to that allegation, it was necessary to obtain the affidavit 
of another attorney, Richard Perkins, including various supporting documents from the 
bankruptcy case. This led to the dismissal of the first cause of action. This particular task 
required extensive research of documents in the prior bankruptcy case and interviews of 
attorney Perkins. Although the first cause of action was a frivolous claim, it nonetheless 
required a substantial amount of time to defeat Plaintiffs' claim. 
Issue No, 3: Attorney Fees during the collection phase. 
Plaintiffs used every possible tactic to avoid paying the judgment entered against 
them in the amount of $6,050. Defendants attempted service of a Supplemental Order on 
Plaintiffs, but they intentionally avoided service. Service was eventually perfected by 
serving Mr. Blevins when he attended a deposition. He then ignored the Supplemental 
Order and failed to appear as ordered. Judge Medley authorized a bench warrant for 
Mr. Blevins but stayed the execution until a pending hearing was held with this Court. 
A garnishment was also attempted but Mr. Blevins had devised a scheme to maintain 
a zero balance in his check account but have all checks honored by a check protection 
system offered by his bank. 
In a bizarre and impermissible manner, Plaintiffs also initiated post-judgment 
discovery on Defendants. Defendants were compelled to file a motion for protective 
order. Plaintiffs then withdrew their discovery requests. Plaintiffs attempted to shield 
$6,050 by first depositing that amount with the clerk of the court and then attempting to 
40-
characterize such amount as a supersedeas bond. At a hearing, this Court rejected that 
characterization and ordered the amount deposited by Plaintiffs, $6,050, to be paid over to 
Defendants. 
During this arduous collection process, 11 hours were expended and $72 in costs 
were incurred. According to Defendants' First Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs 
Relating to the Collection of Judgment, attached hereto has Exhibit E, a total of $2,107 
was sought for fees and costs during the collection phase. Without comment, this Court 
denied those fees and costs. Again, the Utah Court of Appeals requires this Court to 
make specific findings to support such a denial In the alternative, this Court should grant 
the request of Defendants for $2,107, since the award of fees to obtain or collect of fees is 
authorized by law and the amount of $2,107 is reasonable. 
Utah's appellate courts have declared that "fees for fees" is permissible. In Salmon, 
the Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of "fees for fees." 
Although this court has not directly addressed the issue of whether 
fees incurred in recovering fees allowed under a statute should also 
be awarded pursuant to the statute, we agree with the rationale 
articulated in American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-
CIO, Local 3882 v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 301 U.S. 
App. D.C. 293, 994 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1993): 
Federal courts have repeatedly recognized that the 
unavailability of "fees for fees" could render fee-shifting 
provisions impotent, thereby reducing the effectiveness of 
the underlying statutes.... An award of "fees for fees" is 
not merely a remote descendant of the underlying action 
from which it derives. Rather, it is an integral aspect of the 
statutory scheme on which the underlying claim is based. 
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994 F,2d at 22; see also Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 
154, 163-64, 110 L.Ed. 2d 134, 110 S. Ct. 2316 (1990); 
Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47, 53 (3d Cir. 1978); 
Souza v. Southworth, 564 F.2d 609, 614 (1st Cir. 1977). This 
rationale is {916 P.2d 896} consistent with our prior case law 
awarding attorney fees for appeals where attorney fees are 
initially authorized by statute. See First Southwestern 
Financial Servs., 875 P.2d 553, 556 (Utah 1994). 
Analogously, we have recognized that a contractual obligation 
to pay attorney fees incurred in enforcing a contract should 
also include fees incurred on appeal. In Management Services 
v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 408-09 (Utah 
1980), we stated that the purpose of an attorney fees provision 
is to indemnify the prevailing party against the necessity of 
paying attorney fees and thereby enable him to recover the 
full amount of the obligation. Id. at 409. In accordance with 
this purpose, we concluded that Ma provision for payment of 
attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees incurred 
by the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if the 
action is brought to enforce the contract." Id. Similarly, the 
court of appeals recently ruled that the prevailing party in a 
dispute over a contractual attorney fees provision was 
entitled, not only to attorney fees on appeal, but also to the 
fees it incurred establishing the reasonableness of the fees for 
which it was entitled to be indemnified. James Constructors 
v. Salt Lake City, 888 P.2d 665, 674 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 895-96 (Utah 1996) 
If the fee-shifting provisions of the Settlement Agreement that gave rise to an award 
of fees in this action are to have their intended meaning, Defendants are entitled to an 
award of their fees and costs necessarily incurred in collecting the initial award of fees. 
Again, if this Court carefully reviews the billing records, attached hereto as Exhibit E, 
and submitted in support of the fees sought for collection, it should find those fees and 
costs to be reasonable. Accordingly, this Court should award $2,107 to Defendants. 
-12-
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Issue No. 4: Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
The Utah Court of Appeals expressly authorized an award to Defendants of their 
reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal. The amount sought by Defendants is 
$10,020, and which amount is supported by affidavit and billing records, a copy of which 
are attached hereto as Exhibit F. This appeal required two separate docketing statements, 
since there were at the beginning two separate appeals. To avoid two separate briefs, 
however, a motion to consolidate was made. This was granted so that only one brief was 
required. 
Based on Plaintiffs' opposing brief, it was appropriate to file a reply brief. Further, 
because the Court of Appeals failed to authorize an award of attorney fees on appeal, a 
petition for rehearing was filed. The total of 51 hours of legal time should be deemed 
reasonable under the circumstances of this appeal. Accordingly, this Court should award 
$10,020 in attorney fees to Defendants. 
Issue No. 5: Attorney Fees on Remand, 
Since "fees for fees" is well established, it is appropriate and reasonable for this 
Court to also award reasonable attorney fees to Defendants incurred during the remand 
phase of these proceedings. That is, Defendants are entitled to recover their legal fees 
incurred in establishing an award of fees. Such potential award is intended to shift the 
fees as provided by contract and to act as deterrent against Plaintiffs' frivolous and 
prolonged objections against an award of fees. Plaintiffs could at any time agree to pay a 
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sum certain to Defendants and end these proceedings. But for Plaintiffs' contentious 
defense against an award of fees and costs to Defendants, this matter would be ended and 
Defendants would no longer incur any attorney fees or costs.4 
From the citation made above, 
Similarly, the court of appeals recently ruled that the prevailing party 
in a dispute over a contractual attorney fees provision was entitled, 
not only to attorney fees on appeal but also to the fees it incurred 
establishing the reasonableness of the fees for which it was entitled 
to be indemnified. James Constructors v. Salt Lake City, 888 P.2d 
665, 674 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 895-96 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added) 
Since the proceedings on remand are for the sole purpose of establishing the 
reasonableness of the fees for which Defendants are entitled, the fees incurred on remand 
should be awarded to Defendants. While the exact amount of such fees cannot be 
determined until the conclusion of the remand proceedings, the amount of time spent so 
far, including the drafting and filing of this memorandum, has been slightly more than 11 
hours, or in the amount of $2,220. This does not include any further time at hearing, or 
preparing a reply memorandum, or in preparing a final order and judgment. 
4
 For example, Defendants offered a settlement amount to Plaintiffs after the Utah Court 
of Appeals issued its Amended Memorandum Decision. Prior to any fees being incurred by 
Defendants on remand, total fees and costs sought were 518,191. Plaintiffs were extended an 
offer to end this matter with a single payment of $14,000 or monthly payments of $1,100. 
Plaintiffs offered no response nor any offer to negotiate a settlement. Accordingly, Plaintiffs 
should now bear the additional attorney fees for their unwillingness to settle this matter. 
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Once the Court issues its findings and ruling, Defendants will then file and serve a 
final affidavit of attorney fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants seek $18,191 in fees and costs incurred prior to the proceedings on 
remand. So far on remand, attorney fees incurred are about $2,220. This brings the 
amount sought by Defendants to $20,411. This amount is to be supplemented to the 
extent of any additional fees incurred at hearing, in drafting a reply memorandum and in 
preparing any final order and judgment. 
Defendants recommend a brief hearing without witnesses, or no more than 1-2 
witnesses per side. Alternatively, Defendants recommend that the Court rule on the 
memoranda submitted, provided that no third-party affidavits are submitted in support or 
provided that the Court disallows such affidavits, if any. 
DATED this 6th day of December 2004. 
Michael A. Jensen / I 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge L.A. Dever 
STEVEN BLEVINS AND 
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., ET AL, 
Defendants. 
I, Michael A. Jensen, Counsel for the Defendants, hereby certify that on this day I 
personally served the foregoing MEMORANDUM ON ATTORNEY FEES AND 
COSTS by mailing a copy to: 
Steven and Debra Blevins 
10758 South 1090 East 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
DATED this 6th day of December 2004. 
MICHAEL A. JENSEN/Esq. 
Custom\Blevms3\Request for Order October 20, 2004 -16-
EXHIBIT INDEX 
Exhibit A Court of Appeals Amended Memorandum Decision (08/05/2004) 
Exhibit B Verified Bill of Costs (10/08/2004) 
Exhibit C Amended Affidavit of Attorney Fees (12/26/2001) 
Exhibit D Affidavit of Attorney Fees & Billing Records (12/07/2001) 
Exhibit E First Affidavit of Attorney Fees Relating to Collection of 
Judgment (04/12/2002) 
Exhibit F Affidavit of Attorney Fees on Appeal (11/19/2004) 
Exhibit G Court's Docket (12/04/2004) 
CustomVBlevins3\Request for Order October 20,2004 -17-
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COL 
AUG o 5 im 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Steven Blevins and Debra Kay 
Blevins, 
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Randv Isaacson; Linda 
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(Not For Official Publication) 
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Attorneys: Michael A. Jensen, Salt Lake City, for Appellants 
Steven Blevins and Debra Kay Blevins, Salt Lake City, 
Appellees Pro Se 
Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Greenwood. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Randy and Linda Isaacson, Jason Bishop, and Wendy Garamendi 
(collectively, Defendants) appeal from two orders of the trial 
court. We reverse and remand. 
Defendants make two arguments on appeal. Firsu, Defendants 
argue that the.trial court's decision to reduce their attorney 
fees, incurred as a result of defending a breach of contract 
action, was unsupported by findings of fact. Second, Defendants 
argue that the trial court's decision to deny them additional 
1. This Amended Memorandum Decision replaces the Memorandum 
Decision in Case No. 20020177-CA issued on June 10, 2004. 
attorney fees, incurred in pursuing enforcement of their initial 
award of attorney fees, was likewise unsupported by findings of 
fact. 
"Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and will not be overturned in the 
absence of a showing of a clear abuse of discretion." Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) . However, 
"although trial courts are normally afforded broad discretion in 
determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, such an award must 
be based on the evidence and supported by findings of fact." 
Anderson v. Poms, 1999 UT App 207,^9, 984 P.2d 392 (quotations 
and citations omitted). Specifically, in determining an award of 
reasonable attorney fees, trial courts are required to answer the 
following four questions: 
1. What legal work was actually performed? 
2 . How much of the work performed was 
reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute 
the matter? 
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent 
with the rates customarily charged in the 
locality for similar services? 
4. Are there circumstances which require 
consideration of additional factors, 
including those listed in the Code of 
Professional Responsibility? 
Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 990 (footnotes omitted). Indeed, 
this court has made it clear that a trial court (ff abuses its 
discretion in awarding less than the amount [of attorney fees] 
requested unless the reduction is warranted' by one or more of 
the above factors." Endrodv v. Endrodv, 914 P. 2d 1166, 1171 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (alteration in original) (citation omitted); 
see also Saunders v. Sharp, 818 P.2d 574, 580 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991) (noting that trial court erred because it reduced, without 
explanation, the prevailing party's attorney fees). 
In this case, the trial court determined in its first order 
that Defendants' initial request for attorney fees was 
"reasonable." However, without providing any explanation or 
making any findings of fact, the trial court then reduced the 
fees sought by Defendants from $11,538 to $6050, Although 
Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit from a local attorney stating 
that Defendants' attorney fees should not exceed $7000, it is not 
clear from the trial court's order that this was the reason for 
the reduction in the amount of fees awarded. Similarly, the 
•20020177-CA 
trial court's decision to deny Defendants' request for additional 
attorney fees, incurred in enforcing the original judgment, was 
unsupported by any findings of fact. In its second order, the 
trial court noted only that the additional fees requested were 
"unreasonable." 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's reduction in 
Defendants' initial award of attorney fees and its subsequent 
denial of Defendants' request for additional attorney fees 
constituted an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we remand for 
the entry of findings of fact consistent with this decision, and 
if appropriate, for an adjustment in the amount of attorney fees 
awarded to Defendants by the trial court. Moreover, because the 
fee-shifting provision of the settlement agreement entered into 
by the parties also allows for the recovery of attorney fees 
incurred on appeal, we award Defendants reasonable attorney fees 
incurred as a result of this appeal in an amount to be decermined 
by the trial court on remand. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, 
Associate--Presiding Judge 
James 
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As provided by Rule 34, Utah R. App, P., Defendants/Appellants, having prevailed 
on appeal and the trial court's ruling being reversed and remanded, hereby submit their 
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Filing Fees (2 consolidated appeals x S190) S380.00 
Printing Brief $141.06 
Printing Reply Brief S30.69 
Printing Petition for Rehearing S24.22 
Total Taxable Costs S575.97 
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Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
VERIFICATION 
: ss. 
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STEVEN BLEVINS AND 
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, 
INC., ET AL 
Defendants. 
AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
(MICHAEL A. JENSEN) 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge L.A. Dever 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Michael A. Jensen, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am over the age of twenty-one years, and I am competent to provide the 
information, under oath, that is contained in this Affidavit. This information is based on 
my personal knowledge. If called upon to testify in a court of law, I could, and would, 
testify the same as I have stated herein. 
2. I am legal counsel to Defendants in the above-entitled action. 
I 
3. Since the commencement of this action, I have been providing legal services 
for Defendants in connection with all phases of litigation in the above entitled action. 
4. I have personally spent more than 76.4 hours representing Defendants in this 
action, some of which were not billed. The Court previously awarded attorney fees for 
my time in dismissing three of the initial Defendants. The number of hours attributable 
for that award was 7.6 hours. My hourly rate was $175 when this matter first began but it 
increased to $185 per hour effective September 1, 2001, for a blended hourly rate of $177 
during the entire litigation. After deducting for the 7.6 hours of time previously awarded 
by the Court, the resultant number of hours expended in this litigation is 64.9 hours. At 
the blended rate of $177, the total attorney fees for this litigation is $11,538. 
5. I believe that the hourly rate charged by me is reasonable and comparable to 
those charged by other attorneys with similar experience and for similar litigation 
activities. 
6. I believe that the time I spent was reasonable under all of the circumstances. 
The legal issues raised were such that reasonable research and writing were required to 
bring about the dismissal of all four causes of action contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint was essentially frivolous and without merit. For example, I had to 
review litigation in a previous bankruptcy case in which one of the Defendants in this 
case allegedly had not relinquished certain funds to Plaintiffs. In response to that 
allegation, I obtained the affidavit of another attorney, Richard Perkins, including various 
supporting documents from the bankruptcy case. I then filed a motion for summary 
judgment on the First Cause of Action. After filing that motion, Plaintiffs filed a "non-
opposition" and the First Cause of Action was dismissed. 
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A second motion for summary judgment was filed on the Second Cause of Action, 
but in that instance, Plaintiffs filed an opposition memorandum, although extremely weak 
in nature and content. At hearing on November 30, 2001, Plaintiffs conceded dismissal 
of their Second Cause of Action. 
After a scheduling conference and two sets of written discovery on Plaintiffs and 
after responding to written discovery requests from Plaintiffs, 1 filed a third motion for 
summary judgment on the Third and Fourth Causes of Action. Plaintiffs responded 
vigorously in opposition to the Third Cause of Action and also filed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment. After scheduling and rescheduling by the Court, a hearing was held 
on November 30, 2001. At hearing, Plaintiffs conceded dismissal of their Fourth Cause 
of Action, but they vigorously, and I believe unreasonably, defended against summary 
judgment on their Third Cause of Action. Nonetheless, the Court granted summary 
judgement on all remaining causes of action and dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
7. This Amended Affidavit is for the sole purpose of adding 6.4 hours for research 
and drafting a Response to Plaintiffs' Objections and to update and prepare this affidavit. 
DATED this 26th day of December 2001. 
Michael A. Jensen / J 
On the 26{h day of December 2001, personally appeared before me, 
Michael A. Jensen, the signer of the within Affidavit, who acknowledged to me that he 
did execute the same and that the contents thereof are true, accurate and complete to the 
best of his information and belief. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Custom\Blevinb3\Jensen AfT3 Fees December 26, 2001 - 3 - "Notaiy Public""" "1 LYNDAA.H0LBRO0K , 
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I, Michael A. Jensen, Counsel for Defendants, hereby certify that on this day I 
personally served the foregoing AMENDED AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
(MICHAEL A. JENSEN) by personally mailing a copy to: 
Ronald L. Dunn 
Attorney at Law 
68 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
(801) 521-3800; Fax: 537-1315 
DATED this 26th day of December 2001 
MICHAEL A. JEf^SiN 
Custom\Blevins3\Jensen A A3 Feos December 26, 2001 - 4 -
M I C H A E L A. J E N S E N (7231) Filed & Served 12/07/2001 
Attorney at Law 
730 Three Fountains #87 
PO Box 571708 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708 
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264 
Counsel for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
450 South State Street 
PO Box I860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860 
Clerk: 23S-7480; In-Court Clerk: 238-7464/77325 (Audrey/Debbie/Bryce) W37 
STEVEN BLEVINS AND 
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, 
INC., ET AL 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES (MICHAEL A. JENSEN) 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge L.A. Dever 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Michael A. Jensen, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am over the age of twenty-one years, and I am competent to provide the 
information, under oath, that is contained in this Affidavit. This information is based on 
my personal knowledge. If called upon to testify in a court of law, I could, and would, 
testify the^ same as I have stated herein. 
2> I am legal counsel to Defendants in the above-entitled action. 
3. Since the commencement of this action, I have been providing legal services 
for Defendants in connection with all phases of litigation in the above entitled action. 
4. I have personally spent more than 70 hours representing Defendants in this 
action, some of which were not billed. The Court previously awarded attorney fees for 
my time in dismissing three of the initial Defendants. The number of hours attributable 
for that award was 7.6 hours. My hourly rate was $175 when this matter first began but it 
increased to SI 85 per hour effective September 1, 2001, for a blended hourly rate of SI 77 
during the entire litigation. After deducting for the 7.6 hours of time previously awarded 
by the Court, the resultant number of hours expended in this litigation is 58.5 hours. At 
the blended rate of $177, the total attorney fees for this litigation is $10,354. 
5. I believe that the hourly rate charged by me is reasonable and comparable to 
those charged by other attorneys with similar experience and for similar litigation 
activities. 
6. I believe that the time I spent was reasonable under all of the circumstances. 
The legal issues raised were such that reasonable research and writing were required to 
bring about the dismissal of all four causes of action contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
Plaintiffs5 Complaint was essentially frivolous and without merit. For example, I had to 
review litigation in a previous bankruptcy case in which one of the Defendants in this 
case allegedly had not relinquished certain funds to Plaintiffs. In response to that 
allegation, I obtained the affidavit of another attorney, Richard Perkins, including various 
supporting documents from the bankruptcy case. I then filed a motion for summary 
judgment on the First Cause of Action. After filing that motion, Plaintiffs filed a "non-
opposition" and the First Cause of Action was dismissed. 
2 
A second motion for summary judgment was filed on the Second Cause of Action, 
but in that instance, Plaintiffs filed an opposition memorandum, although extremely weak 
in nature and content. At hearing on November 30, 2001, Plaintiffs conceded dismissal 
of their Second Cause of Action. 
After a scheduling conference and two sets of written discovery on Plaintiffs and 
after responding to written discovery requests from Plaintiffs, I filed a third motion for 
summary judgment on the Third and Fourth Causes of Action. Plaintiffs responded 
vigorously in opposition to the Third Cause of Action and also filed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment. After scheduling and rescheduling by the Court, a hearing was held 
on November 30, 2001. At hearing, Plaintiffs conceded dismissal of their Fourth Cause 
of Action, but they vigorously, and I believe unreasonably, defended against summary 
judgment on their Third Cause of Action. Nonetheless, the Court granted summary 
judgement on all remaining causes of action and dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
7. I have attached hereto my billing records in this matter. 
DATED this 3rd day of December 2001. 
Michael A. Jensen ( J 
On the 3rd day of December 2001, personally appeared before me, 
Michael A. Jensen, the signer of the within Affidavit, who acknowledged to me that he 
did execute the same and that the contents thereof are true, accurate and complete to the 
best of his information and belief. 
Cu>som\Bkvms3\Jcnscn A112 Fees December 3, 2001 3 
CERTIFICATION 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge LA. Dever 
STEVEN BLEVINS AND 
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS, Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., ET AL, Defendants. 
I, Michael A. Jensen, Counsel for Defendants, hereby certify that oh this day I 
personally served the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
(MICHAEL A. JENSEN) by personally delivering a copy to: 
Ronald L. Dunn 
Attorney at Law 
68 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
(801) 521-3800; Fax: 537-1315 
DATED this 7th day of December 2001 
MICHAEL A. JENj 
Custom\Blevins3\;ttns«n AI12 Fees December 3,2001 4 
'2/02/01 
1.13PM 
Michael A. Jensen 
Slip Listing Page 
Selection Criteria 
Siip Classification Open 
Client (hand select) include: Custom3 Blevins 
SliD.Transaction Ty 1-1 
:
 ate Info - identifies rate source and (eve! 
SiipiD 
Dates and Time 
Posting Status 
Description 
9127 TIME 
10/06/00 
Billed G:12145 10/31/00 
Litigation: read and review Complaint with 
Clients. 
9'2S TIME 
10/13/00 
Billed G:12145 10/31/00 
Litigation: telephone conversation with 
Client 
5129 TIME 
10/18/00 
Billed G:12145 10/31/00 
Litigation: telephone conversation with 
Client re representation. 
»1*0 TIME 
10/19/00 
Edled G:12145 10/31/00 
L iigation: draft Motion to Dismiss, Motion 
to Strike portions of Complaint, and 
Motion for a More Definite Statement. 
155 TIME 
10/30/00 
Billed G:12145 10/31/00 
L ligation: telephone conversation with 
Client (Randy) 
111 TIME 
11/13/00 
5 lied G:12193 11/30/00 
L ligation: telephone conversation with 
Richard Perkins re trust funds held by him 
aid turned overtto Trustee for Linda 
Isaacson's bankruptcy. 
User 
Activity 
Client 
Reference 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
i
Jensen 
Litigation 
Customs Blevins 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
Units 
DNB Time 
Est. Time 
Variance 
0.50 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.10 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00. 
0.00 
3.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.10 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.50 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Rate 
Rate Info 
Bill Status 
175.00 ~ 
T@1 
175.00 
T@1 
175.00 
T@1 
175.00 
T@1 
175.00 
T@1 
175.00 
T@1 
Slip Value 
87.50 
17.50 
35.00 
595.00 
17.50 
87.50 
12/02/01 
2 13 PM 
Michael A. Jensen 
Slip Listing Page 2 
Sup ID 
Dates and Time 
Posting Status 
Description 
9289 TIME 
11/18/00 
Billed G:12193 11/30/00 
Litigation: review dates of memoranda 
filed on motion to dismiss; draft, file, and 
mail Notice to Submit for Decision on 
Motion to Dismiss. 
User 
Activity 
Client 
Reference 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
Units 
DNB Time 
Est Time 
Variance 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Rate 
Rate Info 
Bill Status 
175.00 
T@1 
Slip Value 
35.00 
S297 TIME 
11/20/00 
Billed G:12193 11/30/00 
L tigation: file, draft, and mail Notice to 
S jbmit for Decision on Motion to Dismiss 
and to Strike. 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
175.00 
T@1 
35.00 
S607 TIME 
01/15/01 
E.IIed G:12373 03/31/01 
Litigation: telephone conversation with 
Richard Perkins re affidavit and when he 
will respond. 
S303 TIME 
01/29/01 
Billed G:12373 03/31/01 
Litigation: read and review revisions 
requested by Perkins for his affidavit; edit 
and revise affidavit; draft letter and fax to 
Perkins with revision and redlined version 
anc requesting signing to be this week. 
SS11 TIME 
01/30/01 
Billed G:12373 03/31/01 
L tigation: meet with Richard Perkins at 
his office to discuss affidavit and have him 
sign it and obtain good copies of exhibits 
to attach to affidavit. 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
0.10 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
175.00 
T@1 
17.50 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
0.80 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
175.00 
T@1 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
0.50 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
175.00 
T@1 
140.00 
87.50 
9645 TIME 
02 06/01 
Billed G.-.12373 03/31/01 
Legation: draft,-file, and serve Notice to 
S-omit for Decision on Motion to Dismiss; 
draft, file, and serve Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on First Cause of 
Ac:ion; draft, file.iand serve Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for same; finalize 
and incorporate Affidavit of Richard 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
3.80 
0.00 
0.00 
nnn 
175.00 
T@1 
665.00 
12/02/01 
: 13 PM 
Shp ID 
Dates and Time 
Posting Status 
Description 
2 
Perkins with Memorandum for SJ. 
9955 
04/09/01 
Billed 
TIME 
G:12426 04/30/01 
Litigation: telephone conversation with 
Judge Dever's I 
Michael A. Jensen 
Slip Listing 
User 
Activity 
Client 
. Reference 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
aw clerk, Ray, re status of 
aecision on two Notices to Submit for 
Decision. 
9957 
04/10/01 
Billed 
TIME 
G:12426 04/30/01 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
Units 
DNBTime 
Est. Time 
Variance _ 
0.10 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.50 
0.00 
0.00 
Rate 
Rate Info 
Bill Status 
175.00 
T@1 
175.00 
T@1 
Litigation: review Minute Entry of Judge 
Dever; draft proposed Order and 
Judgment based on Minute Entry; draft 
Motion and Memorandum for Attorney 
Fees; review billing records and draft 
Affidavit in support of attorney fees. 
0.00 
Page 
Slip Value 
17.50 
262.50 
>975 TIME Jensen 
04/11/01 . Litigation 
Silled G:12426 04/30/01 Custom3 Blevins 
Guardianship and/or Conservatorship 
Activities: arrange for deliver of 
documents ft Mr. Dunn; file documents at 
Court. 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
175.00 
T@1 
35.00 
979 TIME Jensen 
C 4/11/01 Litigation 
Slled G:12426 04/30/01 Custom3 Blevins 
Litigation: draft Answer to Complaint; draft 
First Discovery interrogatories, requests, 
a^d admissions; draft Motion for 
Scheduling Conference. 
3.60 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
175.00 
T@1 
630.00 
^C34 TIME 
3^/20/01 
Biled G.12426 04/30/01 
- ligation: receive and read Objection to 
rorm of Order; research issues of "with 
prejudice" and "on the merits;" draft 
Mternative Order; draft, file, and mail 
Defendants' Objection to Objection; draft 
\mended Motion for Attorney Fees; draft 
nd have notarized Amended Affidavit (for 
aorney fees). 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
1.60 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
175.00 
T@1 
280.00 
12/02/01 
2 13 PM 
Michael A. Jensen 
Slip Listing Page A 
Slip ID 
Dates and Time 
Posting Status 
Description 
10098 TIME 
04/30/01 
Billed G:12426 04/30/01 
Litigation: read and review motions and 
memoranda from Dunn. 
10138 TIME 
05/05/01 
Silled G12496 05/31701 
Litigation: draft response to Second 
Objection to form of Order and request for 
attorney fees; draft Second Amended 
Motion for Attorney Fees; draft Second 
Amended Affidavit of Attorney Fees. 
User 
Activity 
Client 
Reference 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
Units 
DNB Time 
Est. Time 
Variance 
0 20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.40 
0.00 
0 00 
0.00 
Rate 
Rate Info 
Bill Status 
175.00 
T@1 
175.00 
T@1 
Slip Value 
35 00 
245.00 
10139 TIME 
05/05/01 
Billed G.12496 05/31/01 
Litigation: draft Memorandum in 
Opposition to Rule 59 Motion. 
10140 TIME 
05/07/01 
Billed G:12496 05/31/01 
Litigation: draft and file at Court Notice to 
Submit on Form of Order, Memorandum 
in Opposition, Reponse to Second 
Objection, 2nd Amended Motion for 
Attorney Fees, and 2nd Amended 
Affidavit of Attorney Fees; deliver copies 
to Dunn. 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
2.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
175.00' 
T@1 
175.00 
'T@1 
385.00 
70.00 
10229 TIME Jensen 
05/21/01 Litigation 
Silled G:12496 05/31/01 Custom3 Blevins 
Litigation: draft and file Reply to 
Response to Second Amended Motion for 
Attorney Fees. 
1C231 TIME Jensen 
05/22/01 Litigation 
S.Med G-12496 05/31/01 Custom3 Blevins 
Litigation: review deposition of Steve 
0.90 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
4.80 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
175.00 
T@1 
175.00 
T@1 
157.50 
Blevins; review responses to Requests for 
Admissions; draft, file and serve Motion 
and Memorandum in Support of Partial 
Summary Judgment on Second Cause of 
Action; read and review first discovery 
requests from Dunn. 
840,00 
'2/02/01 
1 13 PM 
r i iD lD 
Dates and Time 
Posting Status 
Description 
10271 TIME 
05/30/01 
Billed G:12496 
Litigation: draft, file, and serve 
Memorandum; draft, file, and : 
to Submit for Decision. 
1D359 TIME 
06/19/01 
Billed G:12531 
05/31/01 
} Reply 
Michael A. Jensen 
Slip Listing 
User 
Activity 
Client 
_ Reference 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
serve Notice 
06/30/01 
Litiaation: telephone conversation with 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Customs Blevins 
Units 
DNB Time 
Est. Time 
Variance 
0.70 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Rate 
Rate Info 
Bill Status 
175.00 ~ 
T@1 
175.00 
T@1 
Slip Value 
122.50 
35.00 
Client re Discovery Requests from 
Blevins; review faxed responses from 
Client. 
Page 
1 1-358 TIME 
06/20/01 
Billed G:12531 06/30/01 
Litigation: Telephone conference with 
Judge Dever and Dunn re schedule to 
complete discovery and file dispositive 
motions. 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
0.10 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
175.00-' 
T@1 
17.50 
C365 TIME Jensen 
06/21/01 Litigation 
Billed G:12531 06/30/01 Custom3 Blevins 
litigation: review responses to Discovery 
from Clients; telephone conversation with 
Clients re same; draft formal Answers and 
Responses and priority mail to Clients for 
re/lew and signature. 
3385 TIME 
C6/25/01 
Billed G:12531 06/30/01 
Legation: receive completed signature 
page faxed from Clients; edit and revise 
Discovery Responses and mail and file 
same. 
2.80 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
175.00 
T@1 
490.00 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
0.30 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
175.00 
T@1 
52.50 
^55 TIME 
:7/12/01 
Eiled G:12571 07/31/01 
- ligation: review discovery responses 
Yom Dunn; draft and serve Second 
discovery Requests. 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
1.30 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
175.00 
T@1 
227.50 
12/02/01 
2 13 PM 
Michael A. Jensen 
Slip Listing Page 6 
SiiolD 
Dates and Time 
Posting Status 
Description 
10649 TIME 
08/17/01 
Billed G:12627 08/31/01 
Litigation: receive and read responses to 
second discovery requests. 
10650 TIME 
08/23/01 
Billed G:12627 08/31/01 
Litigation: begin drafting Memorandum in 
Opposition to Summary Judgment. 
10651 TIME 
08/24/01 
Billed G:12627 08/31/01 
Litigation: draft and mail affidavits to 
User 
Activity 
Client 
m Reference 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
Units 
DNB Time 
Est. Time 
Variance 
0.10 
O.OO 
0.00 
0.00 
6.30 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
4.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Rate 
Rate Info 
Bill Status 
175.00 ~ 
T@1 
175.00 
T@1 
175.00 
T@1 
Slip Value 
17.50 
1102.50 
770.00 
Clients; research issues of hearsay in 
affidavits and accord and satisfaction as it 
relates to interest; draft Motion and 
Memorandum to Strike Hearsay 
Testimony. 
1C652 TIME 
08/27/01 
Billed G:12627 08/31/01 
Litigation: draft Motion and Memorandum 
In Support of Summary Judgment on 3rd 
and 4th Causes of Action; telephone 
conversation with Client re affidavits and 
status of case in general. 
1C667 TIME 
08/29/01 
Eiiled G:12627 08/31/01 
Litigation: telephone conversation with 
Ghent re case and re affidavit; file Motion 
and Memorandum for Summary 
Judgment; serve Dunn and Client with 
copies. 
10663 TIME Jensen 
08/30/01 . Litigation 
Billed *G:12627 08/31/01 Custom3 Blevins 
Litigation: edit and revise Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment; file and seo/e same; mail copy 
to Client. 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
7.30 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
175.00 
T@1 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
0.30 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
175.00 
T@1 
2.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
175.00 
T@1 
1277.50 
52.50 
420.00 
12/02/01 
2 13 PM 
Michael A. Jensen 
Slip Listing Page 7 
Slip ID 
Dates and Time 
Posting Status 
Description 
10716 TIME 
09/05/01 
Billed G:12666 09/30/01 
Litigation: receive and review Notice to 
Submit on Summary Judgment; telephone 
conversation with Court; review Court's 
Docket; draft and fax letter to Dunn; draft 
Motion to Strike Notice to Submit. 
User 
Activity 
Client 
Reference 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
Units 
DNB Time 
Est. Time 
Variance 
0.70 
0.00 
0.00 
•0.00 
Rate 
Rate Info 
Bill Status 
185.00 ~ 
T@1 
Slip Value 
129.50 
'0775 TIME Jensen 
09/19/01 Litigation 
Billed G:12666 09/30/01 Custom3 Blevins 
Litigation: review Dunn's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on 3rd and 4th Causes of 
Action; draft Reply Memorandum on 
same Motion; draft Notice to Submit for 
Decision; review Dunn's Memo in 
Opposition to Motion to Strike Hearsay 
Testimony of Steven Blevins; research 
Rules of Evidence on Hearsay and 
exceptions; draft Reply Memorandum on 
same Motion; draft Notice to Submit for 
Decision on Motion; draft Request for 
Hearing on October 30th, date set for 
Motion for SJ on 2nd Cause of Action. 
5.90 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
185.00 
T@1 
1091.50 
0347 TIME Jensen 
'0/05/01 Litigation 
Silled G:12707 10/31/01 Custom3 Blevins 
Litigation; meet with Judge Dever's Clerk 
re pending motions and need to 
consolidate hearing on all such motions. 
3387 TIME 
10/1(3/01 
Billed G:12707 10/31/01 
Guardianship and/or Consen/atorship 
Activities: meet with Judge Dever's Clerk 
-e Request to Hear all Motions and 
:onfirm with her that all motions will be 
leard on October.30th, subject to any 
-a!ay caused by extensive jury trial 
^rrently underway. 
Jensen 
G&C 
Custom3 Blevins 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.10 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
•185.00 
T@1 
37.00 
185.00 
T@1 
308 TIME Jensen 
0/16/01 , Litigation 
illed G:12707 10/31/01 Custom3 Blevins 
itigation: draft, file and mail Notice of 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00-
0.00 
185.00 
T@1 
18.50 
37.00 
12/02/01 
2:13 PM 
Michael A. Jensen 
Slip Listing Page 8 
Slip ID 
Dates and Time 
Posting Status 
Description 
Hearing for October 30, 2001. 
11110 TIME 
11/13/01 
VVIP 
Litigation: meet with Judge Dever's clerk 
re schedule for hearing; draft, file and 
serve Withdrawal of Motion for 
Continuance. 
11154 TIME 
11/19/01 
WiP 
User 
Activity 
Client 
_ Reference 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
Units 
DNBTime 
Est. Time 
Variance __ 
0.30 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.50 
Q.QQ 
0.00 
Rate 
Rate Info 
Bill Status 
185.00 
T@1 
185.00 
T@1 
Slip Value 
Litigation: review case file and court's 
docket; draft and file Amended 
Withdrawal of Motion for Continuance; 
review Reply Affidavit of Blevins; draft and 
file Amended Motion to Strike to include 
Reply Affidavit of Blevins, 
0.00 
55.50 
92.50 
11184 TIME 
11/26/01 
WIP 
Litigation: organize and select documents 
to include as courtesy copies in a binder 
for Friday's hearing on motions for 
summary judgment. 
Jensen 
Litigation 
Custom3 Blevins 
1.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
185.00' 
T@1 
222.00 
11215 TIME Jensen 
11/30/01 ' Litigation 
WIP Custom3 Blevins 
Litigation: prepare for and attending 
hearing on Motions for Summary 
Judgment; begin draft of Final Order and 
Judgment. 
11218 TIME Jensen 
12/03/01 Litigation 
WIP Custom3 Blevins 
Legation: obtain copy of Court's docket 
and review entries; select from TimeSlips 
ail entries for this qase, excluding all costs 
and expenses; draft Affidavit of Attorney's 
Fees; edit and revise Final Order and 
Judgment. 
2.10 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
185.00 
T@1 
185.00 
T@1 
388.50 
259,00 
Gfand Total 
Slip Listing Page 9 
U s e r
 Units Rate Siip Value 
Activity DNB Time. Rate Info 
Client Est. Time Bill Status 
Reference Variance 
Billable 65.10 116S3.50 
Unbillable 0.00 0 00 
Total 66.10 11693.50 
^ 5 S __C7.Q O i l ! ^ 
MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231) 
Attorney at Law 
730 Three Fountains #87 
PO Box 571708 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-1708 
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264 
Counsel for Defendants 
Filed & Served 04/12/2002 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
450 South State Street 
PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -1860 
Clerk: 238-7480; In-Court Clerk: 238-7464/77325 (Audrey/Debbie/Bryce) W37 
STEVEN BLEVTNS AND 
DEBRA KAY BLEVTNS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RANDY ISAACSON, LINDA 
ISAACSON, WENDY GARAMENDI, 
AND JASON BISHOP, 
Defendants. 
FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
RELATING TO THE COLLECTION 
OF JUDGMENT 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge L.A. Dever 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Michael A. Jensen, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am over the age of twenty-one years, and I am competent to provide the 
informatibn, under oath, that is contained in this Affidavit. This information is based on 
my personal knowledge. If called upon to testify in a court of law, I could, and would, 
testify the same as I have stated herein. 
2. I am legal counsel to Defendants in the above-entitled action. 
3. Since the commencement of this action, I have been providing legal services 
for Defendants in connection with all phases of litigation in the above entitled action, 
including all efforts to collect on a judgment entered in favor of Defendants and against 
Plaintiffs. 
4. I have personally spent more than 10,0 hours in attempting to collect the 
Judgment amount of $6,050. In addition, costs were incurred in the amount of $72. The 
amount of time includes the preparation of this affidavit and die accompanying Motion to 
Augment Judgment. In addition, I expect to spend at least one additional hour at the 
hearing set on Plaintiffs' motion on Friday, April 12, 2002. Combined, my total hours in 
collection and related matters are 11.0 hours. At my standard billing rate of $185 per 
hour, total fees so far in the collection process are $2,035. Adding to that the above costs 
(service of process and garnishment fees) of $72, the total amount is $2,107. 
5. I believe that the hourly rate charged by me is reasonable and comparable to 
those charged by other attorneys with similar experience and for similar litigation 
activities. 
6. I believe that the time I spent was reasonable under all of the circumstances. 
The judgment debtors have vigorously and unreasonably avoided payment and thwarted 
were possible all attempts to collect on the Judgment. Defendant Steven Blevins failed to 
appear at a Supplemental Proceeding and the Court entered a Bench Warrant, pending the 
outcome of the hearing referenced above, Plaintiffs have also filed a Motion to Quash all 
- 2 -
supplemental proceedings and have even served discovery requests on Defendants, I 
have had to respond to each of these items. The judgment debtors are solely responsible 
for all of these additional legal fees and costs. 
7. This First Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs Relating to the Collection of 
Judgment is for the sole purpose of awarding to Defendants the additional fees and costs 
incurred by Plaintiffs1 intransigence. 
DATED this 12th day of April 2002. 
Michael A. Jensen ( 7 
On the 12th day of April 2002, personally appeared before me, Michael A. Jensen, 
the signer of the within Affidavit, who acknowledged to me that he did execute the same 
and that the contents thereof are true, accurate and complete to the best of his information 
and belief. 
Custom\Blevins3\Jensen Affl Collection Fees April 12,2002 - 3 -
CFRTTFTCATir-.N 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge L A. Dever 
bLLVLNBLEVIMS AND 
DFBRA KAY BI FVTNS, Waintin ,^ 
vs. 
CI SI f )M s i KL1 1 \\ili.U AlJON, INC., ET AI, Defendants. 
I, Michael A Jensen, Counsel for Defendants, hereby certify that on this da> 1 
personally served the foregoing FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
COSTS RELATING TO THF ( OLLECTION OF JUDGMENT by personally 
deliver-no; a COP1' h : 
Ronald L Dunn 
Attorney at Law 
68 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
(801) 521-3800; Fax: 537 
DA TED this i : day ot Apnl ~UU. 
H^wmafj 
MICHAEL A. JE: 
Custonv3Ie/ins3\Jensen Affl Collection Fees npnl 12, 20^  
04/11/02 
2:10 PM 
Michael A. Jensen 
Slip Listing Page 1 
Selection Criteria 
Activity (hand selec Include: Collections; Collections 
Slip.Classification Open 
Client (hand select) Include: Custom3 Blevins 
Rate Info - identifies rate source and level 
Slip ID 
Dates and Time 
Posting Status 
Description 
11468 TIME 
02/05/02 
WIP 
Collection Activities: obtain Court's 
Order and Judgment; draft and file 
Judgment Information; draft Supple 
Order and obtain from Court. 
11598 EXP 
03/04/02 
WIP 
Final 
sment 
User 
Activity 
Client 
_ Reference 
Jensen 
Collections 
Custom3 Blevins 
al 
Jensen 
Coiiections 
Customs Blevins 
Units 
DNB Time 
Est. Time 
Variance 
1.10 ~ 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1 
Rate 
Rate info 
Bill Status 
185.00 "~ 
T@1 
42.00 
Slip Value 
203.50 
42.00 
Collection Expenses: Process Server to 
Serve Steven Blevins with a 
Supplemental Order. 
11606 TIME 
03/18/02 
WIP 
Collection Activities: review fax letter and 
telephone message from Dunn requesting 
continuance of Supp Proceeding; draft 
and fax !etter to Dunn re same; telephone 
call from Dunn confirming date reset to 
3/28/2002. 
Jensen 
Coiiections 
Custom3 Blevins 
0.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
185.00 
T@1 
74.00 
11618 TIME 
03/19/02 
WIP 
Collection Activities: telephone call from 
Dunn re second change to Supplemental 
Proceeding. 
11664 
03/28/02 
WIP 
TIME 
Jensen 
Collections 
Custom3 Blevins 
Jensen 
Collections 
• Custom3 Blevins 
Litigation: review faxed motion from Dunn 
to quash supplemental order; draft 
Memorandum in Opposition. 
0.10 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
185.00 
T@1 
18.50 
185.00 
T@1 
444.00 
0 /^11/02 
: IOPM 
SiiD ID 
Dates and Time 
Posting Status 
Description 
11665 TiME 
03/29/02 
WIP 
Litigation: edit and revise Memorandum, 
file Memorandum in Opposition 
Motion to Quash 
11637 uME 
04/02/02 
WIP 
Collection Activities: attend Sup 
Michael A. Jenssi 
Siip Listing 
User 
Activity 
Client 
Reference _ _ 
Jensen 
Collections 
Customs Blevins 
to Btevms' 
l a q c p p 
He JIOI u 
Customs B'e/ins 
plemental 
n 
Un.ts 
DNB Time 
Est. Time 
Vanance 
0 60 
0 00 
0.00 
r nc 
1 20 
0 00 
0 00 
oro 
Rate 
Rate Info 
Bnl Status 
185.00 
T@1 
185.00 
T@1 
Proceeding; meet with Judge Medley; 
attempt to meet with Judge Dever's 
cierks; meet with Larry Gobelman re 
expediting hearing on Motion to Quasn. 
11756 EXP 
04/04/02 
WIP 
Collection Expenses: Garnishment Fes 
T~15 TiME 
04/05/02 
WIP 
Collection Activities: telephone 
Jensen 
Collections 
Ci'Stom3 Ble/ins 
Jensen 
Collections 
Custom3 Blevins 
1 
2 !U 
0 00 
0.G0 
0.00 
n ( - n 
185 00 
T@1 
conversation with Judge Dever's clerk to 
schedule a hearing on Motion to Quash; 
draft, file, and serve Notice of Hearing; 
review Dunn's postjudgment discovery 
requests; research issue of postjudgment 
discovery; confer by telephone with a 
retired judge on the issue; draft, file and 
sen/e Motion and Memorandum for 
Protective Order 
11730 TiME 
04/08/02 
WIP 
Collection Activities: Litigation: telephone 
conversation with Client re hearing this 
Friday. 
11753 .TIME 
04/10/02 
WIP 
Collection Activities: telephone call from 
Custom's Bankruptcy attorney in Idaho rn 
hearing and appearance of Blevins; 
te'eohone conversation with Client re 
Jensen 
Collections 
Custom3 Blevirs 
0 30 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
1S5C0 
T £ 1 
Jensen 
Collections 
Customs Blevins 
0 4 . 
0.00 
0.00 
0 00 
u . -U 
T@1 
Page 
S.ip Value 
222.00 
]Q 00 
388 50 
55.50 
F4.00 
04/11/02 
2.10 PM 
Michael A. Jensen 
Slip Listing Page 3 
Slip ID 
Dates and Time 
Posting Status 
Description 
User 
Activity 
Client 
Reference 
Units 
DNB Time 
Est. Time 
Variance 
Rate 
Rate Info 
Bill Status 
Slip Value 
same. 
11755 TIME 
04/11/02 
WIP 
Collection Activities: receive and review 
Notice of Plaintiffs' Supersedeas Bond 
faxed to me by Dunn; review Rule 62 re 
stays and supersedeas bonds; draft 
Motion for Augmented Judgment, 
including an Affidavit of Attorney Fees 
and Costs; file same with Court; Draft 
Bench Warrant consistent with Court's 
Order of 4/2/2002; obtain same from 
Court. 
Jensen 
Collections 
Custom3 Blevins 
1.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
185.00 
T@1 
259.00 
11757 EXP 
04/11/02 
WIP 
Collection Expenses: Service of Process 
to Serve US Bank with Writ of 
Garnishment. 
Jensen 
Collections 
Custom3 Blevins 
10.00 10.00 
Grand Total 
Billable 
Unbiliable 
Total 
10.00 
0.00 
10.00 
1922.00 
0.00 
1922.00 
MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231) 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 571708 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841574708 
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264 
Counsel for Defendants 
Filed & Served 11/19/2004 
JLN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
450 South State Street 
PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 841 i 1-1860 
Clerk: 238-7480; In-Court Clerk; 238-7464/77325 (Audrey/Debbie/Bryce) W37 
STEVEN BLLVINS AND 
DLBRA KAY BLEVINS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, 
INC., FT AL 
Defendants, 
AI1JDAV IT OF AJLTOKNEY'S 
FFFS INCURRED (!f\ \PPFAL 
Case No. 00090607?. 
Incise LA. Dever 
STATE OF UTAH 
COt'iN 1 \ Ob SALJ LAKi 
:ss. 
I, Michael A. Jensen, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
I [ an over the a^3 of twenty-onr vear>, ;m^ I am competent to provide the 
information, under oath, that is contained in diis Affidavit. This information is based on 
my personal knowledge, If called upon to testify in a court of law, I could, and v/onM 
teblifv the suae
 (.LJ 1 hu\ e stated ncrein. 
I am iesal counsel to Defendants in the above-entitled action. 
3. Since the commencement of this action, I have been providing legal services for 
Defendants in connection with all phases of litigation in the above entitled action, including 
on appeal. 
4. Two appeals were commenced, and those appeals were consolidated into a single 
appeal. When the Utah Court of Appeals issued its Memorandum Decision, it omitted any 
reference to attorney fees on appeal. Accordingly, I filed a Petition for Rehearing, and it was 
granted. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals issued an Amended Memorandum Decision in 
which it added a ruling that attorney fees incurred on appeal were appropriate and were to be 
determined by the trial court on remand. 
5. During the period from February 27, 2002 through June 23, 2004,1 personally 
spent 51 hours on the appeals for my clients. My hourly rate during the foregoing period of 
time was $200, for a total billing of $10,200. A copy of my detailed billing records are 
attached hereto. 
6. My activity during the appeals phase of these proceedings included the following: 
a. File two appeals; 
b. Prepare two Docketing Statements; 
c. File a Motion to Consolidate both appeals; 
d. File Motion for Summary Disposition; 
e. Respond to Plaintiffs* Motion to Dismiss Appeal; 
f. Prepare and file Brief; 
g. Prepare Reply Brief based on fallacious statements in Plaintiffs' Brief; 
h. Prepare and file Petition for Rehearing; 
i. Conduct research on all issues for Docketing Statements, Briefs, and Petition 
for Rehearing. 
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I believe that the hourly rate charged by me is reasonable and comparable to 
those charged by other attorneys with similar experience and for similar appeal activities, 
! I I belle" ;,e that the time 1 spent was reasonable under all of the circumstances. 
The legal issues raised were such that reasonable research and writing were required to 
properly present the issues to the Coi irt or Appeals an«l to iDftnd ;i" lin \\ H.ihuifrY 
Motion to Dismiss, .• • 
DATED this I1/1 day oi November du04, 
Michael A. Jensen / / 
On the 19:n day of November 2004, personally appeared before me, 
Michael A. Jensen, the signer of the within Affidavit, who acknowledged to me that he 
did execute the same and that the contents thereof are true, accurate and complete to the 
best of his information and belief, 
Custom\Blcvins3\Jensen Aff4 Fees on Appeal November 19, 2004 
CERTIFICATION 
Case No. 000906072 
Judge L.A. Dever 
STEVEN BLEVINS AND 
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS, Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION, INC., ET AL, Defendants. 
I, Michael A. Jensen, Counsel for Defendants, hereby certify that on this day I 
personally served the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED 
ON APPEAL by personally delivering in open court a copy to: 
Steven B levins 
10758 South 1090 East 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
(801) 571-7601 
DATED this 19m day of November 2004. 
MICHAEL A. JENS 
Custom\Blevins3VJensen Aff4 Fees on Appeal November 19, 2004 
8/9/2004 
8:38 PM 
Michael A. Jensen 
Slip Listing Paqp 
Selection Criteria 
Activity (hand se!ec Include: Appeals 
Slip.Classification Open 
Client (hand select) include Custom^ F l ^ in : 
Slip.Transaction T ; 1 I 
Rate Info - identifies rate source and level 
Slip ID 
Dates and Time 
Posting Status 
Description 
11599 TiME 
2/27/2002 
WIP 
Appeals Activity: draft a 
Apoeal 
11601 TIME 
3/8/2002 
WIP 
Appeals Activity: review 
nd file Notice c r 
• letter from Supr 
User 
Activity 
Client 
Reference 
Jensen 
Appeals 
Custom3 BI- MM » 
Jensen 
Appeals 
Custom3 Blevins 
erne 
Units 
DNB Time 
Est. Time 
Variance 
" 0.50 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.^0 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Rate 
Rate info 
Biil Status 
200.00 
T@1 
200.00 
T@1 
Slip Value 
Court; review Appellate Rules; draft and file 
Certificate That Transcript is Not Required. 
11602 TIME 
3/19/2002 
WIP 
Appeals Activity: draft and file Decreeing 
Statement. 
11603 TiME 
3/19/2002 
WIP 
Appeals Activity: draft diid tile IMcticn for 
Summary Disposition. 
11951 TIME 
5/13/2002 
WIP 
Appeals Activity: telephone call from Court 
of Appeals re possibility of mediation n this 
case. 
Jensen 
Appeals 
Customs Ble/ins 
Jensen 
Appeals 
Custom3 Blevins 
Jensen 
Appeals 
Custom3 Blevins 
3.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
3.90 
0,00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.4(j 
0.00 
0.00 
0 no 
200.00 
T © 1 
200.00 
T@1 
J . 0.00 
T@1 
100.00 
80. 
680.. 
780.C 
80. 
12584 TIME 
9/25/2002 
WIP 
Appeals Activity: receive from Judge Uever 
his denial of Motion to Augment; telcon with 
Clerk of the Supreme Court; draft and file 
Jensen 
Aopeals 
Custom3 Blevins 
1.50 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
200.0C 
T®1 
300. 
8/9/2004 
3:38 PM 
Michael A. Jensen 
Slip Listing Page 2 
SHp ID 
Dates and Time 
Posting Status 
Description 
User 
Activity 
Client 
Reference 
Notice of Appeal on Judge Dever's Order; 
draft and file Motion to Consolidate and for 
New Briefing Schedule. 
12772 TIME 
10/18/2002 
WlP 
Appeals Activity: receive telephone call from 
Court of Appeals; draft and file with 
Supreme Court a Motion to Pour Over. 
12773 TIME 
1V8J2002 
WlP 
Appeals Activity: telephone call from 
Supreme Court re docketing statement; 
receive and review Motion to Dismiss from 
Dunn. 
Units 
DNB Time 
Est Time 
Variance 
Jensen 
Appeals 
Custom3 Blevins 
Jensen 
Appeals 
Custom3 Blevins 
12774 TIME 
11/11/2002 
WlP 
Appeals Activity: draft Docketing Statement 
for second appeal; draft Response to Motion 
h Dismiss. 
12775 TIME 
11/12/2002 
WlP 
Appeals Activity: obtain from trial court a 
cjate-stamped copy of Notice of Appeal. 
12776 TIME 
11/13/2002 
WJP 
Appeals Activity: file Docketing Statement 
3nd Response to Motion to Dismiss; mail 
Same to Dunn. 
Jensen 
Appeals 
Custom3 Blevins 
Jensen 
Appeals 
Custom3 Blevins 
Jensen 
Appeals 
Custom3 Bleyjns 
13513 
1/17/2003 
WlP 
TIME 
Appeals Activity: obtain Indexed Court File. 
Jensen 
Appeals 
Custom3 Blevins 
13214 TIME 
3/20/2003 
WlP 
Appeals Activity: review Rule 22(c); draft 
^nd file Ex Parte Motion for Enlargement of 
Jensen 
Appeals 
Custom3 Blevins 
Rate 
Rate Info 
Bill Status 
Slip Value 
0.50 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.20 
D.DO 
0.00 
0.00 
200.00 
T@1 
200.00 
T@1 
2.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
200.00 
T@1 
200.00 
T@1 
200.00 
T@1 
200.00 
T@1 
200.00 
T@1 
100.00 
40.00 
440.00 
40.00 
40.00 
40.00 
80.00 
8/9/2004 
8:38 PM 
Michael A. Jensen 
Slip Listing P:nV 3 
Slip ID 
Dates and Time 
Posting Status 
Description 
User 
Activity 
Client 
Reference 
Time; ma*! cooy to opposing counsel 
13322 TIME 
3/4/2003 
WIP 
Appeals Activity: continue drafting on Brief; 
review Rules for briefs; review Record and 
select various documents for copies and to 
possibly include in Addendum; discover that 
Record is missing documents fiied after July 
2002; telephone conference with Court of 
Appeals; draft and file Motion to Supplement 
Record and Stay Briefing; return Record to 
Trial Court C'erk. 
Jensen 
Appeals 
Custom3 Blevins 
Units 
DNBTime 
Est. Time 
Variance 
5.80 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Rate 
Rate Info 
Bsli Status 
200.00 
T@1 
Siin1 
1160.00 
14133 TIME 
8/18/2003 
H\P 
Appeals Activity: visit with Clerk or tl 
Appeals Court to check on status of 
Supplemental Index. 
1 -^270 TIME 
9/13/2003 
WIP 
Appeals Activity: work on Brief 
1*1271 T I M E 
9/15/2003 
WIP 
Appeals Act'/ity* work on Brief 
1^289 TiME 
9/19/2003 
WIP 
Appeals Activity: continue VVGTK on Brief, edit 
and revise Brief. 
14290 TiME 
9/21/2003 
WIP 
Appeals Activity, finalize drart of Bne; and 
continue editing and revision process; 
prepare Mdendurns. 
Jensen 
Appeals 
Custom3 Blevins 
Jensen 
Appeals 
Custom3 Blevins 
Jensen 
Appeals 
Custcm3 BIPVTIS 
Jensen 
Appeals 
Customs Rlpvins 
Jensen 
Appeal 
Custom3 Blevins 
0.10 
o.co 
0.00 
0.00 
200.00 
T@1 
20 00 
2.40 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
6.80 
0.00 
0.00 
0 00 
4.60 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
10.20 
0.00 
0.00 
coo 
200,00 
T@1 
200.00 
T@1 
200.00 
T@1 
200.00 
T@1 
480.00 
1360,00 
920.00 
2040.CO 
14291 TiME 
9/22/2003 
WIP 
Appeals Activity: make final edits and 
Jensen 
Appeals 
Customs Pif" ins 
2 70 
0 00 
0 00 
0 00 
200.00 
T@1 
540.00 
8/9/2004 
8:S8 PM 
Michael A. Jensen 
Slip Listing Page 
Slip ID 
Dates and Time 
Posting Status 
Description 
User 
Activity 
Client 
Reference 
revisions in preparation of printing and 
binding; arrange for printing and binding; 
return record to trial court clerk; file Briefs 
with Court of Appeals; mail copies of Briefs 
to Blevins. 
Units Rate 
DNB Time Rate Info 
Est. Time Bill Status 
Variance 
Slip Value 
14484 TIME Jensen 
10/25/2003 Appeals 
WiP Custom3 Blevins 
Appeals Activity: read and review Appellees' 
Brief; research cases cited; draft Reply Brief. 
14523 TIME 
10/30/2003 
WIP 
Appeals Activity: file Reply Brief with Court 
of Appeals. 
Jensen 
Appeals 
Custom3 Blevins 
15598 TIME Jensen 
6/14/2004 Appeals 
WIP Custom3 Blevins 
Appeals Activity: receive and review 
Memorandum Decision from Court of 
Appeals; review Rules on Petition for 
Rehearing; telephone conference with Clerk 
of Court of Appeals re Petition. 
15599 TIME 
6/21/2004 
WIP 
Jensen 
Appeals 
Custom3 Blevins 
Appeals Activity: research other cases 
recently issued by Court; draft Petition for 
Rehearing; arrange for printing. 
156QQ TIME 
6/23/2004 
WiP 
Appeals Activity: file with Court of Appeals 
tne Petition for Rehearing, including all 
copies; mail copies to Blevins. 
Jensen 
Appeals 
Custom3 Blevins 
2.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.30 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
200.00 
T@1 
2QO.Q0 
T@1 
200.00 
T@1 
440.00 
1.50 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
200.00 
T@1 
200.00 
T@1 
4Q.0Q 
60.00 
300.00 
40.00 
Grand Total 
Billable 
Unomable 
Total 
51.00 
0.00 
51.00 
10200.00 
0.00 
10200.00 
http://16S.17/.21! .52/cascsoarclii/CabcScaroh?acUuu=-o... 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEBRA KAY BLEVINS vs. JOHN DOES I-X 
CASE NUMBER 000906072 Contracts 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
L A DEVER 
PARTIES 
Plain:irr STEVrtl (, FEBRA BLEVINS 
SANDY, UT 84 0 94 
Plaintiff - DEBRA KAY BLEVINS 
Sandy, UT 84G94 
Defendant - CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION INC 
Defendant - CONTRACTING FABRICATION 
Defendant: - RANDY ISAACSON 
SLC, UT 84107 
Defendant - LINDA I ISAACSON 
SLC, UT 84107 
Defendan ^,1^. b u n h 
Defendant - JASON BISHOP 
SLC, UT 84107 
Defendant - WENDY GARAMSNBI 
SLC, UT 84107 
Represented by: MICHAEL A JENSEN 
Defendant - MARK CARAMENDI 
Defendant: TORN DOES I-X 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due; 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 
Balance: 
BAIL/CASH BONDS Posted: 
AcDlied: 
431.50 
481.50 
0.00 
3, 00 
6,350.00 
0 . 01 
Printed: 12/04/04 11:28:15 Paae 1 
i i > 
http://168.177.211 52/cascsearch/CaseScarch?actioiv 
CASE NUMBER 000906072 Contracts 
Forfeited: 
Balance: 
TALS Trust Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 
Trust Balance Due: 
Balance Payable: 
6, 
6 
6, 
350 
0 
350 
350 
0 
0 
0 
00 
00 
00 
00 
0 0 
0 0 
.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT 2K-10K 
Amount Due 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit 
Balance 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
FEE 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL 
Amount Due 
Amount Paid 
Amount Credit 
Balance 
80.00 
8 0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.00 
0.00 
190.00 
190.00 
0.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: GARNISHMENT 
Amount Due: 20.00 
Amount Paid: 20.00 
Amount Credit; Q.Q0 
Balance: 0.00 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
190.00 
190.00 
0.03 
0.00 
0.50 
0.50 
0.00 
0.00 
BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE: CASH BOND: Appeals 
Posted By: MICHAEL A JENSEN 
Posted: 300.00 
Printed: 12/04/04 11:28:26 
CASE NUMBER 000906072 Contracts 
Page 2 
http //16S P c2 uiseseaiai Cabeoeaich action=c. 
BAIL/CASK BOND DETAI 
Forfeited: 
Refunded: 
Balance: 
JET L - TY 
Posted 3y 
Posted. 
Forfeited: 
Refunded: 
Balance. 
PE: 
S' 
CASI-
0, 
300. 
0 
,00 
.00 
00 
I BOND- Civ: 
IEVEN & DEBRA 
6, 
6, 
050 
0 
050 
0 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.03 
.1 
BLEV: 
11 X 
INS 
TRUST DETAIL 
Trast Description: Bail/Bond kerand 
Recipient: MICHAEL A JENSEN 
Amount Due: 6,050.00 
Paid In: 6,050.00 
Paid Out. 6,05 0 00 
TRUST DETAIL 
Trust Description: Bail/Bend Reiund 
Recipient: MICHAEL A JENSEN 
Amount Due: 3 0 0.00 
Paid In: 300.00 
Paid Cut: 300 CO 
CASE NOTE 
PROCEEDINGS 
0 8 - 0 3 
0 8 - 0 3 
0 8 - 0 3 
0 8 - 0 3 
0 8 - 0 3 
-00 Case filed by mckaem 
-00 Judge DEVER assigned. 
-00 Filed: Complaint 2K-10K 
-00 Fee Account created 
•00 COMPLAINT 2K-10K Payment Received. J] Z 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT 2K-10K 
10-20-00 Filed: Motion to dismiss, to strike or for more definite 
statement 
10-2 0-00 Filed: memorandum in support of motions 
02-06-01 Filed: motion for partial summary judgment en the first cause 
cf action 
02-06-01 Filed, memorandum in support cf mcnicn fcr partial summary 
judgment on the first cause of action 
02-06-01 Filed: affidavit of atty Richard W. Perkins 
02-06-01 Filed: Notice to submit for decision on 1. Motion to dismiss 2. 
Motion to strike; and 3. Motion for a more definite statement 
02-21-01 Filed: Statement of Non-Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs first cause of action 
onlv 
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02-21-01 Filed. Statement of Non-Opposition to Defendants' motion for 
partial simmary judgment on plaintiffs' first cause of action 
only 
02-22-01 Filed, Notice to Submit: for Decision on Motion for Partial 
http://168.I77.2P 52/casesearch/CaseSearch?actioiv 
Summary Judgment on the First Cause of Action 
04-09-01 Minute Entry - MINUTE ENTRY 
Judge: L. A. DEVER 
Clerk: rayd 
Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss; Motion to Strike, Motion for a More 
Definite Statement and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment came 
before the Court pursuant to U.R.C.P. Pules 12-13, and Rule 4-501of 
the UCJA, Having read the motions and the memoranda filed 
therewith, the Court enters the following ruling: Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendants Custdm 
Steel Fabrication, Inc, Mark Garamendi, and Heidi Eishop is 
GRANTED. As to the Motions to Strike and for a More Definite 
Statement, Defendants' concerns expressed in the Memorandum in 
Support have been considered, and although unopposed, these Motions 
seek relief in the form of information which can be obtained 
through discovery, and are hereby DENIED. As there is no objection 
to Defendants1 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, it is hereby 
GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action is Dismissed. 
Attorney for Defendant to Prepare an Order Consistent with this 
Minute Entry. 
Judge L. A. DEVER 
04-11-01 Filed: notice of change of address 
04-11-01 Filed: motion for attorney fees 
04-11-01 Filed: memorandum in support of motion for attorney fees 
04-11-01 Filed: affidavit of attorney's fees (Michael A. Jensen) 
04-12-01 Filed: motion for scheduling conference and scheduling order 
04-12-01 Filed: certificate of service 
04-12-01 Filed: Answer 
RANDY ISAACSON 
LINDA I ISAACSON 
WENDY GARAMENDI 
04-20-01 Filed: objection to form of order 
04-23-01 Filed: deft's objection to plf's objection to form of order 
04-23-01 Filed: amended motion for atty fees 
04-23-01 Filed: amended affidavit of atty fees (Michael A. Jensen) 
04-23-01 Filed: ex parte motion for enlargement of time for response 
04-23-01 Filed: memorandum of points and authorities in saupport of 
deft's ex parte motion for enlargement of time 
04-23-01 Filed: affidavit of counsel in support of plf's motion for 
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enlargement of time 
04-23-01 Filed order: Order Granting Enlargement of Time 
Judge shenriod 
Signed April 23, 2001 
04-27-01 Filed:- motion to reinstate claims 
04-27-01 Filed: memorandum of points and authorities in support of 
defts' motion to reinstate claims 
04-30-01 Filed: response to objection to objection to form of order, 
http://163.177.2U 52/casesearcliCaseScarch?action=c... 
response to motion to assess fees, objection to second form of 
order and reply in support of objection to form of order 
05-02-01 Filed order: Order and Judgment on partial dismissal and on 
partial summary judgment 
Judge ldever 
Signed May 02, 2CC1 
G5-0--J- Ldse Disposition is Dismsd w/ prejudice debbiep 
Disposition Judge is L A DEVER debbiep 
05-03-01 Filed: certificate of service of response to defendants' 
initial discovery requests 
05-07-01 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decisiono CD'jections co Form cf 
Order 
05-07-01 Filed: Defendant's Memorandam in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Rule 
59 Motion to Reinstate Claims 
05-07-01 Filed: Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Objections to 
Amended Form of Order and To Motion to Assess Fees 
05-07-31 Filed: Second Amended Motion for Attorney Fees 
05-07-01 Filed: Second Amended affidavit of attorney's fees (Michael A. 
Jensen) 
05-14-01 Filed: reply memorandum m supporc of irccicn cc reinstate 
claims 
05-14-01 Filed: notice to submit: motion to reinstate claims 
05-18-01 Filed: response to second amended motion for fees 
05-13-01 Minute Entry - DEFT'S 2ND AMENDED MOTION FOR ATTY FEES 
Judge: L. A. DEVER 
Clerk: debbiep 
On order of Judge Dever, Deft's second amended motion for atty fees 
is granted. Deft's motion for atty fees is granted in the sum of 
$1330.00. c/o atty for deft to prepare order for the court to sign. 
Clerk sent a copy of this decision to all parties by mail. 
05-21-Dl Filed: deft's reply memorandum in support of their second 
amended motion for atty fees 
05-22-01 Filed: certificate of service o: pl^'c mil „ai discovery 
requests 
05-24-21 Filed: deft's Mot: on tor pn'"ial Summary Judgment: on the second 
cause of action 
35-24-01 Filed: deft's memorandum in support cf Motion for partial 
Summary Judgment on the second cause of action 
05-24-01 Filed: response to motion for partial summary judgment 
Re:second cause of action 
35-30-01 Filed: deft's reply memorandum in support of motion for partial 
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summary judgment on the second cause cf action 
05-30-G1 Filed: notice to submit for decision 
05-30-01 Filed: Defendants' reply memorandum in support cf notion "~ * 
partial summary judgment on second cause of action 
05-31-31 Note: Per phone call from Atty Mike Jensen, clerk set tnis case 
for a telephone scheduling conference en 6/20/2001 at 9:00 a.m. 
Notices mailed to both attorneys 
05-31-31 TELEPHONE SCHEDULING CONF. scheduled on June 20, 2001 ac 09:00 
AM in Third Floor - W3 7 with Judge DEVER. 
05-31-01 Notice - NOTICE for Case 000906072 ID 85039-
TELEPHONE SCHEDULING CONF. is scheduled 
Date: 06/20/2001 
http://l 68.177.211 ^2/casesearch/CaseSearch?action= 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W37 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: L. A. DEVER 
**This case is set for a TELEPHONE SCHEDULING CONFERENCE** per 
Motion filed on 4/12/2001** 
06-20-01 Minute Entry - Minutes for TELEPHONE SCHEDULING CONF. 
Judge: L. A. DEVER 
Clerk: kathrynb 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): RONALD L DUNN 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MICHAEL A JENSEN 
Video 
Tape Number: OFF TAPE 
HEARING 
The Court sets cut-off dates: 
Discovery is due by 8/15/2001 
Motions are due by 8/31/2001 
Depositive Motions are due by 9/14/2001 
06-27-01 Filed: Certificate of Service 
07-12-01 Filed: certificate of service of deft'a second discovery 
requests 
08-15-01 Filed: certificate of service of response to Defendant's second 
discovery requests 
08-20-01 Filed: Motion for partial Summary Judgment 
08-20-01 Filed: memorandum in support of Plfs Motion for partial 
Summary Judgment 
08-20-01 Filed: affidavit in support of plfs Motion for partial Summary 
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Judgment 
08-29-01 Filed: Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on the 
Third and Fourth Causes of Action (Hearing Requested) 
08-29-01 Filed: Defendant's memorandum in support of motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on the Third and Fourth Causes of Action 
08-30-01 Filed: Defendant's motion to strike Hearsay Testimony of Steven 
Blevins, (Hearing Requested) 
08-30-01 Filed: Defendant's memorandum in support of motion to strike 
Hearsay Testimony of Steven Blevins (hearing requested) 
08-31-01 Filed: Defendants' memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs' 
motion for partial summary judgment on the Third Cause of 
Action 
09-06-01 MOT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT scheduled on October 30, 2001 at 02:00 
PM in Third Floor - S35 with Judge DEVER. 
09-06-01 Notice - NOTICE for Case 000906072 ID 914384 
MOT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT is scheduled. ~ll,J 
http://168.177.211 52/casesearch/CaseSearch?action=c.. 
Date: 10/30/2001 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S35 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: L. A. DEVER 
The foregoing dates should be considered firm settings and will not 
be modified without court order, and then only upon a showing of 
manifest injustice. Counsel ar% iskpfcructed to stay in contact with 
the Clerk as the trial date approaches regarding dates. 
**This hearing is for arguments on deft's motion for partial 
Summary Judgment on the 2nd Cause of Action** 
09-06-01 Filed: Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiff's notice to 
submit for decision on un-responded motion 
09-13-01 Filed: response to deft's motion to strike Paragraph 13 of 
affidavit of Steven Blevins 
09-13-01 Filed: reply memorandum in support of plf's motion for partial 
summary judgment 
09-14-01 Filed: response to Defendants' motion for motion for partial 
summary judgment 
09-21-01 Filed: Notice to submit for decision on deft's Motion for 
Partial summary Judgment on the third and fourth causes of 
action 
09-21-01 Filed: deft's reply memorandum in support of Motion to Strike 
hearsay testimony of Steven Blevins 
09-21-01 Filed: notice to submit for decision on deft's Motion for 
Motion to strike hearsay testimony of Steven Blevins 
09-21-01 Filed: request for hearing on all pending motions 
09-21-01 Filed: deft's reply memorandum in support of Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on the third and fourth causes of action 
Printed: 12/04/04 11:28:34 Page 7 
CASE NUMBER 000906072 Contracts 
09-27-01 Filed: notice to submit for decision on Defendants' motion to 
strike Plaintiff's notice to submit for decision on 
un-responded motion 
10-16-01 Notice - NOTICE for Case 000906072 ID 939844 
MOT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Date: 11/30/2001 
Time: 11:15 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S35 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
B'efore Judge: L. A. DEVER 
The reason for the change is On court's own motion 
**This case has been Rescheduled due to a high profile case which 
takes precedence** 
10-16-01 MOT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT scheduled on November 30, 2001 at 
11:15 AM in Third Floor - S35 with Judge DEVER. 
10-17-01 Filed: Notice of hearing 
10-29-01 Filed: Motion for continuance of or rescheduling hearing 
11-09-01 Filed: reply affidavit in support of Plf's Motion for Partial 
*1ln 
http.//I68.177.211 52/casescarch/CaseSearch?action= 
Summary Judgment 
11-13-01 Note: LAD/KB Atty Michael Jensen appeared and stated that his 
Motion for Continuance may be cancelled. Nov, 30, 2001 at 
11:15 a.m. will be fine with him. He will file a motion to 
withdraw the motion. 
11-13-01 Filed: Withdrawal of Motion for Continuance 
11-19-01 Filed: Defts' amended motion to strike hearsay testimony of 
Steven Blevms 
11-19-01 Filed: Amended withdrawal of motion foe continuance 
11-28-01 Filed: notice of automatic stay 
11-30-01 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Judge: L A DEVER 
Clerk: kathrynb 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): RONALD L DUNN 
Defendant's Attorney (s) : MICHAEL A JENSEN 
Video 
Tape Number: 11/3 0/2001 Tape Count: 11:25:52 
HEARING 
This case came before the Court on Defense Motions for Summary 
Judgment on 2nd Cause of Action 
The Court heard from Atty Dunn and Atty Jensen regarding issues 
that need to be addressed today. 
The Court finds that the only issue pending are cross-motions for 
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Summary Judgment on 3rd Cause of Action and Motion to Strike 
The Court heard oral arguments from Atty Ronald Dunn for the 
Plaintiff and Atty Jensen for the Defendant. 
The Court Rules: No Claim for offset 
Further arguments heard 
The Court rules that Good Faith and Fair Dealing are dismissed, 
reasonable attorney fees are awarded. 
12-07-01 Filed: Affidavit of Attorney's Fees (Michael A. Jensen) 
12-19-01 Filed: affidavit of R. Brent Stephens 
12-19-01 Filed: objection to proposed order and objection to atty's fees 
and demand for evidentiary hearing 
12-26-01 Filed: Amended Affidavit of Attorney's Fees (Michael A. Jensen) 
12-26-01 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision on Defendants' Order and 
Judgment and Affidavit of Attorney Fees 
12-26-01 Filed: Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Objections to 
Attorney Fees 
01-17-02 Minute Entry - RULING ON DEFENDANTS' ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Judge: L A DEVER 
Clerk: kathrynb 
The Court denies Defendant's Order and Judgment and Affidavit of 
Attorney Fees. No original documents on the Judgment or Affidavits 
on Attorneys Fees have been submitted to the Court. 
02-01-02 Filed order: FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Judge ldever 11*5 
http://168.177.2il 52/cascsearch/CaseSearch?actiou= 
Signed February 01, 2002 
02-01-02 Note: Clerk entered certificate of mailing 
02-04-02 Fee Account created Total Due: 1.00 
02-04-02 COPY FEE Payment Received: 1.00 
02-05-02 Filed: Judgment Information Sheet @J 
02-05-02 Issued: Supplemental Order 
Judge L A DEVER 
Hearing Date: March 05, 2002 Time: 14:00 
02-12-02 Judgment #1 Entered 
Creditor: CONTRACTING FABRICATION 
Creditor: CUSTOM STEEL FABRICATION INC 
Debtor: STEVEN & DEBRA BLEVINS 
Debtor: DEBRA KAY BLEVINS 
Creditor: HEIDI BISHOP 
Creditor: JASON BISHOP 
Creditor: LINDA I ISAACSON 
Creditor: MARK GARAMENDI 
Creditor: RANDY ISAACSON 
Creditor: WENDY GARAMENDI 
6,050.00 Attorneys Fee's 
6,050.00 Judgment Grand Total 
02-12-02 Filed judgment: Final Order and Judgment @J 
Judge Idever 
Signed February 01, 2002 
02-27-02 Filed: Notice of Appeal 
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02-27-02 Fee Account created Total Due: 190.00 
02-27-02 APPEAL Payment Received: 190.00 
Note: Code Description: APPEAL 
02-2 8-02 Note: Cert, copy of Notice of Appeal forwarded to Supreme Court 
03-01-02 Bond Account created Total Due: 300.00 
03-01-02 Bond Posted Payment Received: 300.00 
03-08-02 Filed return: Supp Order on return 
Party Served 
Service Type 
Service Date 
BLEVINS, STEVEN 
Personal 
March 04, 2002 
03-08-02 Filed: certificate that transcript is not required 
03-12-02 SUPP ORDER scheduled on March 19, 2002 at 02:00 PM in Third 
Floor - W3 2 with Judge DEVER. 
03-18-02 SUPP ORDER rescheduled on March 28, 2002 at 02:00 PM 
Reason: Plaintiff requested continuance. 
03-26-02 SUPP ORDER scheduled on April 02, 2002 at 02:00 PM in Third 
Floor - W3 2 with Judge DEVER. 
03-29-02 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Quash 
Supplemental Order - Hearing and Expedited Disposition 
Requested 
03-29-02 Filed: Certificate of Service 
04-01-02 Filed: Motion to Quash Supplemental Order and Memorandum in 
Support Thereof 
04-02-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for Supplemental Order 
Judge: L A DEVER 
Clerk: janetr 
PRESENT 
http://168.177.211 S2/casesearch/CaseSearch?action= 
P l a i n t i f f ' s A t t o r n e y ( s ) 
D e f e n d a n t ' s A t t o r n e y ( s ) 
V i d e o 
RONALD L DUNN 
MICHAEL A JENSEN 
HEARING 
Attys for both parties present. Supp order was heard before Judge 
Medley. Judge Medley orders Bail set at $200/ however, execution 
is stayed pending resolution before Judge Dever. Atty Michael 
Jensen will prepare the order. 
04-03-02 Filed: certificate of service of Plaintiff's initial discovery 
requests (post-judgment) 
04-04-02 Issued: Garnishment (us bank) filed non-wage application 
04-04-02 Fee Account created Total Due: 20.00 
04-04-02 GARNISHMENT Payment Received: 20.00 
Note: Code Description: GARNISHMENT 
04-05-02 Filed: Notice of hearing on plf's motion to quash supplemental 
proceedings 
04-05-02 Filed: deft's motion for protective order 
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2002 at 10:45 
,00 
6,050.00 
Time: 02:00 
04-05-02 Filed: deft's memorandum in support of their motion for 
protective order 
04-05-02 Note: LAD/KB Per phone call from Atty Michael Lewis, clerk 
cleared date of 4/12/2002 at 10:45 am for the expedited 
hearing. Atty Lewis will send notices. 
04-05-02 MOTION TO QUASH SUP ORDER scheduled on April 12, 
AM in Third Floor - S35 with Judge DEVER. 
04-11-02 Bond Account created Total Due: 6050. 
04-11-02 Bond Posted Payment Received: 
04-11-02 Issued: $200 Bench Warrant 
Clerk karries 
04-12-02 Issued: Supplemental Order 
Judge L A DEVER 
Hearing Date: May 07, 2002 
04-12-02 Filed: Motion to Augment Judgment 
04-12-02 Filed: First Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs Relating to 
the Collection of Judgment 
04-12-02 Filed order: ORDER FORFEITING BOND 
Judge Idever 
Signed April 12, 2002 
04-12-02 Filed: answer of garnishee (no funds) 
04-12-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION TO QUASH SUP ORDER 
Judge: L A DEVER 
Clerk: kathrynb 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): RONALD L DUNN 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MICHAEL A JENSEN 
Video 
Tape Number: 4/12/2002 Tape Count: 10:47:06 
~YT 
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HEARING 
Atty Dunn reports that the Bankrupcy filed was dismissed Wednesday 
of this week. Plaintiff's Motion, therefore, is moot. 
A Notice of Appeal was filed yesterday and Atty believes that the 
Appeal was not filed in good faith. 
The Court heard arguments from both counsel regarding the 
supercedious bond. 
After hearing arguments of counsel and referring to the applicable 
Rules, the Court finds in favor of Defense. 
The Court denies request of Atty Dunn representing the Plaintiffs. 
The Court enters Order Forfeiting Bond. 
04-16-02 Filed return: Writ of Garnishment (not for garnishment of 
earnings for personal services or wages) 
Party Served: Stephanie Alfrey, authorized employ 
Service Type: Personal 
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Service Date: April 05, 2002 
04-22-02 Filed: withdrawal of post-judgment discovery requests 
04-23-02 Filed: Letter from Supreme Court - Order - Case transferred to 
Court of Appeals 
04-25-02 Filed: Letter from Court of Appeals - Case assigned to Court of 
Appeals - Cca#20020177-ca 
04-30-02 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision 
05-01-02 Trust Account created Total Due: 6050.00 
05-01-02 Bond Transfer/Refund Payment Received: -6,050.00 
05-01-02 Bail/Bond Refund Payment Received: 6,050.00 
05-01-02 Note: 
05-01-02 Bail/Bond Refund Check # 25290 Trust Payout: 6,050.00 
05-03-02 Filed: Response to deft's Motion re late-filed response 
05-03-02 Filed: objection to form as order and notice to submit re: 
Defendant's motion to augment judgment 
05-07-02 Filed: response to plfs' objections to form of order 
05-08-02 Note: **JUDGE DEVER DENIED SIGNING THE FIRST ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
TO AUGMENT ORIGINAL JUDGMENT SUBMITTED BY ATTY MICHAEL JENSEN** 
05-14-02 Filed: Indexed: Cert/Copy of Index sent to Court of Appeals -
Coa#20020177-ca 
05-15-02 Note: Record: Files-2 sent up to Court of Appeals -
Coa#20020177-ca 
05-2 9-02 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash and Request for 
Hearing (Copy) 
05-30-02 Filed: Motion to Quash Bench Warrant (Copy) 
06-03-02 Filed return: Bench Warrant on return 
Party Served: BLEVINS, STEVEN 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: May 24, 2002 
06-03-02 BENCH WARRANT scheduled on June 04, 2002 at 02:00 PM in Third 
Floor - W3 2 with Judge DEVER. 
06-04-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law & Motion 
Judge: L A DEVER 
Clerk: janetr 
PRESENT 
http://168.177.21] 52/casescarch/CaseSearch?action= 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MICHAEL A JENSEN 
HEARING 
Pla present, Def not present. Court orders a $3 00 Bench Warrant 
to be issued. 
06-12-02 Filed; defts' memorandum in opposition to plfs' motion to quash 
06-12-02 Filed: Notice to submit Motion to Quash 
06-12-02 Filed: reply memorandum in support of Motion to quash Bench 
Warrant 
06-13-02 Minute Entry - MOTION TO QUASH BENCH WARRANT 
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Judge: L A DEVER 
Clerk: darlac 
The Plaintiff's motion to Quash Bench Warrant is granted. Attorney 
for Plaintiff to prepare order. 
Judge L A DEVER 
07-09-02 Filed order: Order quashing Bench Warrant 
Judge Idever 
Signed July 08, 2002 
08-20-02 Note: Files returned to 3rd District Appeals for Sup. Index - 2 
volumes 
08-26-02 Note: Supplemental Index done - cert, copy forwarded to Court 
of Appeals 
09-23-02 Filed order: Denial of first Order and Judgment to augment 
original judgment 
Judge Idever 
Signed September 22, 2002 
09-25-02 Filed: Notice of Appeal 
09-25-02 Fee Account created Total Due: 190.00 
09-25-02 APPEAL Payment Received: 190.00 
Note: Code Description: APPEAL 
10-01-02 Note: Cert/copy of Notice of Appeal on Post-Judgment Order 
forwarded to Supreme Court 
10-07-02 Note: Cert, copy of Notice of Appeal (2nd NOA; filed 02/27/02) 
forwarded to Supreme Court 
10-16-02 Filed: Supreme Court letter to Michael A. Jensen (SC # 
20020824-SC) - Appeal received by Supreme Court 
10-18-02 £iled: Certificate that Transcript is Not Required 
10-18-02 Note; Cert, copy of Certificate that Transcript is Not Required 
forwarded to Supreme Court 
12-11-02 Filed: Letter from Supreme Court - Order - Case transferred to 
Supreme Court 
12-17-02 Filed: Court of Appeals letter to Michael A. Jensen (COA # 
20020824-CA) - case assigned to Court of Appeals 
12-23-02 Filed: Court of Appeals Order (COA # 20020177) - motion to 
consolidate granted. Cases will now be consolidated under COA 
"l-i-
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# 20020177-CA 
03-19-03 Filed: Notice of withdrawal of counsel 
03-20-03 Filed: Notice of withdrawal of counsel 
03-25-03 Filed. Letter from Court of Appeals - Coa#20020177-ca - Ordei 
07-21-03 Note. 2nd Supplemental Index. Cert/Copy of 2nd Suppl Index 
sent to Court of Appeals - Coa#20020177-ca 
07-28-03 Filed: Order signed by Judge Thorne from Court of Appeals 
12-30-03 Note: Record forwarded to Court of Appeals. 2 files 
10-07-04 Note: Remittitur: reversed & remanded. 2 files returned. 
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Remittitur forwarded to Dave Shewell. 
10-07-04 Filed: Remittitur - remanded @J 
10-08-04 Filed: verified bill of costs 
10-08-04 Filed: Request for scheduling conference 
10-15-04 Notice - NOTICE for Case 000906072 ID 6086705 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 11/12/2004 
Time: 09:15 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S35 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: L A DEVER 
10-15-04 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE scheduled on November 12, 2004 at 09:15 
AM m Third Floor - S35 with Judge DEVER. 
10-18-04 Filed: Motion to Reset Date for Scheduling Conference 
10-19-04 Filed order: Order on Motion to reset date for Scheduling 
Conference 
Judge Idever 
Signed October 19, 2004 
10-19-04 Notice - NOTICE for Case 000906072 ID 6089769 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE. 
Date- 11/19/2004 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - S35 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: L A DEVER 
The reason for the change is ATD requested continuance. 
10-19-04 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE scheduled on November 19, 2004 at 09:00 
AM in Third Floor - S35 with Judge DEVER, 
10-21-04 Filed: Ob]ection to Request for Judgment for Verified Bil of 
Costs 
10-22-04 Note **Order is not signed-Counsel to wait for hearing on 
il/19/04** 
10-27-04 Fee Account created Total Due: 0.50 
10-27-04 COPY FEE Payment Received: 0.50 
Note: 1.00 cash tendered. 
11-19-04 Minute Entry - Minutes for SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
Judge: L A DEVER 
Clerk: rhondam 
PRESENT 
http://168.177.2U ^2/casesearch/CaseSearch?action= 
Plaintiff(s); STEVEN & DEBRA BLEVINS 
Defendant's Attorney (s) ; MICHAEL A JENSEN 
Video 
Tape Number: Disk 012 Tape Count: 9:03-9:13 
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HEARING 
This case is before the Court for a Scheduling Conference. 
Attorney for the defendant addresses the Court with issues that are 
pending on this case. The Court finds their are no facts to this 
case and directs defendants attorney to submit a memorandum. 
The Memmorandum brief to be submitted within 3 weeks. At that 
time plaintiff is to respond to defendant's memorandum within 10 
days. When ready to review a notice to submit is to be filed for 
the court to rule. Bill of costs stayed till decision. 
Court will sign order to release appeals bond in this case. 
11-19-04 Filed order: Order to Refund Appeals Bond 
Judge Idever 
Signed November 19, 2004 
11-19-04 Filed: Affidavit of Attorney's Fees Incurred on Appeal 
11-19-04 Trust Account created Total Due: 300.00 
11-19-04 Bond Transfer/Refund Payment Received: -300.00 
11-19-04 Bail/Bond Refund Payment Received: 300.00 
11-23-04 Bail/Bond Refund Check # 34346 Trust Payout: 300.00 
11-23-04 Filed: Check #0034346 for $300.00 mailed to Michael A. Jensen, 
136 south main St. PO BOX 571708 St 430 SALT LAKE CITY, UT 
84157-1708 
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